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RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse examine la dynamique de la réforme politique au Canada ainsi que la
gestion de sa diversité ethnoculturelle. Elle questionne les particularités des changements
aux programmes multiculturels fédéraux et comment ceux-ci sont potentiellement perçus
durant une période de réforme institutionnelle. Cette thèse offre, en réponse, l’argument
que les institutions publiques servent de véhicule pour ajuster les définitions d’intégration
et pour diriger notre compréhension de la notion de notre responsabilité sociale en tant
que citoyen et citoyenne. Cette perspective s’attarde plus particulièrement sur le rôle des
idées comme déterminant important dans la décision politique. Elle souligne, dans cet
optique, les deux rôles de la politique canadienne sur le plan institutionnel : celui de
médiateur ou facteur d’influence face aux questions d’intérêts politiques et celui
d’organisateur d’idées. À partir de ces prémices, au lieu de traiter les idées et les intérêts
comme deux notions distinctes, nous explorons comment ces deux notions interagissent
dans un contexte institutionnel afin d’expliquer les changements politiques et la
continuité.
Notre étude identifie trois périodes de changement de régime : les années 70, les
années $0 et les années 90. Dans chacune de ces trois décennies, les débats et luttes au
sein du gouvernement canadien ont donné lieu à d’importants ajustements et pratiques
institutionnels. Ces événements sont analysés comme des cas d’apprentissage politique où
l’état génère une nouvelle compréhension des problèmes et des ressources mobilisées
pour l’administration. Tout au cours de ces trois périodes, nous voyons une continuité
évidente dans le rôle focal des joueurs gouvernementaux dans l’établissement des termes
et définitions d’une intégration ethnoculturelle. Cependant, vers le milieu des années $0,
111
le consensus entre plusieurs de ces acteurs s’est dégradé. Plutôt, on posait des questions
concernant les demandes potentiellement déstabilisantes envers les droits de
représentation et d’ethnoculturalisme dans des sociétés multinationales. Durant les années
90, un certain consensus intellectuel sous la forme d’un néolibéralisme jumelé à un
mouvement critique croissant vis-à-vis du multiculturalisme comme conséquence du
débat de l’unité nationale, ont incité le gouvernement à établir un nouveau modèle
politique.
Mots clés: multiculturalisme; diversité ethnoculturelle; citoyenneté; néolibéralisme;
unité nationale; institutionnalisme historique
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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the dynamics ofpolicy reform and the management of
etbnocultural diversity in Canada. It asks how changes to the Govemment of Canad&s
multiculturalism program can be understood throughout periods of institutional reform
and program rationalisation. In offering an answer, this thesis argues that public
institutions serve as a vehicle for adjusting the terms of integration as well as contributing
to our understanding ofcitizenship. This perspective pays particular attention to the role
of ideas as an important determinant in policy making. At the same time, it highuights the
institutional setting of Canadian politics that mediates conflicting interests and structures
the flow of ideas. As such, rather than treating ideas and interests as separate and
unrelated variables, this thesis explores how the two interact within an institutional
context to explain both policy change and continuity.
Our analysis is primarily policy centred, looking at the relationship between state
and society to grasp the historical and organisational factors that shape policy decisions.
In our examination of multiculturalism we identify three periods ofpolicy change: the
1970s, the 19$Os, and the 1990s. In each ofthese decades the debates and struggies in the
Canadian polity resulted in significant institutional adjustments and practices. These
events are analyzed as instances of policy leaming, wherein the state generated new
understanding of problems and mobilized resources for administration. Across three
decades of change, we find substantial continuity in the central role played by state actors
in establishing the terms of ethnocultural integration. However, by the mid 1 9$Os the
consensus among many ofthese same state actors had broken down. In its place,
questions arose about the potentially destabilizing demands for ethnocultural and
V
representation rights in multinational societies. We find these concems to have served as
vital adjuncts in the wider debate over state support for cultural diversity. By the 1990s,
sufficient intellectual consensus in the form of neo-liberalism coupled with the growing
criticism towards multiculturalism as a consequence of the national unity debate guided
state action towards a new policy model.
Keywords: multiculturalism; ethnocultural diversity; citizenship; neo-liberalism;
national lmity; historical-institutionalism
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CHAPTER 1
Managing Diversity: Institutions, Ideas and Public Agendas
Introduction
Many countries in the world today share a concem about social cohesion and the
ways that diverse communities live together. Occasionally there is fear that heterogeneity
will produce intractable problems and that the institutional practices designed to mitigate
them may only exacerbate difficulties.1 Conversely, there is also the awareness that
public institutions are key to conflict management and that an appropriate response to
dïversity can contribute to increased social cohesion through recognition practices and by
promoting feelings of belonging.2 Given such conificting views, finding morally
defensible and politically viable answers to the issues (or) concems to which diversity
gives rise is one ofthe greatest challenges facing democracies.3 Doing so goes well
beyond a philosophical task. It also requires serious analytic attention to what institutions
do, can do, and might do.
‘for a discussion of this prospect see Keith Banting and Will Kymiicka, eds. Multiculturalism and the
Weifare State Recognition and Redistribution in Conternporaiy Democracies (London: OUP, 2006); and
Avigail Eisenberg, “Equality, Trust, and Multiculturalism,” in Social Capital Diversity and the Wefare
State, eds. fiona M. Kay and Richard Johnston (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Neil J. Smelser and Jeffrey
C. Alexander, eds. Diversity and Its Discontents: Cultural Conflict and Common Ground in Contemporary
American Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Ayelet Shachar, “On Citizenship and
Multicultural Vulnerability,” Political Theory 28 (2000): 64-89.
2 See, for example, Siobhan Harty and Michael Murphy, ‘Multinational Citizenship: Practical Implications
ofa Theoretical Model,” in Law and Citizenshz, ed. Law Commission of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2006); Policy Research Initiative, “Immigration and Social Cohesion,” Horizons, Volume 5, Number 2,
(Ottawa: Public Works and Govemment Services Canada, 2002); Peter Berger, ed., The Limits ofSocial
Cohesion: Conflicts and Mediation in PluraÏist Societies (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998); and Jane Jenson,
“Mapping Social Cohesion: The State ofCanadian Research,” Canadian PoÏicy Research Networks, Study
No. f\03, 1998. In this last contribution the author suggests that the term social cohesion “is used to
describe a process more than a condition or end state, while it is seen as involving a sense ofcommitment,
and a desire or capacity to live together in some harmony”, (Executive Summary, y).
See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenshtp: A Liberal Theoîy ofMinority Rights (London: OUP, 1995).
1
2This thesis explores the dynamics ofpolicy reform and the management of
ethnocultural diversity in Canada. It asks how changes to the Govemment of Canada’s
multiculturalism program can be understood throughout periods of institutional reform
and program rationalisation. In offering an answer, this thesis argues that public
institutions serve as a vehicle for adjusting the terms of integration as well as contributing
to our understanding of citizenship. This perspective pays particular attention to the role
of ideas as an important determinant in policy making. At the same time, il highuights the
institutional setting of Canadian politics that mediates conflicting interests and structures
the flow of ideas. As such, rather than treating ideas and interests as separate and
unrelated variables, this thesis explores how the two interact within an institutional
context to explain both policy change and continuity.4
During penods of contestation policy disputes are ofien marked by conflicting
ideas about change derived from fundamental beliefs about politics and economics. These
political and economic belief systems can redefine goals and offer prescriptions to
individuals and groups seeking direction. In these terms, ideas help people to understand,
define and formulate policy responses. Yet policy outcomes are the product ofa more
complex logic than the mechanical supplanting of one set of ideas by another. Ideas
interact within specific institutional contexts to produce change. Policy outcomes and
periods of contestation are also explained in this thesis by a range of causal factors that
interact with ideas, including the organisation of political interests and influences of the
socio-economic environment.
4A useful reflection on the relationship between ideas, interests, and institutions can be found in Bruno
Palier et Yves Surel c< Les “trois I” et l’analyse de 1’Etat en action », Revue Française de Science Politique,
vol 55, no 1, 2005; and John L. Campbell, “Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy,” Annual Review ofSocioÏogy
(2002) 2$: 21-3$.
3Our analysis is therefore primarily policy centred, looking at the relationship
between state and society to grasp the histoncal and organisational factors that shape
policy decisions. We investigate these matters through an examination of the federal
policy ofmulticulturalism’s development, with particular emphasis on periods of
significant change or reform. We identify three periods ofpolicy change: the 1970s, the
1 9$Os, and the 1 990s. In each of these decades the debates and struggies in the Canadian
polity as well as an altered international environment resulted in significant institutional
adjustments and practices. These events are anaÏyzed as instances of policy learning,
wherein the state generated new understanding ofproblems and mobilized resources for
administration.5
Drawing ftom a historical-institutionalist approach to policy analysis, this study
highuights the ways in which state institutions reconcile conflicts of value and recognise
the contribution ofcitizens.6 As a theoretical approach, this historical-institutionalist
approach parallels theories of state-society relations in the social sciences where
histoncal dynamics and institutional structures figure prominently in accounts ofpolicy
change.7 This way of interpreting policy change privileges the institutional context within
which political strnggles are undertaken. However, this approach argues that individual
The idea ofpolicy leaming is discussed by Hugh Heclo, “Ideas, Interests, Institutions”, in The Dynamics
ofAmerican Politics: Approaches & Interpretations, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd and C. Jiilson (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994).
6 On this approach see especially Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Instimtionalism in
Contemporary Politica) Science,” in Folitical Science. State of The Discipline, eUs. Ira Katznelson and
Helen V. Mimer (New York, NY and Washington, D.C.: Norton and American Political Science
Association, 2002).
Sec, for instance, the recent effort to classify forms of change in Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen,
“Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies,” in Continuity and Discontinuity in Institutional
Analysis, eUs. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (Oxford: OUP 2005).
4decisions are a product of institutional seftings, understood within a much larger frame of
reference. It presents an interpretation ofpolicy outcomes as the resuit flot only of
different legal, administrative, and political structures, but through an optic that includes
a wider range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define and
act upon their interests.
The rest of this chapter introduces the main historical narrative on
multiculturalism reform with two introductory discussions and one organizational
section. The first discussion presents the argument of the thesis in its short form. The
second investigates theoretical issues about state-society relations and public institutions,
reviewing existing approaches to the fundamental issues of state intervention and
ethnocultural policy. In relation to these theories, we then introduce our own ftamework
for analysis using concepts denved from the historical-institutionalist literature and the
field ofpolicy analysis. The final section sets out the organisation ofthe thesis with a
brief description and historical timeline followed by the remaining chapters.
1.1 The Argument in Brief
By most accounts, the last twenty years have been a period ofprofound change in
Canadian politics. Through an ambitious program of market liberalisation and state
retrenchment, the federal govemment set out to alter the way in which public agencies
performed, paid for, and provided public services.8 Rooted in arguments about the extent
and expense of the modem state, this strategy was forged through intellectual debate and
8As Neil Bradford notes generally, “initiatives were in place to transform federal social policy into market
reinforcing programs that became adjuncts to the defining policies of free trade and deficit reduction”. See
Commissioning Ideas: Canadian National Policy in Comparative Perspective (Toronto: OUP 1998), 8.
5political struggie that stretched across two decades. By the early 1990s, this agenda
pushed deficit and debt reduction, along with program rationalisation and institutional
reform to the forefront of public policy discussions. Our analysis ofthe discourse and
objectives associated with this strategy highuights the extent to which major policy
agendas affect the course of public policy while reflecting fundamental decisions about
the nature of state-society relations.
Since its inception in 1971, federal multicultural policy has represented a moral
vision and a public philosophy about the priorities of the country and the form of cultural
diversity. More than an abstract intellectual construct, multiculturalism spelled out the
programmatic action and the specific instruments to be directed towards the pursuit of
this vision. By linking vision and action, multiculturalism has been responsible for
defining an accepted relationship between state and citizen. It would be misleading to
suggest that this relationship was built solely upon multiculturalism, for the govemment’s
commitment to diversity and the idea of citizenship it supported were based on other
policies and initiatives such as immigration, human rights and social justice. Yet it was
multiculturalism more than any other which focused on advancing respect for cultural
diversity that came to be identified as one of the central pillars of Canadian citizenship.
At a practical level, multiculturalism had been linked to citizenship tbrough the
efforts of the Secretary of State’s Citizenship Branch, which in response to the national
unity “crisis” in the 1960s had been given a mandate by the federal govemment to
mobilise Canadian society on a broad participatory front.9 While this helps explain
Those targeted to receive special fimding were multicultural, officiai language minority, and women’s
groups. See Leslie A. Pal, Interests ofState: The PoÏitics ofLanguage, MulticulturaÏism and feminism in
Canada (Monfreal: MQUP 1997).
6multiculturalism’s beginning as a public policy, it does flot establish a theoretical
understanding ofhow multiculturalism is connected to citizenship. To do so, we need to
see citizenship as a system of inclusion and exclusion in which the state defines links and
distinctions among citizens. ‘° State institutions, as the basis of this system, are
responsible for the recognition of different categories of citizens with particular rights
and daims. Those citizens that are recognised, as in the case of ethnocultural
communities through multicuÏturalism, enjoy more than a sense ofbelonging to a larger
community — they enjoy a commitment on the part ofthe state to assist them in
overcoming barriers to their full participation in Canadian society. A change in the
character of public institutions therefore lias consequences, both for the nghts exercised
by a range of citizens, and for their recognition as citizens by the state more generally.
In arguing that changes to multiculturalism have been linked to a broader debate
over the nature of Canadian citïzenship and to political forces seeking change, we begin
by considering multiculturalism’s role as part ofthe extension of citizenship rights that
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. We then analyze the evolution of multiculturalism in
Canada and begin to consider the shifi in thinking about multiculturalism as an public
institution that is associated with a program of market liberalization and state
retrenchment.
In following the course ofmulticulturalism poÏicy in Canada, we find that the
most recent era has been distinguished by a shifi from one policy paradigm to another,
each deeply rooted in very different ideas about how the economy works and the
‘°A discussion ofthe borders and boundaries ofcontemporary citizenship can be found in Jane Jenson,
“Introduction: Thinking about Citizenship and Law in an Era of Change,” in Law and Citizenship.
7direction of social policy.” This shifi, from an era of Keynesian economics towards a
post-Keynesian and neo-liberal conception of economic development, constituted a major
departure from pre-existing views about the role of the state and the obligations of
govemment to its citizenry. Along with a host of other domestic economic and social
policies this paradigmatic shifi camed particular implications for muhiculmralism.
Paramount among these was a debate over the wisdom of state support for ethnocuitural
diversity. In conjunction with the constitutional deliberations of the 1 980s and 1 990s, this
shift served to broaden cails for changes in the way the federal govemment both
promoted and administered multiculturalism.
In interpreting the significance of this development, we argue that a narrow
assessment of the criticisms surrounding multiculturalism has the potential to
misrepresent the nature and extent of the motives underiying the examination of federai
ethnocultural policy. We suggest that the efforts to rethink and restructure
muiticulturalism were drawn mto a larger debate about the sources of unity in a diverse
society and the nature ofCanadian citizenship.’2
Support for this argument is founded upon a definition of citizenship that extends
beyond formai legal practices and obligations, to include an understanding of citizenship
On the subject ofpolicy paradigms and state action see Peter A. Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social
Leaming, and the State: The Case ofEconomic Policymaking in Britain,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 25,
No. 3 (Apr., 1993).
t2 Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips discuss changes to citizenship as the product of a historical shifi in the
friangular relationship among the state, the market and communities. See “Regime Shift: New Citizenship
Practices in Canada,’ International Journal ofCanadian Studies. 14: 111-35 (Fall 1996). While flot
implying that citizenship is devoid of any meaning when detached from the sovereign nation state, their
work emphasises the discourse and practice ofcitizenship that individuals have as members ofbounded
communities. In this sense, it is different from the literatare that looks at the evolution ofa “post-national”
citizenship discussed by Yasmeen Soysal in Limits ofCitizenshzp: Migrants and Post-nationat Membershtv
in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
$as an expression ofbelonging to, or identification with a larger community.’3 In this
sense, citizenship is more than simply a synonym for nationality. States construct the
boundanes oftheir politicai community by recognising their own citizens, by defining
who qualifies and under what terms their relationship to the state and their fellow citizens
are to be managed. Recognition is often framed in terms ofvarious institutional
arrangements expressed as officiai state policy.
In Canada, among many other policy areas, this recognition has been reflected in
the federal policy of multiculturalism. As an inclusionary model of integration,
multiculturalism established that citizenship in Canada would be firmly rooted in the
recognition of citizens with diverse origins, and that an integral part of this recognition
would be based flot on the extent or quality of one’s participation, but on full membership
in a political community. Accompanying the benefits of shared rights and freedoms,
multicuituralism developed over the decades as an integral component of Canadian
citizenship. This vision of a multicultural society reflected the idea that Canadians shouid
recognise themselves in public institutions, and that they should expect a certain amount
ofuniformity between their private identities and the content ofgovemment policies.’4 In
effect, multiculturalism entrenched an activist role on the part of the federal govemment
to reflect and respond to Canada’s diversity.
13 Robert fulford asserts that: “As mucli as it is a legal fact created by legislation, citizenship is a metaphor:
for most people, in most countries, it stands for a tangle of human connections, past and future, at the same
time that it defines entitiements and responsibilities”, See “A Post-Modem Dominion: The Changing
Nature of Canadian Citizenship” in The Meaning and future ofCanadian Citizenshtp, ed. William Kaplan
(Montreal: MQUP 1993), 104.
On this point see Raymond Breton, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation Building” in The Fotitics of
Gendei Ethnicity and Language in Canada, eds. Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1986). On the importance of state recognition of ethnic minorities see also Amia
Elisabetta Galeofti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
9Across three decades of change, we find substantial continuity in the central role
played by state actors in establishing the terms of ethnocultural integration.15 However,
by the mid 1980s the consensus among many ofthese same state actors had broken
down.’6 In its place, questions arose about the potentially destabilizing demands for
ethnocultural and representation rights in multinational societies. We find these concems
to have served as vital adjuncts in the wider debate over state support for culturai
diversity. By the 1 990s, sufficient intellectual consensus in the form of neo-liberalism
coupled with the growing criticism towards multiculturalism as a consequence of the
national unity debate guided state action towards a new policy model.’7
The concluding chapter clarifies the importance of this trend and without
imposing any artificial uniformity makes two statements about the interactive effects
among public institutions and diversity. first, we suggest that ethnocultural policy is flot
purely instrumentai. Institutional practices send signais to citizens about who they are and
how they should behave. The state constructs the boundaries of its political community
by recognising its own citizens, by defining who qualifies and under what terms their
relationship to the state and their feliow citizens are to be managed. Second, by offering a
perspective on the rise of neoliberaiism and the difficuit relationship between
multiculturalism and national unity we suggest that the very definition ofwhat is
‘ See also Micheline Labelle et Daniel Salée, «La citoyenneté en question: l’État canadien face à
l’immigration et la diversité nationale et culturelle », Sociologie et sociétés, vol. 31, n° 2, (1999), 125-144.
16 See Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Daiva Stasiulis, “Ethnic Pluralism under Siege: Popular and Partisan
Opposition to Multiculturalism,” Canadien Public Poticy, XVIII: 4 (1992), 365-386.
17 In the related field of immigration another decade would pass, and only in the context ofthe new security
concems prompted by the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States before there would be a
substantial revision to Canadian immigration policy. On the changes to immigration policy see Yasmeen
Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel, “Security, Immigration and Post-September Il Canada,” in Reinventing
Canada: Politics ofthe 2lst Centuty, eds. Janine Brodie and Linda Trimble (Toronto: Pearson, 2003).
10
Canadian was being debated. Explanations for policy change that limit their analytical
focus to fiscal restraint fail to reveal the full extent ofthe pressures for reform.
Examining the legacies ofthe Mulroney and Chrétien govemments clarifies this point. As
the country restructured its economy the relationship between the state and its citizens,
and in particular, the forms of legitimate representation, were being transformed. The
legitimacy of state supported diversity was steadily losing ground to the notion that
individuals can and should compete equally in the political marketplace. Moreover, and
supporting an aftack on multiculturalism, was the national unity question. By the early
1 990s, a decade of consensus on the merits of multiculturalism was broken through a
series of constitutional debates that charactenzed multiculturalism as a threat to national
unity, rather than a way of sustaining it. In its place was an interpretation that viewed
ethnicity as divisive and multiculturalism as secondary to the primary goal of stabilizing
the Quebec-Canada relationship. Here, the reforms to multiculturalism signal that the
assumptions underpinning Canadian govemance have changed substantially from those
of the late 1 960s when multiculturalism was envisioned.
1.2 Ethnocutturat Diversity and $tate Intervention: A frameworkforAnatysis
In broad terms, this study seeks to fil two iacunae in the literature on
ethnocultural policy. first, it addresses a critical and under-studied dimension of
Canadian ethnocultural diversity, the role of public institutions. While there is an
increasing interest in the notion that pluralism and multiculturalism is a route for
poiyethnic and multinational states to follow, littie attention has been paid to how policies
and programmes that underpin the recognition of ethnocultural diversity affect social
li
cohesion.18 As institutions, policies act to reshape politicai behaviour by providing a
framework in which mies and norms become sources of information and meaning for
citizens.19 In most analyses of etimocultural diversity in Canada, however, the function
that govemment action itseifmay play in shaping ethnocultural policy remains largely
unexpiored. For example, much ofthe classic work on ethnoculturaiism is phulosophical
and (or) addresses federaiism. In the first category, Wiii Kymiicka’s, Multicultural
Citizenshtp: A Liberal Theoiy ofMinority Rights and Charles Tayior’s “The Politics of
Recognition” stand out. 20 In the second group, Kenneth McRoberts’ Misconceiving
Canada: The Strugglefor National Unity and Alan C. Cairns’ Charter versus federaÏism:
The Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform are among the more prominent instances.21 Even
the recent wide-ranging review of Canadian diversity by Abu-Laban and Gabriei spends
more time on the outcomes ofpoiicies, in terms oftheir relationship to the post-911
environment, than on the institutions themselves. 22
18 Like discussions in related policy fields, however, more needs to be known about what mix of
ethnocultural policies and institutions wiIl help raffier than hinder social solidarity. Canadian and
international examples of this line of inquiry include, Will Kymiicka, Finding our Way: Rethinking
Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: OUP, 1998); Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon, “The
“Canadian Diversity Model”: A Repertoire in Search of a Framework,” CPRN Discussion Paper No. F119,
November 2001; Council of Europe, Diversity and Cohesion: New Challengesfor the Integration of
Immigrants and Minorities (JuIy 2000); Benjamin Hempel, Does Canada Compare? Social Cohesion and
Cultural Policies in Australia, the United States and the European Union. Prepared for the Strategic
Research and Analysis Directorate, Canada, (Ottawa: Department of Canadian Heritage, 1999).
19 Theodore J. Lowi, ‘American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” World Politics
6(1964), 677-715.
20 Will Kymiicka, Multicultural Citizenshtp; Charles Taylor, “The Politics ofRecognition”, in
Multiculturalism and the Politics ofRecognition, cd. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992).
21 Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggiefor National Unity (Don Miils, Ont.: OUP,
1997); and Alan C. Cairns, Charter versus federalism: The Dilemmas ofConstitutional Reform (Montreal:
MQUP, 1992).
22Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism,
Employment Equity, and Globalization (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2002).
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A second purpose of the study is to link the development of multicultural policy
with the evolution ofa discourse on Canadian citizenship.23 Until recently, few academic
works have focused on the fact that muÏticulturalism exists in a policy environment that
lias changed over time and which is currently being altered in search of the appropnate
mechanisms for realizing policy goals and the appearance ofnew daims.
Although both tasks are complementary, the first moves this thesis in the direction
of institutional analysis, uncovering the institutional practices that support ethnocultural
diversity. The second task is a form ofpolicy study, asking, in effect, what leads the state
to action?24 This involves weighing the influence ofpolitical ideas against a host of
causal factors that contribute to the development of policy. It also entails recognition of
how ideas and interests often meet head-on with political expenence, and in so doing
provide a mechanism for policy feedback, leaming, and improvement. Unexpected or
undesired policy outcomes often lead to reassessments of policy choices and potentially
to a reconsideration of underlying principles.
A consideration of both ideas and institutional practices requires the formulation
of a ftamework for analysis. Reviewing contemporary approaches to the smdy of state
intervention and policy making can provide theoretical inspiration in these areas. A
number of traditions can 5e distinguished in the literature on multiculturalism. Three will
23 One effort to do so is Kymiicka and Banting’s research on the effects ofmulticulturalism for social
citizenship. While important, their research question is quite different from that ofthis thesis. See “Do
Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?”, in Cultural Diversity Versus Economic $olidariry, ed.
Philippe Van Parijs (Brussels: Editions De Boeck Université, 2004).
24 In thinldng about public policy as a subject of inquiry, there is a distinction to be made between what
might be called a “policy study” and “policy analysis”. The former is ofien used to indicate a primarily
descriptive attempt to understand the policy-making process, while that later is usually understood more
narrowly to explain a prescriptive activity. In the literature, the conceptual distinction is rather vague, but as
Pal points out, the central difference, even if they are oflen used interchangeably, is one of style. Beyond
Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent fîmes. 2d ed. (Scarborough: NeÏson, 2001), 14.
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be considered here: neo-Marxist, statist or state-centric and public choice.25 Each
approach envisions the state as autonomous but defines the mechanism of autonomy in a
different way. Therefore, our discussion will focus on the theoretical reach of these
models as it applies to our purpose ofunderstanding the role of public institutions as a
vehicle for managing etimocultural diversity.
Theories ofthe state rooted in a neo-Marxist perspective are notable for their
emphasis on state action as an expression of social-class relations. Policy outcomes in
this view represent limited concessions made by the state to the working class to assure
the viability of capitalism. While possessing a certain degree of autonomy, the state
nevertheless acts in the overali interests of capital and can neyer wholly deviate from the
requïrement ofreinforcing the prevailing distribution ofpower. In the formulation of
ethnocultural policy, programs and practices are introduced to legitimize inequality and to
conceal exploitation through the transmission of dominant ideologies. For example,
fleras and Elliott note that multiculturalism in Canada constitutes an ideology whose
endorsement ofdiversity is widely accepted as intrinsic to Canada’s collective image, and
consequently an area in which the state can legitimately intervene. 26Although there is an
explicit commitment to diversity, a “tacit approval of the status quo is equally evident and
25 is important to bear in mmd that several separate branches of scholarship, including public choice,
organization theory, and historical-institutionalism lay daim to the label neo-institutionalist. See ENen M.
Immergut, “The Theoretical Core ofNew Institutionalism,” Politics & Society, 26:1 (March 1998), 5-34.
Neo-institutionalism is therefore flot a single model ofpolitics with identical implications for the
determination of policy. This is frue notwithstanding the fact that ail branches of neo-institutionalism may
share a theoretical core about the value of institutions. For this reason aione, a public choice rationale for
state behaviour can be considered separately from other “institutional” explanations.
26Augie Fieras and Jean Leonard Ellioff, The Challenge ofDiversity: Multiculturalisrn in Canada
(Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992).
14
promoted”.27 This state function is seen as forestaliing demands for more fundamental
reform and highlights the role of ethnocultural poiicy as an instrument of social control.28
To the extent that state actors have at their disposai a combination of strategies,
including physical coercion, ideological manipulation, and popular consensus, for
legitimizing and reinforcing the existing socio-political order, neo-Marxist perspectives
emphasize the latter two as being particularly significant in liberal democratic states.29
The motivations for state intervention, however, are flot solely designed to reinforce
existing power relations. Neo-Marxists argue that state intervention serves both
capitalists and the state itself by minimising potential dismptions to the social order yet
maximizing the orderly accumulation of capital.3°
Statist wnters in contrast argue for a more sophisticated understanding of
autonomy in which state power is not iinked in any obvious way to the structural
requirements of capitalism. Leading theorists of this approach reject what they perceive
to be deeply embedded society-centred assumptions of state autonomy that do flot
recognize that state as having an interest in maintaining its own power and which may
lead it to act independently of or even against the wishes of the dominant classes.3’ Public
27 Ibid., 55-56.
28 This classic neo-Marxist critique of multiculturalism is summarized by Alan B. Anderson and James S.
Frideres in chapter 14 of Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981).
29 See Daiva Stasiulis and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Limited Inclusion in
Canada,” in Canadian PoÏitics: An Introduction to the Discipline, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and lames P.
Bickerton (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1990).
30 See, for instance, Leo Driedger’s concem with social stratification, power, status and inequality in Multi
Ethnic Canada: Identities and Inequalities (Toronto: OUP 1996).
31 Leading figures ofthis view include Theda Skocpol, “Bring the State Back in: Strategies ofAnalysis in
Current Researcli,” in Bringing The State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda
Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Eric A. Nordiinger, On the Autonomy ofthe
Democratic State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For Nordiinger, a statist perspective
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officiais in any poiicy field are thought to translate their own preferences into
authontative action somewhat independent of economic groups or societal inclinations.
The resuit is a policy process directed by the logic of the state itself.
\Vhule no explicitly shared research agenda lias tied statist writers together, the
resuit lias been to re-inject the notion of state intervention as a plausible explanation for
political and social change. b address the effects of state on society and to make clear
outcomes of public policy, these autliors suggest tliat states matter pnmarily because of
their “organizational configurations” that make possible the raising of certain political
issues and tlie exclusion of others.32 This perspective encourages a view ofpolitics as a
reflection of state action; albeit one that does not reify the state as some single entity witli
limited purpose and consistent effects. In the same way, statist scholars concede that the
ftagmented nature of tlie sprawling liberal democratic state limits tlie capacity for co
ordinated action.33 Yet, tlie dominant focus among advocates of this approach remains
squarely with tlie independent influence oftlie state on political outcomes. In pushing the
concept of autonomy mucli further than their Marxist counterparts, statist writers grant a
determining role to state officiais and bureaucratic traditions. On the subject of
ethnocultural policy, they debate whether a strategy of ethnic inclusion and a focus on
national identity is possible or even preferable. They do flot, however, dispute the
capacity of the state to manage an increasingly diverse, rights-conscious, and
need flot imply that the state has a greater impact upon society than society upon the state. But without
minimizing the importance of societal actors and variables, the state can be accorded analytical priority.
32 Skocpol, 21.
Indeed, several authors argue that federalism poses limitations on the exercise ofpower. See Keith
Banting, The WeVare State and Canadian federalism, 2nd ed. (Montreal: MQUP, 1987); and Alan C.
Cairns, “The Embedded State: State-Society Relations in Canada,” in State and Society: Canada in
Comparative Perspective, ed. Keith Banting, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
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particularistic society. In this category one may include the critique ofmulticulturalism
on the part ofQuebec intellectuals who view the policy as undermining Quebec’s daim
to nationhood. This view, while stressing the adverse effects of multiculturalism on
Quebec society does flot reject the pnnciple of state-sponsored diversity. It is the federal
model based on multiculturalism that is rejected because it is viewed as incompatible
with Quebec’s own intervention in matters relating to culture and language.34
In English Canada, statist scholars such as Pal have argued that around the time
the official policy of multiculturalism was adopted, the govemment sought to create
multicultural advocacy organizations that would promote its own agenda.35 This reflected
in part the broader state mandate to mobilize Canadian society on a common
participatory front. The federal govemment’s discourse during this penod linked the
growth of a national identity to the realisation of equitable treatment of disadvantaged
groups. While the range of issues addressed was not unlimited, advocacy groups were
able, oflen with project grants from the federal departments, to have their interests known
and to make their daims for equity.36 Politicians and bureaucrats wouldjustify their
actions by arguing that such interests were inherently difficuit to organize on their own»
fledgiing ethnic groups therefore required the active encouragement of the state.
See, for example, Guy Rocher, «Les ambiguïtés d’un Canada bilingue et biculturel » dans Le Québec en
mutation, (Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1973); Micheline Labelle, «Le débat sur la culture ethnique, la
culture nationale, et la culture civile: réflexions sur les enjeux de l’intégration des minorités ethniques au
Québec, » Communication présentée au Colloque: <‘ Culture ethnique, culture civile et culture nationale,»
Congrès de L’ACFAS, Université de Sherbrooke (mai 1991); M. Labelle, F. Rocher, et G. Rocher;
« Pluriethnicité, citoyenneté et intégration: de la souveraineté pour lever les obstacles et les ambiguïtés.»
Cahiers de recherche sociologique, (1995) no 25, 2 13-245.
Pal, Interests ofState, 136-140.
36Jenson “Fated to live in Interesting Times: Canada’s Changing Citizenship Regimes,” in Canadien
Journal ofPotitical Science, 30: 4 (1997), 627.
Pal, Interests ofState, 109.
17
The third major approach, public choice, also grants autonomy to the state but
differs over the manner in which institutions shape the behaviour of socjetai and state
actors. Public choice scholars proceed from the assumption that political actors are self
interested utility maximizers with fixed goals and preferences. Institutions and state
structures figure into the equation by shaping the strategies chosen by political actors to
realize their goals. As a theory, this approach applies the tools ofeconomic analysis to
non-market forms of allocations and as such provides a level oftheorizing about
decision-making processes. On this view, the principal concem is with understanding
how and why certain state choices are made. Institutions, such as the mies that determine
the constitutional division ofpowers in a federation, allow political choices to be made,
but they do flot allow every conceivable political choice to be considered.38 Therefore,
institutions do not determine actors’ preferences, but they do affect individual and
collective choices.
Public choice approaches pay particular attention to the relationship between state
actors, voters, and the formulation of electoral platforrns. Politicians are thought to enter
a self-setving process ofadopting policies that will secure their election, and, ah other
things being equal, will respond to those interests representing the largest number of
voters. In this calculation, poiicy outcomes rest on the pre-given and unchanging
motivations ofstate officiais who are joined only by their desire to maximize career goals
and expand program resources.39 The state is flot conceived as an institutional structure
Immergut, “The Normative Roots of New Institutionalism: Historical Institutionalism and Comparative
Policy Studies,’ in Theorieentwicklung in der Potitikwissenschaft-eine Zwischenbitanz, eds. Arthur Benz
and Wolfgang Seibel (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997), 328-329.
Bradford, Commissioning Ideas, 11.
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embodying some pnncipled conception of the public good. In accordance with this view,
ethnocultural policy is flot intended as a means by which groups can make their daims
known to the state, but as a tool to covet electoral favour among ethnocultural minorities.
In Canada, both advocates and opponents ofmulticulturalism concede that the
policy has helped rather than hindered support from ethnie voters for the architects of the
policy, the federal Liberal party. Stili others, however, point to the instrumental and veiled
goal ofthe policy as a tool of former Prime Minister Trudeau’s national unity strategy.4°
Several scholars maintain that a key incentive for multiculturalism was its utility in
helping to undermine support for the “two nations” view of Canada — a view Trudeau
found perilously consistent with Quebec’s ïndependence movement. From this
perspective, a policy of cultural pluralism was significant not for what it offered as what
it excluded and worked against, namely a bicultural definition ofCanadian society.41
Ultimately, criticisms of multiculturalism as an electoral pioy or a tool to undermine
Quebec nationalism, share a decidedly deterministic view ofpolitical behaviour that
attributes collective or individual preferences to inferred interests.
Clearly, each of these theones views the state and policy making about
ethnoculturalism somewhat differently. Public policy may be the result of rational choices
based on the self-interested analysis of state actors, a reflection or consequence of state
structures and processes, or as tool of social class relations. Each, however, believes that
° See Raymond Bretons argument in “Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building”.
41 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 124. for the author, contradictions inherent in the goals of cultaral
preservation and the enhancement of personal autonomy — hallmarks of the original policy, along with
Tmdeau’s indifference to the policy more generally, demonstrate that multiculturalism was to serve as a fou
to Quebec nationalism rather than a principled support and embracing of ethnocultural diversity. See also
François Rocher and Micheline Labelle, “Debating Citizenship in Canada: The Collide of Two Nation-
Building Project”, in from Subjects to Citizens. A Hundred Years ofCïtizenship in Australia and Canada,
eds. Pierre Boyer, Linda Cardinal and David Headon (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 2004), 263-286.
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public policy irrespective of its purpose is designed to deal with public problems. For
neo-Marxists, political struggles are defined by class interests and thereby reinforce a
system of class hegemony. Autonomy, albeit “relative”, arises from the mix of
institutional rules that are inevitably constrained to act in the interests of capital. Such a
fimctionalist and reductionist approach to policy outcomes is problematic in that it stops
short of viewing the modem state as stmcturally autonomous from civil society. In the
absence of true autonomy, this approach has difficulty grasping the idea that state
institutions are able to structure political struggie and influence policy outcomes. Without
such insight the power of institutional variables to explain policy outcomes is frustrated.
Similarly, the rational choice model of strict rationality that assumes preferences
are given and unchanging is often unsuitable for conceptualizing policy outcomes.
Although rational choice scholars concede that institutions act to constrain self-interested
behaviour, they fail to capture the dynamic character of institutional structure dut-mg
periods ofprofound or turbulent policy change.42 Such discontinuities imply that flot
simply the strategies but also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional
context they find themselves in. Moreover, because politics is often conducted in a
complex institutional setting, individuals may be motivated by a mix of conflicting
preferences and may privilege some interests at the expense ofothers. This leads to the
conclusion that unless something is known about the context, broad assumptions about
self-interested behaviour are misleadïng.43 Conflicting interests and preferences should
42Accounting for the unfolding ofprocesses over time (or a temporal dimension) is a feamre central
preoccupation for many ofthe leading authors within the field ofhistorical institutionalism and
comparative historical analysis. See lames Mahoney and Diefrich Rueschemeyer, eds. Comparative
Historicat Analysis in the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10-12.
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therefore be understood as the product of historical constructions, as limits on human
rationality and knowledge that can be redressed only by flilly examining history. The
centrality of institutional settings and the value of historical contexts demonstrate creative
aspects ofpolitics flot captured by the rational choice perspective.
Viewed from this perspective, both neo-Marxism and rational choice fail to
present a mode! ofpolicy outcomes that grants a determining and independent ro!e to
institutional structures and configurations ofpower within the state. Moreover, neither
approach succeeds in overcoming a conception of state-society relations that is
essentia!ly dualistic — where one sphere acts on the other to rea!ize its goals. It is this
failure that !eads this study towards its understanding of institutional structures and policy
change. Moving in this direction requires flot oniy greater attention to the distribution of
power within the state, but ana!ytical focus on institutions as structures that shape the
strategies and goals ofpolitical actors. In this respect, much can be gleaned from the
growing institutiona!ist !iterature.
As a schoo! ofthought, institutiona!ism has undergone somewhat ofa renaissance
in recent decades. Unlike the inter-war tradition of institutional studies that rarely went
beyond a mere description of formal institutions, New Institutionalism, or neo
n Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, in Structuring Politics:
Historical Institutionatism in Comparative Analysis, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank
Longsfreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 9.
As Paul Pierson explains, “Policies can, for example, provide resources that facilitate or impede
participation. They may create framing effects that influence what actors see and what they don’t, which
issues attract attention and how they feel about those issues, who they see as their allies and opponents, as
well as whether they feel that their grievances are legitimate and will be freated legitimate.” “Public
Policies as Institutions,” in Rethinking Potiticat Institutions: The Art ofthe State, eds. lan Shapiro, Stephen
Skowronek, and Daniel Galvin (New York University Press, 2006), 11. Pierson’s focus on history is most
closely associated with his work on of path dependency, which stresses the constraining role of the past, in
confrast to theories in which change is mainly seen as the outcome of deliberate action. See ‘Increasing
Retums, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94, 2, (2000),
251-267.
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institutionalism as it is more widely known, has provided an important and increasingly
popular starting point to investigate the inner workings ofthe state.45 Its popularity may
be explained in part by its theoretical reach as a broad fundamentai approach that can be
applied to a wide variety of empirical problems. Proponents ofthis approach share a
general interest in analyzing the effects of mies and procedures for aggregating individual
wishes into collective decisions. Unlike the behaviourist movement ofthe 1950s and
1 960s that was chiefly concemed with observable behaviour as a basis for explaining
political phenomena, neo-institutionalists reject individual psychoiogy as the principal
tool for political analysis.46 Rather they seek to understand preference formation, politicai
demands and poiicy outcomes by focusing on specific institutional seftings.47
Within the neo-institutionalist tradition three broad but related branches have
emerged: rational choice, sociological, and historical. Rational choice institutionalists
argue that individuals and their strategic preferences ought to be the centrai concem of
social science. Like public choice theorists more generally, rational choice
institutionalists tend to assume that the overriding goal ofpoliticians in liberal
democracies is to ensure their election or re-election.48 However, they differ significantly
in that they view institutions as crucial for shaping the strategies chosen by political
actors to realize their goals. In this respect, institutions serve to stabilize relationships
Leaving aside the interdisciplinary dispute as to what is “new” about neo-institutionalism, the neo
institutionalist literature has served as an important debate among social scientists who argue that
fundamentally institutions matter, but disagree over the extent to which they matter.
Immergut, “The Theoretical Core ofNew Institutionalism,” 25.
Peter Hall and R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political
Studies 44 (1996), 936-957.
48 Thomas A. Koelble, “The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology,” Comparative Politics
Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jan., 1995).
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between political actors and to induce cooperative behaviour among self-interested
individuals.
The second major school ofneo-institutionalism, known as sociological
institutionalism, presents a broad critique of rationality based on the presumption that
inherent limits on cognition serve to constrain individuai choice.49 Here individuals are
viewed as “embedded” in their socio-politicai environment, unabie to calculate their
preferences based on an ideai consideration of ail possible choices.5° Whether through the
absence of adequate time, resources, or information, preferences are thought to resuit
from the various routines and habituai behaviours that individuals adopt to overcome
their cognitive limits.5’ In cases where institutional stability or stasis is the object of
inquiry, this theoreticai approach bas served well as a tool for understanding public
poiicy. Conceptually, however, sociological institutionalism bas been less successful
accounting for institutionai change. The prevailing view among policy theorists in
particular, is that theories that attempt to explain continuity as opposed to change and
innovation are flot aiways well suited to reveal the interpiay between ideas, strategy and
historical circumstance that resuit in new policy directions.52
In part, the third major school of institutionalism offers a remedy to this problem
by focusing chiefly on institutions as independent variables that influence struggies over
Sociological institutionalism as a branch of scholarship also appears as Organization Theory. See
Immergut, 14-16; and Campbell, “Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and Social
Movements Research,” in Social liovernents and Organization Theoiy, eds. Gerald F. Davis, Doug
McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
50Walter W. Poweil and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991), 11.
s Immergut, 14-15.
52 Bradford, 12.
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power and policy. Historical institutionalists do flot reject the concept ofrationality
altogether, rather they view self-interest as being problematical and focus on the capacity
of institutions to actively shape politics. In this conception, individuals are not passive
actors, yet they are bound by institutional arrangements that serve to guide their
choices.53
Policy change for historical institutionalists has served as a focal point for
understanding how struggies unfold among varying interests and ideas within particular
institutional settings. Among the leading proponents ofthis approach, Peter Hall and
Margaret Weir have devoted considerable attention to how institutional arrangements
“condition” policy development and change.54 They do so by examining the interaction of
institutions and political processes across both countries and time. It is our contention that
this approach can be revealing when applied to the study of Canada’s policy of
multiculturalism.
How may historical institutionalism help to illuminate the development and
changing environment in which multiculturalism operates? We achieve this by addressing
sources of institutional dynamism — understood as change or variability in the impact of
institutions brought on by their interaction with their political environments.55 This is
Margaret Weir, “Ideas and the Politics ofBounded Innovation,” in Steinmo et al., Structuring Politics,
188-216.
See Peter Hall, Governing the Econorny: The Politics ofState Intervention in Britain and france (New
York: OUP, 1986); Margaret Weir, “Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation,” and Margaret Weir and
Theda Skocpol, “State Structures and the Possibilities for Keynesian Responses to the Great Depression in
Sweden, Britain and the United States,” in Bringing The State Back In, 107-163.
Thelen and Steinmo, Structuring PoÏitics, 16-17. See also the case made by André Lecours for historical
institutionalism as a theoretical insight into the politics of identity, “Theorizing Cultural Identities:
Historical Institutionalism as a Challenge to the Culturalists,” Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science, 33: 3
(2000), 499-522.
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accomplished in two ways, by focusing on how the policy has served to accommodate
interests and filter politics in Canada, as well as how the policy has itse]fbeen mediated
by the broader politicai context.
The historical institutionalist literature identifies several sources of institutional
dynamism that descnbe situations in which institutions can produce different outcomes
over time. In une with this trend, our focus is on examples of how the meaning and
functioning of multiculturalism was transformed by changes in the socio-economic
context or balance ofpower. To that effect, we are concerned with policy change, albeit
within stable institutions. Change on the order of complete institutional breakdown or
crisis — moments of dramatic change — are flot the source of our theorizing.56
What we need at this point is a mid-level analysis paying close attention to
institutional settings where state officiais and societal interests interact to construct public
policies as guides to action. Peter Hall has aptly described the institutional relationship
that binds these forces together and structures their relations to society.57 His approach to
understanding the logic of state intervention and economic management presents a view
of policy as a theoretical construct. Public policies are courses of action to deal with
specific problems, but that action is anchored in both a set of values regarding
appropnate public goals and a set of beliefs about the best way of achieving those goals.58
The distinction between regular or routine policy shifts and more significant paradigm shifts is an
important theoretical consideration. A number ofpolitical scientists continue to contest the ability of
ideational-institutional theories to explain large-scale potitical change. See, for instance, Robert C.
Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change,t in American Politicat
Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 4 (December 2002), 697-712; and Sfreeck and Thelen, “Institutional Change
in Advanced Political Economies.”
Peter Hall, Governing the Economy, 19.
Michael Atkinson, ed., “Public Policy and the New Institutionalism,” in Governing Canada: Institutions
and Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1993), 19. Atkinson notes that public policy in the sense
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Policies, therefore, exist in the reaim of ideas and public discourse. This view is mirrored
by other institutionalist scholars who stress the need to understand ideas and interests in
institutional settings — what some have deemed an institutional-interpretative approach.59
Above ah, the advantage of such an approach is that it relaxes the strict institutionalist
emphasis on order and embraces the view that to account for policy change or reform is
to understand the role played by ideas and institutions within periods of uncertainty.
Irrespective ofthe policy sector being considered public polices are made within
ideational frameworks that help structure individual and collective thinking about what
constitutes a public problem. Simply put, ideas are essential because policy makers need
to know what public problems are, to understand potential courses of action, and later to
evaluate the overali resuits. Political ideas are thus used to advance political interests and
inform appropriate actions. Ronald Manzer has argued the utility of locating ideas in a
causal chain that accommodates a role for other factors. He notes:
Policies here are seen as results or outcomes ofpolitical actions. They can be
explained by a range of causal factors, which include the distribution ofpower
among participants in policy-making, organization ofpolitical interests, structure of
institutional constraints, and influences of socio-economic environment. To explain
public policy the effect ofpolitical ideas must be weighed against the effect ofthese
other causal factors in the policy-making process.6°
A historical institutionalist approach can be used for case study research through
the elaboration oftwo concepts: the pohicy paradigm and the agenda-seuing network. The
understood here is a branch ofpolitical theory. Policies, he maintains, “require a theory of the right and the
good and a theory ofhow the world works. They are nourished by the beliefthat their goals are worthwhile
and their means are effective. Doubt on either ofthese matters signais the beginning ofpolicy change.”
For a consideration of the role and causal importance of ideas and institutions in politics see Peter Hall
and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”; and Judith Goldstein,
“Ideas, Institutions andAmerican Trade Policy,” International Otganization, 42, 1(1988), 127-217.
° Ronald Manzer, Public Schools and Political Ideas: Canadian Educational Policy in Historical
Perspective (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1994), 4-5.
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concept ofthe policy paradigm in political science borrows noticeably from Thomas S.
Khun’s discussion of scientific paradigms.61 Political scientists refer to a reasonably
consistent set of ideas that guide policy thinkers in defining the “problem” and in seeking
information to shape the policy “solution.” Reference to Khun, notes Peter Hall:
allows us to locate the different kinds ofpolicy change relative to one another. First
and second order change can be seen as cases of”normal policymaking,” namely of
a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overail terms of a given policy
paradigm, much like the “normal science.” Third order change, by contrast, is likely
to reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in the overarching
terms ofpolicy discourse associated with a “paradigm shift.” If first and second
order changes preserve ffie broad continuities usually found in pattems ofpolicy,
third order change is ofien a more disjunctive process associated with periodic
discontinuities in policy.62
For our purposes, the policy paradigm allows us to consider the development and
operation of multiculturalism as the product of an intellectual endeavour — an exercise in
social leaming — undertaken by policymakers. Working within a ftamework ofideas and
standards, these policymakers set out in a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals of
ethnocultural integration in response to past experience and new information. Here, an
agenda-setting network can be identified generating a body of advice, both solicited and
volunteered, with ideas that in some instances led to the creation of competing
paradigms. Over the course ofmulticultural policy, advice flowed to the federal
govemment from a vanety of sources including multicultural groups, various government
bodies, government-appointed advisory groups, the media, and academics. When the
govemment ignored such advice, the ideas did flot necessarily disappear. Some “hovered”
61 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure ofScientflc Revotutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
62 Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Leaming, and the State: The Case ofEconomic Policymaking in
Britain,” 279. for another account ofpolicy paradigms see Walter Salant, “The Spread of Keynesian
Doctrines and Practices in the United States,” in The Political Power ofEconomic Ideas, ed. Peter Hall
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
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over the policy field, thereby continuing to provide alternatives to the conventional policy
approach used within govemment. The persistence of certain ideas can be seen when they
reappear in different policies within similar policy fields (e.g. immigration). from this
vantage point, when several of these ideas or notions keep recumng in policy advice,
they can be said to constitute a new or competing policy paradigm.63
The agenda-sefting network, or “policy network” concept in political science, has
its origins in comparative research on industnal performance and economic policy.M The
academic attention to policy networks lias generally been reserved for describing the
relationship among a particular set of actors that form around an issue important to a
specific policy community.65 The object ofpolicy network analysis, irrespective ofits
brandi ofresearcli, has been to conceptualize the relationship between the state and civil
society. Further to this, our interest is to understand how actors that make up an
ethnocultural policy community have influenced a prevailing policy paradigm. Every
political system contains a distinctive constellation of forces channelling the flow of ideas
and information into decision-making circles. From this vantage point, policy
communities serve to explain and defend those ideas whose action gives purpose and
direction to state intervention. If policy design is about choosing the most appropriate
instrument to deal with public problems, tien any explanation for a particular policy must
63 The role of ideas and ideologies influencing a policy agenda is discussed in Andrew Chadwick,
“Studying Political Ideas: A Public Political Discourse Approach,” Political Studies, 48, 2000.
Peter J. Katzenstein, Between Fower anti Plenty: foreign Economic Poticies ofAdvanced Industrial
Stales (Madison, WI: University ofWisconsin Press, 1978).
65 William D. Coleman and Grace Skogstad, eds., Policy Communities & Public Policy in Canada: A
Structural Approach (Mississauga, Ontario: Copp Clark Pitinan Ltd, 1990), 26.
See, for example, Éric Montpetit’s comparative discussion ofpolicy networks and the contribution to
govemance in Misplaced Distrust: Policy Networks and the Environment in France, the United States, anti
Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).
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address flot only those who identify the problem but the agenda-setting network
interested in what means are properly and practically available to deal with it.67
It is out of moments ofpolitical conflict that solutions to public problems are
ofien envisioned. More specifically, we attempt to show the formation of ideas and
institutions that led pragmatic but principled politicians, bureaucrats, members of
ethnocultural communities, and others to adopt, rethink and then recast a policy of
multiculturalism. This, therefore, is flot a story of independent variables, but of
configurations among ideational and institutional elements, none of which is sufficient
but each of which is necessary for a comprehensive explanation of an important episode
in Canada’s ethnocultural policy.
1.3 Organization ofthe Thesis
In this study, therefore, we take our cue from historical institutionalists and policy
analysts to explore the development of multiculturalism in Canada. Chapter Two begins
this analysis by considering the role multiculturalism plays as an “interpretative order”
within which citizenship is understood in a multicultural state. This chapter builds on the
argument raised earlier in this chapter about the connection between multiculturalism and
citizenship and the role played by institutions as constitutive meanings of politics.
Chapter Three sets in motion our detailed investigation ofthe policy; here we describe
the first stage in its trajectoly by focussing on developments in the mid-1960s and 1970s.
67 This view of public policy and problem recognition as a socially constructed discourse has many
adherents. See, for instance, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction ofReality. A
Treatise in the Sociology ofKnowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Murray Edelman, The Symbolic
Uses ofPolitics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb,
“Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy Choice,” Poticy Studies Journal, 21, 1: 56-7 1, 1993.; and
Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1987).
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Chapter Four tracks the debate and expansion ofthe policy into the 19$Os; a period of
growth for muhicukuralism but also a period of contestation. During this era political
ideas, including those associated with neo-liberaÏ govemance and the national unity
debate, found persuasive expression among actors whose institutional position gave them
both the motive and the opportunity to undertake reform. Chapter Five examines
multiculturalism in the 1 990s, a time of decision when debates and ideas camed over
from the previous period led to a re-evaluation and rethinking of Canada’s approach to
managing ethnocultural diversity. The concluding chapter retums to arguments about
institutions, ideas and the public agendas influencing Canadian multiculturalism policy in
periods of socio-political transformation.
CHAPTER 2
Citizenship and Multiculturalism:
Managing Difference in an Ethnoculturally Diverse State
Introduction
Both state and non-state actors in Canada have appealed for models of
ethnocultural relations based on their particular conception ofthe requirements and bonds
ofmembership in a political community. We contend that discourses on citizenship are
fiindamentally linked to the development of ethnocultural policy in Canada. This chapter
continues our analysis of multiculturalism in Canada by establishïng the connection
between citizenship and the management of ethnocultural diversity. It explores the
literature on citizenship both in Canada and abroad, analysing how the concept bas served
as a conceptual frâmework for thinldng about the meaning and scope of membership in a
diverse political community. It examines the traditional language ofcitizenship largely
confined to race and immigration and the expansion ofthe idea of citizenship related to
the diversity ofarenas in which citizenship is now being claimed and contested. This
analysis also considers a range of strategies for managing difference and recognising
citizens in ethnoculturally diverse states.’
This chapter retums to the argument introduced in the previous chapter about the
role played by institutions as constitutive of meanings ofpolitics. It does so by exploring
Attempts to reconcile diversity with the norms ofcitizenship are discussed by Micheline Labelle and
Daniet Salée in « La citoyenneté en question: l’Etat canadien face à l’immigration et la diversité nationale
et culturelle », Sociologie et sociétés, vol. 31, n° 2, (1999), 125-144; and Danielle Juteau « Le
multiculturalisme est-il compatible avec l’idée moderne de citoyenneté? », dans L. K. Sosoe, ed. Diversité
humaine. Démocratie, multiculturalisme et citoyenneté, (Québec: Les Presses de l’Université LavaI, 2002).
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the interplay between ideas and institutions in mediating conflicts of value in Canadian
society. Beneath every policy debate there is a complex but important process through
which issues corne to awareness and ideas about them become influential. As Donald
Schon lias terrned them, these “ideas in good currency” may change slowly or lag behind
present events but they provide a reference point for policy debates.2 Untangling the
meaning of these political ideas requires an interpretive analysis with an emphasis on
political language. Ronald Manzer lias captured the essence ofthis enterprise:
Political ideas constitute meanings ofpolitics and policies because they form the
language through which people understand their place in the political world, and
thence articulate their interests, conceive modes of association with others in their
political community, and devise courses of collective action. Political thinking is the
condition for political action; political language is the precondition for political
thinking; political ideas are the elements ofpolitical language. If the existence of
public policies implies collective awareness or consciousness of choice, either
prospectively or retrospectively, collective consciousness ofthe meanings ofpolitical
institutions and public policies depends on being able to describe them by the means
ofthe ideas that comprise the community’s political language.3
Analysing the political ideas inherent in citizenship debates then, provides a
method for leaming the language of ethnocultural politics and policy-making. Policy
making, to be clear, is about trying to solve public problems
— a process that includes an
awareness of a problem (problem recognition), a persuasive argument about the nature of
the problem, and possible solutions (problem definition).4 The core process ofconcem,
2 D. A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), 123. The ways in
which shared ideas spread and how one shared idea replaces another is also represented in the work of the
philosopher Daniel Dennett, Darwin ‘s’ Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings ofLfe (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1995); and J.W. Kingdom, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (New York:
Harper Collins, 1995).
Ronald Manzer, Public Schools and Politicat Ideas: Canadian Educational Policy in Historical
Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 6.
4Leslie A. Pal, Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times, 2” eU.
(Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson, 2001), 96-100.
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however, is the intellectual process of shaping the problem definition (jroblem
structuring). Such a process involves the mobilization ofpolitical actors and policy
specialists whose interest is with helping to shape a workable understanding ofthe
problem.5 Our focus in this chapter is therefore on the content of ideas that emerge from
considerations of membership and social cohesion prevalent within citizenship studies.
The rest ofthe chapter is divided into several sections. The first part is devoted to
a discussion ofthe political ideas inherent in the literature on citizenship. A connection
between citizenship and ethnocultural relations is explored and evidence from the
literature and laden phrase “identity politics” is presented as a venue where the two fields
oflen meet. We then consider ethnocultural policy and multiculturalism in particular as an
extension of the ideas central to citizenship. Ibis section delves into what might be
termed the “big debate” ofethnocultural relations within liberal democratic states —
attempting to uncover the appropriate policy options designed for managing differences
among populations.6 Multiculturalism represents a very specific response to ethnocultural
relations and can best be understood if distinguished comparatively from other possible
responses, including but flot limited to segregation and assimilation. We conclude by
presenting multiculturalism as an expression of contemporary citizenship for ethnically
diverse societies, one in which political integration (the goal of any democratic state) may
be facilitated. Such an understanding, we demonstrate, is based on a view of social
W. N. Dunn, Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction (Englewood Cliifs, NJ: Prentice Hafl, 1994), 138.
6Most of the methods for eliminating rather than managing differences among populations have few
defenders among contemporary policy experts. It is worth remembering, however, the Western democracies
have in the past used forced population transfers, and genocide to deal with inter-ethnic tensions. The
historical freatment of indigenous peoples in North America and more recently acts of “ethnic cleansing” in
the former Yugoslavia are both examples ofextreme methods for eliminating differences.
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cohesïon where concems about social stability, political unity, and civil peace meet to
address the goal ofmembership in a political community.7 As we document here and in
subsequent chapters, many of the fears about the erosion of citizenship or the
fragmentation of national unity prevalent within debates about multiculturalism can be
traced to the vanous dimensions of social cohesion. Other concems about
multiculturalism, as we discover, are linked less to identity concems (identification and
attachment to a political community) than to the legitimacy of state intervention in areas
of social policy and in the lives of citizens more generally.
2.1 Citizenshtp and Betonging
The desire to live together in harmony and to manage the differences between
cultures has long been an area of interest for theorists engaged in citizenship studies.
Prior to the 1990s, citizenship was largely discussed only in relation to questions of race
and immigration. Today the concept seems to have captured the interest of a wide range
of academics from an equally wide range of perspectives.
While there may be no single view of citizenship, issues surrounding membership
is where the politics of citizenship has taken root. Often this implies more than a
discussion of “who does and who does flot belong.” It includes struggies over the
meaning ofmembership in the community in which ones lives. It is not uncommon,
This is Kymlicka and Norman’s characterization of social cohesion. They speak of social cohesion in the
context of their discussion on “citizenship worries” which they view as a product of “the aspect or aspects
ofcitizenship that are supposedly endangered by various cultural rights”. See “Citizenship in Culturally
Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts,’ in Citizensh%r in Diverse Societies, eds. Will Kymiicka and
Wayne Nonnan (New York: OUP, 2000), 31. See also Denise Helly, “Social Cohesion and Cultural
Plurality,” Canadian Journal ofSociology, 28(1) 2003: 19-42.
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therefore, for the literature to reflect this preoccupation by using concepts such as justice,
recognition, inclusion, participation, and responsibility. These are then linked to models
ofreality (how the world works) and the prescriptions that flow from them (what policy
makers should do). From the standpoint oftrying to understand ethnoculturaÏ policy
througb the language of contemporary citizenship, the role of ideas becornes of crucial
importance.
Like ail the important contested poiitical concepts of our tirne the concept of
citizenship can be appropnated within very different poiitical discourses and articulated
to very different positions. Most authors who equate citizenship with membership are
inciined to discuss the legitimacy of social rights that are to be provided by the state. For
T.H. Marshail, the fuilest expression ofthese rights required a iiberal welfare state. In his
discussion of citizenship and social ciass lie provides one of the earliest, clearest and
most suggestive accounts of the histoncal and social reasons for the emergence of the
post-war weifare state.8 Aithough the bulk of Marshali’s work was focused on the Bntish
experience his terms of reference were implicitly general and capable of widespread
application in the social sciences of Western societies. It is flot surprising therefore that
writing on social citizenship since then has denved a considerable extent from Marshall’s
thinking on the subject.9 Conceptualiy, the interest in social citizenship has spawned two
overlapping but distinct sets ofrights’ concerns. The first set of “conventionai social
citizenship nglits refers to social weifare entitiements sucli as income security programs
8 T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenshtp and Social Devetopment (London: Trentham, 1949).
Sec, for instance, Gosta Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of W4fare Capitalism (Oxford: Polity
Press, 1990); and Paul Pierson, Dismantiing the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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and health care guarantees. While the second set of “new” social citizenship rights
presents a more encompassing set of social policy provisions compared to specific (i.e.
fragmented) welfare programs noted above. In this second representation, social rights
refer to guarantees of equal opportunity for socially disadvantaged groups that are
designed to facilitate their full participation in public as well as economic life.1° The
building of social institutions and the establishment of social rights for citizens along the
unes of the “new” social citizenship has become the dominant trend in the literature)1
In Marshall’s initial exploration ofthe topic he proposed that citizenship
flourished under a particular kind of social bond — through a direct sense of community
membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession.12 In this
conception citizens are viewed as political actors constituting political spaces. Cioseiy
linked to democratic and neo-republican thought, this model emphasized the invoivement
of citizens in the building of society. In discussions over the last decades this idea lias
helped to encourage thinking outside a purely legal framework where citizenship was
once seen merely in terms of the formai mies of nationality. The effect of this judgment
lias been to reinforce the widespread argument that citizenship is at heart an oppositional
concept, defining a reiationship between individuals and the state.13 Membership is,
10 Lynda Brickson and J. Scott Matthews, “The Mass Politics of Social Citizenship”. Paper prepared for the
Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meetings, May 30 to June 1, 2003, Halifax, NS.
“One ofthe ongoing debates generated by an interest in social citizenship has been the critique that
multicultural policies make it difficuit to sustain an expansive Welfare State. This position is discounted by
Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka in, “Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare StateT’ Queen’s
University, School ofPolicy Studies, Working Paper 33 (Revised Version: December 2004).
12 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Oxford, OUP, 1950).
13 Gerard Delanty, “Models ofCitizenship: Defining European Identity and Citizenship”, Citizenshi,r,
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, (1997), 288.
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however, not conditional, it is a matter ofnght and entitlement. But it is reciprocal
—
providing rights, but also demanding responsibilities towards the community.
While Marshall’s work captured the spint ofBntain’s post-war statism it
remained virtually suent on the question of competing ethnie identities. There was no
discussion of the state ‘s role in mediating disputes among different ethnic groups, nor
was there a discussion of how to advance respect for minorities and alleviate racism
through social policy. In Marshall’s defence these were unlikely the issues that
preoccupied him and lis contemporaries — class and production relations were the key
social cleavage ofthe post-war citizenship model. The resuit ofthis tradition,
nonetheless, is that it helped establish a conceptual framework for thinking about the
management ofethnicity in modem liberal democracies. It did so in a number ofways.
first and foremost, research on citizenship established a number of constituent
dimensions or concepts that the literature on managing ethnie relations would corne to
share. This connection is especially apparent in that both policy areas focus on the
dimensions of membership required to permit a liberal democratic state to function in the
face of diversity. These dimensions include measures for eliminating as well as managing
differences between citizens or groups. For instance, models of social citizenship are
focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the representation of state interests as it applies
to the design or redesign ofwelfare state architecture.’4 At an operational Jevel this has
corne to mean a choice arnong which major social policy initiatives and goals for public
spending should be designed to achieve some measure of equality among citizens.
14 Jane Jenson and Denis Saint-Martin, “New Routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship and the Social
Investment State”. Canadian Journal ofSocioÏogy: 28(1) 2003, 89.
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Likewise for those interested in state responses to ethnocultural relations, the attention
has been on the appropriate mix ofpolicy instruments designed to alleviate tensions
between ethnic groups and promote unity and equality.
Second, the work on citizenship suggested that membership in the liberal
democratïc state would remain a contested concept. Dunng times of economic and
political uncertainty state actors have ftequently sought to redefine policy goals and look
for changes to the status quo. With its origin firmly in the politics ofrights, this meant
citizenship would inevitably be swept up in discussions focusing on the re-allocation of
services and entitiements offered by the state. As the debates on citizenship were
eventually broadened to include race and ethnic relations it became difficuit for both
proponents and opponents of a liberal welfare state to exciude ethnicity as a variable
within their problem definition. This led social theorists by the I 970s to consider the
impact for ethnic minorities ofpower relations and the structural inequalities related to
the operation ofthe capitalist economy.’5 It also produced a considerable effort aimed at
empiricalÏy measuring attitudes towards ethnoculturaÏ diversity that would prove useful
in the production of social policy aimed at ethnic communities.’6
Admiftedly, there are differences that become apparent when comparing the
literatures on social citizenship and ethnocultural relations and citizenship — explaining in
In Canada some of the studies during this period include: J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1965); Leo Driedger, The Canadian Ethnic Mosaic: A Questfor Identily
(Toronto: McClelIand and Stewart, 1978); and Jeffiey G Reitz, The Survival ofEthnie Groups (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980).
16 See J.W. Berry, R. Kalin and Donald M. Taylor, Multicutturalism and Ethnie Attitudes in Canada
(Ottawa, Deparfinent of Supply and Services, 1977). More recently Statistics Canada has measured
attitudes towards ethnicity: “Ethnic Diversity Survey: Portrait ofa Multicultural Society,’ Statisties
Canada: Housing, Family and Social Statisties; 89-593-XIE. (Ottawa, Minister of Indusfry, 2003).
38
part the presence of two separate but interrelated fields of study. One dïfference arises
over the very idea of state support for prescriptive policy. for instance, few of even the
rnost radical proponents of change to the post-war welfare state model would suggest that
govemment should remove itself altogether from ail areas of social policy. Ibis would
include the strongest supporters of ftee-market principies in Canada and abroad who
recognise that citizenship warrants some degree of state investment to enhance or protect
social cohesion. Even in the wake of increasing global competition and the focus on the
knowiedge-based economy, nght-leaning governments have corne to a sirnilar conclusion
and continue to advocate an interventionist role in areas of social policy. Support in
Canada for these rneasures lias, for example, continued to sustain various incorne-based
security prograrns. The issue then is not about the presence of intervention, but the
degree.
No such consensus on the need to support state intervention, liowever minimal,
exists among theorists and policy-makers concemed with managing ethnocultural
relations. The starting point of their discussions commonly revolves around the rationale
for any degree of state supported action. The outcome is effectively to split the field into
tliose theorists and commentators who accept the need for state action but disagree over
the appropriate methods for achieving certain goals, and those who reject a role for the
state outright by suggesting that the management of etlinocultural relations to foster
social cohesion is compromised through an empliasis on group differences rather than
commonalities.’7
17 In the first category of Canadian supporters of the poiicy we rnight include Kyrniicka, Taylor, Fieras and
Eiliott (introduced in Chapter 1). In the second group, some of the rnost notable objections to the policy in
Canada have corne from authors who view multiculturalisrn as working against the need to prornote
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A second version of this argument, that multiculturalism divides rather than unites
citizens, includes supporters of a model of limited govemment who believe that the state
has no business cultivating or validating cultural diversity.’8 This position is markedly
different from that which advocates intervention through such policies as
multiculturalism in the belief that ït may serve to stifle dissent among minorities and
preserve the status quo among social classes.’9 There is a difference, in other words,
between those who oppose multiculturalism, and individuals who hope to use it for
reasons antithetical to those underlying current state policy.
This brings us to the third contribution ofthinking about citizenship, an awareness
of a time perspective. If citizenship remains a contested concept then the interest it
generates is likely to rise and fali. In this sense it is very much a product ofa certain lime
and place. Like discussions of citizenship more generally, the re-emergence of ethnicity
cultural and political unity through homogenization. Reginald Bibby, in particular, views multiculturalism
as impeding the full integration and acceptance of immigrants into the mainsfteam. See Mosaic Madness:
The Poverty and Potential ofLfe in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1990). Likewise, Neil Bissoondath argues
for “reasonable diversity within vigorous unity” as an alternative to the cunent policy. Sec Setting
Illusions: The Cuit ofMulticulturatism in Canada (Pengum Canada, 1994), 224. Other prominent critics
inciude the Canadian historias J.L. Granatstein. Sec Who Killed Canadian Histoîy? (Toronto:
HarperCollins, 1998); Richard Day, Muiticutturalism and the History ofCanadian Diversity (University of
Toronto Press, 2000); and Daniel Stoffman, “The Illusion of Muiticulturalism,” in MulticulturaÏism and
Immigration: An Introductory Reader, cd. Eispeth Cameron (Toronto: CSPI, 2004).
18 This une ofreasoning is most commoniy associated with neo-iiberal arguments about the necessity of
reducing state intervention in policy areas that are considered to be in the private domain, and hence flot a
legitimate arena for govemment involvement. In Canada, this position was first adopted at the federal party
level by the Reform Party in 1989 as one of its founding principles. Reform Party of Canada, Plaform and
Statement ofPrinciples (October 1989). Since the merger of the Canadian Alliance (formerly the Reform
Party) and the Progressive Conservative Party in December of 2003, the officiai policy ofthe Conservative
Party of Canada has become somewhat iess clear. Whiie the party’s first policy deciaration speaks of
multiculturalism as a “valued reality”, it fails short of spealdng directly to the requirement of supporting
multiculturalism through public funding. Sec Conservative Party of Canada, Policy Dectaration, (March
19, 2005), 33.
19 If any confusion exists here between the two it is likely because most people assume that one either
supports multiculturalism forsimilar reasons, or opposes it for equally similar but different reasons. The
reality is more compiex. As we noted in the first chapter there is more than one theory about the nature of
multiculturaiism and its effect on inter-culturai relations.
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and its relationship to social cohesion in the ilterature of the past decade is a product of
our times. As noted earlier, ideological arguments about the role ofthe state in the
production of services to meet public ends has drawn considerable and wide attention. In
Canada, this has encouraged the view in some quarters that investment in a social policy
agenda over the past two decades has taken a back seat to the federal priorities of debt
reduction, tax cuts, and more recently national security concerns.20 For both defenders
and opponents of this sweeping endeavour the battles waged over social policy are very
much part ofthe new reality of public issue management in turbulent times.21
In addition, increasing levels of diversity throughout Western liberal societies has
also sparked the interest in the connection between ethnocultural relations and the
dimensions of social cohesion. Recent events from Europe, most notably the noting of
French Muslim youths in the fail of 2005 has only served in many cases to strengthen the
resolve ofboth advocates and opponents ofa particular state treatment ofthe “ethnic
issue”.22 Likewise, the debate over immigration in the aftermath ofthe September 11,
20 Peter Hicks, Social Policy Reform in Canada: Establishing an Effective Social Policy Agenda with
Constrained Resources. International Development Research Centre (IDRC) (Ottawa, 1995); Michael J
Prince, “from Health and Welfare to Stealth and fareweli: Federal Social Policy 1980-2000,” in How
Ottawa Spends 1999-2000: Shape Shfling: Canadian Governance Toward the 2Ist Centuiy, ed., Leslie Pal
(Don Mills, OUP, 1999); and Andrew Jackson, “Whatever Happened to Social Development?” Submission
to hie House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance. Canadian Council on Social Development. May
21, 2002.
21 The reference to “public issue management in turbulent times” is taken from the subtitle of Leslie A.
Pal’s book, Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Zîmes.
22 The riots were touched off by the deaths of two Muslim youths of African origin elecfrocuted in a power
station as they fied the police in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois on Oct. 27. Responsibility for the
violence some conclude must fail, in part, on the shoulders of the French Republic and its unwillingness to
give immigrants a stake in a new national identity. For a discussion ofFrance’s failure to recognize etlmic
communities as legitimate actors, see Timothy B. Smith, france in Crisis: We(fare, Inequaliry and
Globatization since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Violence of the sort, if flot of
the same degree, has occurred elsewhere in Europe, most notably the fighting between Pakistani and
Bangladeshi immigrants and British police officers in several towns in northem England in the summer of
2001.
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2001 terrorist attacks in the United States has challenged policymakers and academics
alike. The challenge, as some see it, is to implement measures that will strengthen
domestic security without turning away from a tradition that recognises the contribution
of immigrants to their host societies.23 Stiil others see in immigration from non-Western
sources the potential to undermine the basis of political unity as government-sanctioned
privileges (read multiculturalism) “rejects the idea ofa “color-blind” society ofequal
individuais and instead promotes a “color-conscious” society”.24
With these views and concems in mmd advocates of officiai multiculturaiism in
Canada point to the increasing growth of foreign bom residents as the natural resuit of a
liberal immigration policy and further evidence ofthe need to retain an inclusive policy
that promotes tolerance.25 Opponents ofthe poiicy are no less moved by the increasingly
heterogeneous nature ofthe Canadian population which they view as further confirmation
of the need to promote a singuiar Canadian identity.26
23 On the challenges of diversity in Canada, particular immigration in the post 9/11 environment see
Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel, Setiing Diversity: Immigration, MutticuÏturalism, Employment
Equity, and Globalization (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2002).
24This is the argument by Samuel P. Huntington. See ‘If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington
Responds to His Critics,” foreign Affairs, November/December 1993. Strong disagreement with
multicultural accommodation can also 5e found in Arthur M. Schiesinger, fie Disuniting ofAmerica:
Reflections on e Multiculturel Society (New York: WW Norton, 1992). In Britain, the unfolding social and
political responses to racial equality and the hostile response to multiculturalism over the past two decades
is chronicled in Roger HewiWs White Backlash and the Politics ofliulticulturalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
25 Other comments about the need for multiculturalism include: that problems of national unity are not the
result of its diversity, but the resuit of a failure to recognize diversity; that the policy works to remove
discriminatoiy barriers that preclude equality; and that multiculturalism is a necessaiy response to the
reality of a diverse Canadian society.
26 See, for instance, Garth Stevenson, “Multiculturalism: As Canadian as Apple Pie,” Inroads, vol. 4 (May
1995).
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2.2 Citizenshti, and Identily Potitics
Evidence of a wide-ranging conversation exploring the links between citizenship
and the identity based political movernents ofthe second halfofthe twentieth century is
increasingly apparent. The term “identity politics” lias corne to signify a wide range of
political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of certain social
groups. Identity politics begins with the investigation of previously stigmatized accounts
of group rnembership. These social rnovements have fostered a body of literature that
takes up questions about the nature, ongin and futures of the identities being defended.
One ofthe most renowned ofthese investigations considers the relationship ofethnicity
to an evolving post-national citizenship. In her work, Limits of Citizenshzp: Migrants and
Fost-National Membershzp in Europe, Yasmeen Soysal presents an empirical examination
ofTurkish migrants in six European countries, and in so doing reflects on the complexity
of cultural and identity issues that surround their status as guest workers.27 This
foundation leads Soysal to posit the evolution of a post-national model of mernbership in
which identities continue to be culturally particulanzed, but rights are decoupled from
nation-states and universalized under an international human rights rubric. Although flot
an examination of European policies towards ethnic rninorities, her study teli us a great
deal about the posture of European govemments towards the absorption of a certain
category of immigrants. The challenge of diversity in the modem world leads the author
to present a compelling argument for an inclusive democratic ideal compatible with
ethnocultural diversity. While her conclusions based on the study ofTurkish migrants are
27y N. Soysal, Limits ofCitizenshzp: Migrants and Postnationaï Membershz in Europe (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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removed from Canada’s recent experience with ethnocultural relations, they suggest that
membership, and particularly the tensions between host and immigrant communities, has
increasingly become a socially and politically significant concem of Western
govemments.
At a theoretical level, Soysal ‘s discussion of citizenship emphasises a post
national dimension. While flot implying that citizenship is devoid of any meaning when
detached from the nation state, most authors writing of the Canadian experience highlight
the discourse and practice of citizenship that individuals have as members of bounded
communities. Several stand out in this regard, including Alain Cairns’ Reconfigurations:
Canadian Citizensht and Constitutional Change; Bourque and Duchastel’s L ‘Identité
fragmentée: Nation et citoyenneté dans tes débats constitutionnels canadiens, 1941-1992;
Jenson and Phillips’ “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada”; Miriam
Smith’s A Civil $ociety?: Collective Actors in Canadian Folitical Ljfe; and Kymlicka’s
Multicultural Citizenshzp.28 What these works have in common is their reference to the
problems and stresses associated with Canada’s identity as a multinational and
multicultural country.
for Alan Cairns, one ofthe dominant themes emerging from recent constitutional
discussions in Canada has been a consideration of ethnicity
— be it expressed as
Abonginal rights, immigration, or multiculturalism. The centrality of ethnicity’s position
28A1an Cairns, Reconfigurations. Canadian Citizensh%,j and Constitutionat Change (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1995); Miriam Smith, A Civil Society?: Collective Actors in Canadian Politicat Lfe
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005); G Bourque and J. Duchastel, L’Identitéfragmentée: Nation et
citoyenneté dans les débats constitutionnels canadiens, 1941-1992 (Montreal: Fides, 1996); Jane Jenson
and Susan Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada.” International Journal of
Canadian Studies. 1996: 14: 111-35; WiIl Kyrnlicka, Multicultural Citizenshtp: A Liberal Theo,y of
Minority Rights (Oxford: OUF, 1995).
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in Canada, lie notes, is confirmed as ail ofthese issues have appeared in one form or
another in the iast three attempts at constitutionai renewal in Canada (with the exception
ofmulticulturalism’s absence in the Charlottetown Accord). According to Cairns, the
saliency of ethnicity in Canada has been particularly obvious since the mid 1 980s in
discussions ofthe Charter ofRights and Freedoms. Among the most important analyses
ofthe Charter’s impact on public life in Canada, Cairns has argued that it is viewed as
more than an apparatus that hands out abstract rights. According to Cairns, most
Canadians now view the Constitution flot as unchanging part ofthe landscape, but rather
as a policy instrument for their goals, and perhaps more importantly, as making the most
fundamental statement that a society can about who counts as a citizen.29
By exploring the impact ofthe Charter on group politics, Cairns’ work
emphasises the ways in which political institutions and public policies shape the demands
of social forces. for a number of authors, however, this position overstates the impact of
state institutions on the current range of identity daims being advanced by identity based
social movements. As Miriam Smith has argued in her analysis ofthe gay liberation
movement, “If one of the resuits of the entrenchment of the Charter has indeed been the
rise of new forms of identity politics and a new frame of rights talk, then we would
expect that social movements prior to the Charter would have used the courts less and
would have been less anchored in rights-based frames”.3° The evidence, she concludes,
does not support the hypothesis; court challenges by equality seeking social movements
29 Cairns, 20-22.
30 Miriam Smith, “Social Movements and Equality Seeking: The Case of Gay Liberation in Canada,”
Canadien Journal ofPoliticat Science, 31: 2 (1998), 288.
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have a long history in Canada. Smith goes on to suggest, “The fact that a nascent social
movement with relatively weak political and financial resources and poor chances of
legal success chose to pursue and support litigation demonstrates that equality seeking is
a frame and a strategy that has deeper foots ifl Canadian society than some daim about
the Charter ‘s impact would suggest”.3’ Nevertheless, whether as a resuit of the Charter or
as part of a movement wïth deeper roots, the fact remains that identity daims are very
much part of the expanding collection of political movements commifted to struggies that
have hitherto been neglected or suppressed.
The capacity of state institutions to recognise and foster social forces is also
reflected in the literature on national identity. In L ‘Identitéfragmentée, Bourque and
Duchastel examine the evolving representation of national identities in Canada. Like
Smith, they concur that the Charter both as an institution and as a constitutional process
has contributed to the recognition of identity daims. However, while Smith chronicles
the equality seeking successes of social movements, Bourque and Duchastel survey the
problematic character ofthe Charter’s capacity to recognise different identities. Based on
the constitutional discourses offederal and provincial leaders from 1941 to 1992, they
discuss the general process of fragmentation of the Canadian identity that ultimately
resulted in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For the authors, this fragmentation is
responsible for the present crisis of legitimacy in Canada and has manifested itself in two
ways: the narrowing ofthe democratic space and the weakening ofthe national political
community. The solution to ffie current predicament varies, they argue, and hinges most
notably on whether it is analysed through a Quebec or Canadian perspective.
31 Ibid.
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The latter ofthe two concems expressed by Bourque and Duchastel is especially
important in that it supports our daim that identity concems vary flot only with time but
with space. In the present context this is abundantly clear to the extent that Quebec and
English Canada have had different and at times competing views conceming the value of
officiai multicuituralism. Most importantiy, the general acceptance of multiculturalism in
Canada has flot been matched in Quebec. There the poiicy has been heavily criticised for
having underrnined the daims to nationhood ofthe Québécois. This has lefi some feeling
that multiculturalism not only violates the spirit ofthe two founding nations’ thesis, but is
an aftempt to mask the national question that has otherwise dominated federal poiitics
since confederation.32
While the impact of the Charter on Canadian citizenship has been well
documented, by comparison, studies into the effects of ideological shifts on citizenship
are somewhat more recent.33 Jenson and Philiips have discussed the ideological effects of
citizenship change in light of its impact on interest advocacy and citizen access to elites.
With a simiiar emphasis on the role of ideology, Moms and Changfoot sought to uncover
how neo-liberaiism and transformations ofthe state have influenced the question of
national unity.34
32 Guy Rocher, «Les ambiguïtés d’un Canada bilingue et multiculturel », dans Le Québec en mutation
(Montreal: Hurtubise HMH, 1973); Julien Harvey, «Une Impasse, le multiculturalisme? » Texte présenté à
la Conference fédérale-provincale sur le multiculturalisme, Winnipeg, 1985; Muguette Labelle,
“Multiculturalism and Government” in James S. Frideres, ed. Multiculturatism and Intergroup Relations
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1989); and Danielle Juteau, “Multicultural Citizenship: The Challenge of
Pluralism in Canada,” in Citizensh;p and Exclusion, ed. Veit Bader (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1997),
96-112.
This theme appears to be ofparticular interest to European theorists. See D. Miller, “Bounded
Citizenship,” in Debating the Borders of Citizensh(p, ed. K. Hutchings. (London: Macmillan, 1998).
Martin J. Morris and Nadine Changfoot, “The Solidarity Deficit: The Rise ofNeo-liberalism and the
Crisis of National Unity,” InternationalJourizalofCanadian Studies, Issue, 14 (Fall 1996).
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In the case ofJenson and Phillips, they argue that the institutions and practices
that constitute Canadian citizenship were being dismantled through budgetary cuts and
general fiscal restraint.35 Their work is based on the premise that state institutions
consciously as well as inadvertently engage in the politics of recognition that contributes
to the stability or brings about change in the relationship between citizen and state. At its
most general, then, citizenship is about establishing the conditions of inclusion and
exclusion. In Canada, they argue, post-war citizenship fashioned afier Marshall’s passive
entitiement based on social rights was being restructured under pressure as state and non
state actors sought to make sense ofthe world conditions confronting them. Although
they share the notion with others that citizenship defines boundanes among individuals,
they emphasise the market driven pressures confronting states today are far different from
the politics of special interests (seeking differentiated rights) that is reflected in the
literature on the Charter ofRights and freedoms. As they daim, “more than a decade of
politics driven by a neo-conservative (New Right) agenda has resulted in new definitions
ofmarketised and individualised citizenship”.36 For Jenson and Phillips, the shïffing
relationship between state and society was evident in that the legitimacy of group action
and desire for social justice was losing ground to the notion that citizens and interests
could compete equally in the marketplace of ideas.
Drawing on Jenson and Phillips, Minam Smith argues that there is an important
relationship between the transformation of group politics in Canada and the transition
35According to Jenson, a citizenship regime includes “the institutional arrangements, mies and
understandings that guide and shape state policy; and the range of daims recognised as legitimate”. (1997,
631).
36Tbid, 115.
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from the Keynesian welfare state era to the era ofneo-liberal globalisation.37 What is
important about this work, in light our discussion of citizenship, is the argument that the
adoption of a neo-liberal agenda by the federal government in the 1 990s lias resulted in
tlie diminished capacity for democratic engagement. By assuming less responsibility for
the redistribution of social wealth and becoming increasingly concemed with reducing
spending, the federal govemment, she contends, has weakened the relationship between
state and citizen. The problem with this neo-liberal conception of citizenship, according
to Smith, is that it de-legitimises collective action and group activity. She concludes that
the professed need to restructure the state has gone beyond the level of policy change,
reshaping the central institutions of the state.
The nse ofneo-liberalism has also been chronicled in the works ofBradford,
Brodie, and McBride and Shields. The major contribution ofthese studies is their similar
attention to the process of macroeconomic policy change and the dismantling of the post
war economic and social order. For Bradford in Commissioning Ideas, there have been
few reonentations in national economic policy-making throughout Canadian history. The
current course of national policy is viewed by the author as a period of fundamental
change resulting from critical economic and social policy choices. More than mere
incremental change, Bradford contends that the Liberal govemment under Jean Chrétien
governed with a political agenda remarkably similar to that oftheir Conservative
predecessors. For all the talk ofpolicy innovation in the mn up to the 1993 election, the
Liberals continued and at times accelerated the pace of deficit reduction and public-sector
Miriam Smith, A Civil Society?: Collective Actors in Canadian Political Lfe (Peterborough: Broadview
Press, 2005).
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downsizing.38 Similarly, Janine Brodie argues that the course ofneo-liberal policy in
Canada has had a significant impact on social entitiements and social policies.39 Yet the
author makes the point of accounting for the decune in social programs as more than
simply a shift in governing philosophies and practices, but a “challenge” to the very basis
of Canadian’s understanding of themselves and their fellow citizens. In Dismantiing a
Nation, McBride and Shields contend that the continuity between the Conservative and
Liberal govemments has made the return to an activist federal state and a renewed social
policy focus seems quite remote. They argue that the pursuit ofmarket-driven strategies
to the resolution of economic problems has reinforced the disintegrative tendencies
emanating from regional, cultural and national tensions, and has undermined the uneasy
basis for national unity.4°
The points of convergence between the literature on citizenship and the rise of
neo-liberalism demonstrate a growing concem with the increased defection from support
for the public goods ofthe welfare state. At this point we are lefi to ask whether the same
can be said in the area of ethnocultural policy. Is there, or has there been, a growing
concem with ideological based aftacks similar to those evidenced in other social policy
areas? The short answer is yes. Yet, to daim that neo-liberalism, or any other
ideologically based movement, has single-handedly changed the character of
ethnocultural policy in Canada, would appear at this stage far too simplistic and
38 Bradford, 1-3.
u Janine Brodie, “Citizenship and Solidarity: Reflections on the Canadian Way,” Citizenshi,, Studies,
Volume 6, Number 4/ December 2002.
40 Stephen McBride and John Shields, Dismantiing a Nation: The Transition to Corporate Rule in Canada,
2”’ cd. (Halifax, NS: femwood, 1997), 18.
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deterministic. Choosing one determining variable as the cause in the absence of other
potential explanations is somewhat arbitrary, and at worst potentially misleading. One
could just as easily begin with the introduction of multiculturalism in Canada in 1971, or
with objections and pressure from Quebec nationalists. The options are numerous and
equally (potentially) valid.
While it may be difficuit to identify why etimocultural policy, and
multiculturalism in particular, has changed since the early 1 970s — a task taken up in
subsequent chapters — we need first to establish a context in which policy change
becomes possible. This requires recognition that there are a range of options available to
liberal democratic states for managing diversity. As noted in the first chapter, policies
such as multiculturalism are variable in their content and aiways subject to reformulation
when new ideas and circumstances discredit their practice and reopen debate. Many
states have experimented with different strategies reflecting the search for new policy
solutions that inevitably are marked by conflicting attitudes or ideas towards change.
2.3 Recognising Cilizens: Dtiftrent Strategiesfor Managing Diversity
A number of names have been given to explain the various policies that
contemporary states use in responding to ethnocultural diversity; multiculturalism,
interculturalism, pluralism, state patronage, the list goes on.41 Yet despite the wealth of
names there are perhaps only three broad strategies that a liberal democratic state might
pursue; assimilation, segregation, and integration. The first type may be viewed as a
41 One of the obvious omissions from the list given above is state sanctioned violence aimed at eradicating
a subordinate or minority group (genocide). As this section and chapter is primarily directed towards the
experience ofliberal democratic states, I exciude these cases here.
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means directed towards the elimination of differences while the latter two are examples
of attempts to manage differences. It is worth noting that the management of cultural
diversity like other areas of state intervention is part of a dynamic policy process that
evolves wïth time. For this reason it is useful to consider different stages in the evolution
of cultural policy in addition to contemporary cases. This section continues with several
examples in a cross-national ftamework. The cases offered are not intended to represent
an exhaustive list but to highlight certain features of the strategies considered here.
Creating Citizens by Assimilation
The first of the tbree strategies, assimilation, has been described as a one-way
process of absorption, where the intent is to supplant minority pattems of living and
impose the cultural and instïtutional values of the host (dominant) society. The desired
outcome is that the minority group in question loses its distinctiveness and acts like the
majority. This orientation towards diversity has been justified on the grounds that the
system ofbeliefs and values held by ethnocultural minorities are irrelevant, immoral, or
anachronistic.42 Like most policy measures designed to produce some degree ofoutward
compliance, the options available here range from more to less coercive. The banning, for
instance, of all ethnic associations that seek to celebrate and foster a minority identity
would be viewed as fairly heavy handed. In practice such a commitment would be
unlikely to bring about a wholesale absorption into the mainstream. Minority customs are
therefore generally tolerated as long as they are restricted to the private reaim.
42Augie Fieras and Jean Leonard Elliott, Engaging Diversity: MulticuÏturaÏism in Canada. 2nd cd. (Toronto:
Nelson, 2002), 61.
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Throughout Canadian history cultural assimilation bas been the state objective
most wriften into law, yet it has rarely worked as completely as designed. As a
consequence a strategy of cultural exclusion has ofien followed. Canada’s early
experience with immigration makes clear that conformity was to be achieved through
excluding certain groups that, for various reasons, were seen as inassimilable or
undesirable. Without the marked presence ofthese cultures British-Canadianism became
the de-facto standard. For the country’s major federal parties adherence to this policy was
a matter of some necessity. Both the Liberals and Conservatives viewed immigrants of
non-British origin as capable of weakening or debasing Canada’s national character.43
Canada’s history ofassimilationist policy has been matched elsewhere. In the
United States, immigration policy became the means to deny entry and identify the
conditions under which new residents could live. A case in point is the 1924 federal
immigration law designed to exciude certain groups deemed unacceptable or unable to be
readily assimilated.44 The legislation performed the dual role of exciuding “undesirables”
while allowing in those predominantly white European immigrants that were considered
likely to accept the dominant ideology and culture ofthe United States. Immigration
policy aside, the dnving force behind assimilation in the United States has flot been the
presence of restrictive policies but an underlying American ethos that values mgged
individualism and the idea of equality of opportunity. As John Garcia notes: “These
values have historically been ingredients of a pervasive American tradition that serves as
‘ Daiva Stasiulis and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Limited Inclusion in
Canada,” in Canadian Politics: An Introduction to the Discipline, eds. Alain Gagnon & James Bickerton
(Peterborough, Broadview Press, 1990), 581.
‘ Robert M. Jiobu, Ethnicity andAssimilation (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 8.
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a cuitural core that ail members of society (citizens or flot) intemalize, thus ensunng
societai stability and graduai change.45 Moreover, whiie ethnic differences are recognised
the expectation is that group members will intemalise American values within the first
generation. The importance of this obligation can flot be understated. Difference impiies
incompatibility with the dominant culture and the very idea of diversity suggests a
repudiation ofthe social and political fabric ofthe nation. Historically, defenders ofthis
position invoked a common refrain by arguing that multiple allegiances served to
minimise a common identity that ensured national pride both at home and abroad.46
Among European countries, France has received similar attention for its
management of immigration and ethnoculturai diversity through assimilation.47 Since the
revolution of 1789 the prevailing conceptions of nationaiity and citizenship have lcd the
French state to pursue policies aimed at cultural uniformity based on the norms prevailing
among the majority community. Untii recent reforms which ended the automatic
acquisition of french nationality by the chiidren of immigrants, membership in the
French polity was relativeiy open to outsiders. This openness was partly motivated by
demographic concems — a product ofFrance’s declining birthrate throughout the
nineteenth century and most ofthe twentieth century.48 This confidence in the capacity of
John Garcia, “A Multicultural America: Living in Sea ofDiversity,” in Multiculturalismfrom the
Margins, ed. Dean A. Hams (Westport, Connecticut: Bergin & Garvey, 1995), 30.
46 is therefore quite understandable, as Garcia continues that members of multicultural groups are seen as
opponents of mainstream society, patriotism, and American global power. (ibid., 30-31).
See, for example, Gérard Noiriel, The french Melting Pot (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press,
1996).
48Alec Hargreaves, Immigration, ‘Race” and Ethnicity in Contemporaiy france (London: Routledge,
1995), 162. Within the context offranco-German relations a low birth rate was a matter ofserious concem
when it came to raising a standing army.
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Frencli society to absorb immigrants is reflected in the number that entered the country
from 1950 through the 1960s. Yet the assimilationist tradition, like other aspects of
France’s revolutionaiy heritage, is double-sided and steeped in ambiguity. On the surface
the citizenship and immigration practices appear universalistic and egalitarian — in
keeping with republican principles. In cultural terms, however, they may be viewed as
exclusionaiy and repressive. The French mode! of assimilation implies that there are
standards ofbehaviour and values that ethnic groups can acquire. Leaving aside the
deeper theoretical issue of whether such standards may even be defined, the policy
enables the state to avoid challenges to the majority’s cultural hegernony.49 In short, it
accepts that particularistic cultures represent a rejection and therefore a danger to a
universal dominant culture and its influence on people and cornmunities.5°
In Canada, only in the latter halfofthe twentieth century would immigration
corne to play a more vital role in the electoral strategy of in particular, the federal Liberal
party. Cultural policy therefore, to the extent that it began to suggest pluralism as a
possible avenue for rnanaging diversity, was stili defined primanly as a pluralism oftwo
— English and French. The focus of state interests was to devise a solution to the
problems of a bilingual and bicultural state, flot the ethnoculturally diverse nature of the
country.
49As Peter S. Li notes generally, the inability to adequately define the behaviours and values needed to join
the majority of any culture raises two problems. On the one hand, in the absence of any objective criteria
any sign that appears at odds with the majority is taken to be an indication of incomplete assimilation. More
importantly, it is impossible in the first place for visible minorifies to ever assimilate completely. See Peter
S. Li, ed., “Race and Ethnicity,” in Race andEthnic Relations in Canada, 2” ed. (Toronto: OUP, 1999), 14.
50The riots in the fail of 2005 have only intensified longstanding debates about integration and
discrimination in france. for one perspective on the crisis see Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Frencli Riots:
Rebellion ofthe Underclass”, Femand Braudel Center, Binghamton University, Commentary No. 174, Dec.
1,2005.
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By the 1 950s, the commitment to Anglo conformity began to diminish with
postwar immigration from continental Europe and beyond. The reason was somewhat
understandable. In the two decades after 1950, Canada’s population almost doubled with
new immigrants contributing approximately seventeen percent to the total
•51 Uncertainty
about the cultural, socio-economic and political consequences of changes in the
population gave the federal govemment a reason to revaluate its approach. If only to help
immigrants seUle and foster a sense of community among a diverse population,
successive govemments began to modify the existing concept of Canada in une with
these new demographic realities.
$egregation: Separate — and Oflen Unequai — Citizenships
Unlike assimilation, where the goal ostensibly is to eliminate differences between
groups, segregation has a different aim and inspiration. Rather than absorbing difference,
the intent here is to isolate ethnic minorities from the mai ority culture by the imposition
of a normative moral, ethical and legal framework. In recent times the policy has been
employed primarily by white populations to maintain their ascendancy over other groups
by means of social colour barriers.52 The separation may be geographical leading to the
“ghettoisation” ofminority groups, but is usually supported or may be limited to
providing services through separate institutions such as schools. From the point ofview
ofethnic minority groups, this can mean involuntary exclusion from full and equal
51 Censuses ofCanada 1871 to 1996; Employment and Immigration Canada, Immigration Statistics, 1994
(Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997).
52 Some ofthe most complicated cases include the segregation of indigenous populations. The reservation
system in Canada and the United States is perhaps the ultimate symbol of this attempt.
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participation in virtuaily ail areas and institutions of public life. In effect, the creation ofa
separate or unequal citizenship is the resulting state of affairs.
Linked to the goal of guaranteeing the political and economic power of a
dominant group, support for segregation also tends to be based on the assumption that
assimilation is either not possible or flot desired. In the first instance, the presence of a
significantly numerous ethnie minority might make it unlikely to ever fully assimilate
into the mainstream culture. It may also be built on the assumption that assimilation can
neyer be totally achieved. The other basis for segregation is based on psychological and
biological conceptions of race. Advocates of racial segregation are apt to reject an
egalitarian conception of multicultural integration. The histoncai example of the United
States is a case in point. Although the American Constitution had unambiguously
provided legal guarantees to ail of its citizens, African-Americans were subject to
segregationist laws for most of that nation’s history.
By the mid 1 960s, the civil rights movement, fuelled by the guiding ideas of
liberalism, had taken shape. Through various organisations and as individuals, African
Americans began to bring to the fore deeply critical views of racism and segregation by
measuring their reality with the yardstïck of the nation’s highest principles.53 One of the
means by which this resentment was channelled into effective opposition was through the
use of the legal system. Efforts more recently to enforce anti-discrimination laws and to
promote affirmative action programs for selected groups have met with resistance in the
United States. As a result, the federal govemment has been reluctant to recognise groups
Lucius T. Outlaw, “Racial and Ethnic Complexities in American Life: Implications for African
Americans,” in Multicutturalismfrorn the Margins, ed. Dean A. Harris (Westport, Connecticut: Bergin &
Garvey, 1995), 41.
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as special categories eligible for benefits or targeted sanctions. This stems from the idea
that freedom of choice allows each person to work out his or her differences with the
resuit that banding together becomes voluntary. While the activism of the civil rights
movement heightened the awareness ofthe disempowerment ofminority groups, it was
unable to challenge the deep seated beliefthat cultural pluralism represented anything
else but a serious challenge to American individualism.
Another informative example of segregation can be gleaned ftom South Africa’s
apartheid past. The main focus of legislation enacted during the late 1 940s concemed
population registration, the prohibition of mixed marnages, demarcation of group areas,
and restructuring of education — nothing less than a state apparatus designed to maintain
etimic pnvilege. The govemment of the day, determined to resist any and ail movements
toward seif-determination, insisted that in South Africa seif-determination for the
minority white population was incompatible with majority African rule. The resuit was a
program of separate development through the establishment of a national homeland, or
Bantustan, where Africans were encouraged to seftle. Under the guise of “trusteeship”,
state policy was to confine the African majority to reserves that could flot support them,
thus ensuring the continuation of cheap labour.54 Those that chose to remain in many of
South Afnica’s black townships were denied basic political rights and were subject to
deportation in the event ofunrest or large-scale unemployment.
By creating new citizenship status through the homelands, the white’s only policy
effectively removed the Affican population from protection under the law. Before the
The state legislation that permifted the Apartheid govemment to do this was the Group Areas Act of
1950; it was only repealed in 1991.
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establishments ofthe homelands, the govemment’s obligation to the black majority, as
limited as it was, made them subjects of the state. The redefinition of citizens as
foreigners, however, was driven by the idea of marginalising rather than serving the
mai ority black population. Yet the idea of enshrining a constitution that promoted
exclusion rather then integration was destined to provoke conflict. By promoting racial
pnvilege apartheid ironically accelerated the downfall of institutionalised racism and
brought with it an end to state sanctioned segregation. It therefore failed quite
irrevocably, in the final analysis, to stave off dissent and secure the stability of the
regime, as unjust and illegitimate as it may have been.
With the benefit of the foregoing discussion a more general critique of
segregation can be advanced and separated into two areas; that it is either unworkable or
limits personal fteedom. In ffie first instance segregation is unworkable because it does
flot adequately address the central issue of disunity it is designed to mitigate (a similar
indictment is made against multiculturalism, a charge we take-up later in this chapter).
Rather than serving as a check to the potential problems that ethnocuÏtural differences
create, segregation serves in the long term to exacerbate an already complicated situation.
It does so in many ways. By restricting contact with other individuals and institutions
segregation curtails the opportunities people have to participate in civil society. far from
aiding social cohesion, where members share common values enabling them to identify
common aims and objectives, this effectively frustrates attempts to collectively deal with
problems facing the state. Grievances, in part from ethnocultural minorities, can then
begin to spiral with resistance to state control conceivably met with punitive measures or
violence.
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Segregation also fails short in the reaim ofpersonal fteedom, which has emerged
as a central principle influencing contemporary discourse on ethnocultural policy. Along
with assimilation, neither strategy lias any positive lessons to provide in this area. Both
regard it as a primary function of the state to overly prescribe the moral character of
society by willingly eliminating or segregating ethnocultural differences. A truly liberal
democratic state, altematively, should by definition reject such attempts and allow
citizens the fteedom to develop their own identity and form their own associations.55 This
stems from the liberal view that state action cannot be justified on the basis that one’s life
is more or less worthy or meaningful than that of another. Furthermore, since many
people believe in more than one objective “correct” set of values, every person should
enjoy the freedom to arrive at their own conception ofthe good.56 By “conception ofthe
good” we can include the hopes one might have to establish mutually beneficial
attachments to other individuals — or a sense ofbelonging to a wider community.
Each member of society is, nonetheless, expected to live up to certain normative
standards of behaviour. Individuals are expected to participate in the workings of society
and contnbute to the common good in exchange for the individual rights and benefits that
society endows upon its members. This is the moral connection between the individual
and society. Stili, while a degree of social order is important for maintaining national
unity, there is no requirement that it must corne at the expense of cultural pluralism.57 No
This point has been made by Charles Taylor, “The Politics ofRecognition” in Multiculturalism:
Examining the Potitics ofRecognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), 25-
73; and Will Kymiicka in Multiculturat Citizensh;p.
56 Joseph Raz, The Moratity ofFreedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 108.
Social order is flot the same thing as social cohesion. As Dick Stanley points out, “[social order] can arise
in a socially cohesive society... but they also inevitably arise in an authoritarian society or a beleaguered
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consensus in the literature or conclusive empirical proof suggests otherwise. In fact, what
is needed is not necessariiy cuitural homogeneity but support for a culture with shared
values that creates a sense of familiarity or belonging. Citizens in a liberal democracy, it
may be argued, will be more likeiy to deveiop an attachment to the nation if they view
those who govem them as working wïthin an established and legitimate framework.
Conversely, citizens that either do not recognise their leaders or the political system as
legitimate are less likely to be open to measures undertaken by the state to promote
national identity. Along similar lines several authors suggests that the acceptance of
pluralist integration as a stat&s defining cuiturai philosophy is a significant advance over
previous ideologies and iikely the best route for polyethnic and multinational states to
follow.58 Kymiicka, in particular asks, what holds theses nations together in the absence
of any common history or shared history? The great variance in historicai, cultural, and
political situations suggests that no one solution is likely to appiy in ail cases. However,
he notes: “What is clear, I think, is that if there is a viable way to promote a sense of
solidarity and common purpose in a multinational state, it wiil invoive accommodating,
rather than subordinating, national identities. People from different national groups wiil
only share an allegiance to the iarger polity if they see it as the context within which their
national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated”.59
community such as Nazi Gennany, a street gang, or the Michigan Militia. However, they succeed in
achieving these characteristics at the price ofcoercion and exclusion.” In “What do we know about Social
Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government’s Social Cohesion Research Network.”
Canadian Journal of$ociotogy, 28(1), 2003, 9.
58 Kymiicka, Multicultural Citizensh4p. See also John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1999).
This is a central argument of Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship.
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Integration: Out ofMany, Oiie Citizenship
It is obvious that ethnic conflict on any level is a crisis most states seek to avoid.
Doing so within a framework where democratic principles and human rights are
respected is more challenging. This is, in part, the legacy of the evolution in thinldng
about pnnciples of non-discrimination and the wider acceptance ofminority and cultural
rights in the second haif of the twentieth century.6° It is also the resuit of the growth of
liberal values and the spread of democracy. This does flot suggest that these rights and
principles could flot be violated. It is, however, certainly more problematic and less
acceptable to violate minority rights in a democratic regime. Liberal-democratic states
that violate human or minority riglits often feel obliged and occasionalÏy pressured to
present an explanation for their behaviour before the international community. In essence,
while maintaining national cohesion is stili a basic goal for every national govemment,
increasingly it has to coexist with the principles of democracy and human rights.
With these concems in mmd interest in ethnic integration has, especially in the
English-speaking world, eclipsed other strategies as a just form of recognition and
accommodation of ethnocultural minorities. With its foots in pluralist theory, where the
focus is on the retention of personal identities and recognition of citizens, etimic
integration stresses that the hannonious coexistence of different groups is based on the
maintenance of their own unique characteristics within a larger community. At an
interpersonal level this involves the social processes by which individuals of different
60 For example, this acceptance was reflected in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (1948) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). The latter stipulated that minorities should flot
be denied religious freedom, the use of their language, and more importantly in the context of our
discussion, they should be able to “enjoy their culture’.
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ethnic groups interact. This interaction resuits in changes to the ethnic identity of the
individuals creating a new transcendent identity of citizens that is more than the sum of
its constituent parts. The key features of this integrationist process may be summarised as
follows: it is flot assimilation — ethnocuitural minorities should flot be expected to give up
their distinctive cultures and identities to integrate into the new society; it is a two way
process — ethnocultural groups must adapt to their new society but the new society must
also adapt; it involves ail of society — while govemment should lead, integration involves
civil society; it requires the active participation of immigrants in articulating their needs
and in the development and delivery of services; and finally, it should take place within a
rights ftamework (equality and anti-discrimination legislation and policies).6’
There are several forms, or more appropriately, degrees of ethnic integration; the
Melting Pot and the Mosaic are the most commonly known.62 The Melting Pot entails a
reciprocal relationship, where etbnic integration is founded upon the desire for all groups
to contribute in the formation of one culture. Ideally, this one “melting pot” culture
becomes the sum or amalgamation of ail its contributors, and it is constantly evolving to
accommodate its participants. To be clear, the concept is similar to that ofthe mosaic,
though interest in retaining the cultural distinctiveness of groups is certainly flot as great.
The intent or state strategy is, for that reason, manifestly different. As a consequence it is
thought of as a process of merging, in opposition to assimilation and integration.
61 This integration inventoly is adapted from John ONeili. “Integration ofRefugees in Ireland: Experience
with Programme Refugees 1994-2000,’ in No welcome here? Asylum seekers and refugees in Ireland and
Britain, eUs. Colin Harvey and Margaret Ward, Democratic Dialogue, Report 14, October 2001, 97.
62 There is some question among academics as to whether the idea of the melting pot is truly an
integrationist strategy. Fieras and Eliiott consider the “merging” of dominant and minority cultures to
represent a synthesis and flot a wholesale process of assimilation, 73-76. Robert Jiobu, however, sees the
melting point as a variation on the assimilationist theme, 8-10.
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Although the melting pot has been attached to many countries it is predominantly
used with reference to the United States and the creation of the American nation. As such
it is closely linked to the process ofAmericanisation — the creation ofa “distinct people”
amalgamated from various ethnocultural groups. This is in stark contrast to the mosaic
model which is committed to the recognition of separate cultures and is predicated upon
the accommodation and the retention of ethnicity. The emphasis here is squarely upon
heterogeneity and diversity, where ethnocultural differences are recognized and
celebrated. This model is ofien referred to as multicultural.
Mutticulturalism: An Ideal Unmatched by Reality?
Although multiculturalism is understood as both a philosophical school with a
distinct theory ofone’s place in the world and a perspective on (or a way of viewing)
human life, in the context portrayed here it is best understood as a political doctrine with
a policy or programmatic content. State action in the form of multiculturalism is directed
towards more than simply respecting the cultural differences of its citizens. it is designed
to cultivate a willingness among members of society to cooperate with each other so as to
contribute to their development and well-being. Willingness to cooperate implies a
necessary, but freely chosen, participation in public affairs through citizenship. If some
groups in it wish to lead autonomous lives to the extent that they infrequently interact
with others, the state should respect their choices so long as they do not compromise the
solidarity and trust between members of society.63 It is flot a requirement, of a
This discussion is based loosely on the themes of social cohesion discourse described by Denise Helly in
“Social Cohesion and Cultural Plurality,” Canadian Journal of$ociology, 28(1) 2003, 19-20.
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muhicultural strategy, to require that ail citizens form partnerships of the same kind or
intensity. Indeed, it is precisely because it attaches great importance to cultural diversity
that a policy of multiculturalism accommodates those that do not share its dominant
cultural ethos.
In Canada, it has become somewhat of a cliché since the mid- 1 960s to refer to
Canadian society as a cuttural mosaic — set against the American model equated with the
metaphor ofthe melting pot. Stiil one cannot push the idea ofthe cultural mosaic too far
without recognising that it represents an ideal that is ofien unmatched by reality.
Depending to whom one speaks this has led to the various conclusions; that
multiculturalism either fails to accommodate diversity or effectively denies it — this is
ofien referred to as the “multiculturalism as assimilation by another name” cnticism.64
The inventory of criticisms can continue, but the two central arguments against
multiculturalism may be summansed as follows.65 First, opponents argue that contrary to
the stated aims ofthe policy to foster a sense ofbelonging and attachment to Canada,
multiculturalism fragments people in ways that dissolve the potential for shared action. In
a multinational and multicultural state, they argue, multiculturalïsm erodes the solidarity
that is necessary to unify citizens across their many differences. The fear this engenders is
two foid, where will the primaiy commitment or allegiance of ethnic minorities lie in
cases of conflict; and what are the potential consequences of groups who regard
themselves as separate and seek self-government rights. Both ofthese concems surface in
E. Vasta, “Dialectics of Domination: Racism and Multiculturalism” in The Teeth Are Smiling: The
Persistence ofRacism in MutticulturalAustralia, eds. E. Vasta and S. Casties (Sydney: AIlen, 1996), 46-72.
Other charges against multiculturalism are that it implies relativism, and condones illiberal practices. For
a rebuttal ofthese daims see Arme Phitlips, “Why Worry About Multiculturalism?” Dissent. Winter, 1997.
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the face ofclaims for the political representation ofunderrepresented groups, yet like
many of the problem addressed under the heading of multiculturalism, they relate to more
general issues about the way nghts or choices of one group constrain the rights or choices
of another.66 This aiso highlights, quite cleariy, the significance of state action in the area
of ethnocultural relations. To summarise, the debate remains essentially tied to the
foliowing question: How far should the state go in respecting the values and practices of
different groups? Further, should it pursue policies which enable groups to maintain their
separateness or should it leave them to fend for themseives, giving only those protections
that it extends to ail individuals within its jurisdiction?
The suggestion that multiculturalism leads to fragmentation is the most serious
cnticism and also the most widespread. The sentiment here ranges from fear that the
poiicy will produce an uneasy or weak sense of national unity, to the more alarmist cali
that is so intrinsically corrosive that it will eventualiy destroy any society that adopts it.67
The problem lies both with the nature of multiculturalism and the highly compiex nature
of citizenship. Because a multicultural strategy intervenes to manage ethnocultural
relation it lias the potential to structure relations, as noted earlier, that allow individuals
the fteedom to lead autonomous lives and avoid interaction with others. A
muiticulturalism policy cleariy carnes some risks. While flot designed to divide and
separate people the unintended consequences are a product of extending the traditional
66 Ibid, 60.
Many authors have either expressed one or both views, those that have influenced my response include;
Alvin J. Schmidt, The Menace ofliulticulturalism: Trojan Horse in America (Praeger Publishers, 1997);
Arthur M. Schiesinger, Jr., The Disuniting ofAmerica (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); William J.
Bennett, The De- Valuing ofAmerica (New York: Summit Books, 1992); Reginald W. Bibby. Mosaic
Madness: The Potential and Poverty of Canadian Lf (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1990).
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liSerai principle ofindividual toleration to groups.68 This does flot preclude the ability of
citizens to commit themselves to a shared sense ofbelonging. Although we hear ftom
many of multiculturalism’s opponents that this is a contradiction. Nor does it appear that
the adoption of multïcultural policies will adversely affect redistnbutive social policies
central to the Welfare State.69 In fact, it bas been argued that multiculturalism could heÏp
to strengthen social solidarity needed for a vibrant welfare state, by virtue ofthe message
the state sends to citizens by encouraging minorities to trust the larger society.7°
Aftachment to a political community involves a primary commitment to its
continuing existence, and implies that one cares enough flot to actively or consciously
undermine it. Even though various citizens may develop different emotions towards their
community, what is necessary to maintain it and can legitimately 5e expected ofthem is a
basic commitment to its integrity and welfare, what one might cali patriotism or political
loyalty.7’ Their criticisms need not indicate disloyalty so long as their basic commitment
to the community is flot in doubt.
furthennore, far from pleading multiculturalism’s neutrality in matters of national
unity, supporters contend that the policy promotes the national interest by breaking down
68 Harris makes the point that it is unfair to criticize multiculturalism when these consequences are
unintended. See Multiculturalism from the Margins (Westport, C.T.: Bergen and Harvey, 1995).
69 Keith Banting, Richard Johnston, Will Kymiicka, and Stuart Soroka, “Do Multiculturalism Policies
Erode the Welfare State? An Empirical Analysis, in Mutticulturalism and the We(fare State
Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, eds. Will Kymiicka and Keith Banting
(Oxford: OUP, 2006).
Banting and Kymiicka contend that in some respects countries that have adopted formai multiculturalism
have fared no worse in sustaining redistributive social policies, and may have donc better than those opting
for a different approach.
Bhikhu Parekh, “What Is Multiculturalism?” in Multiculturalism: A Symposium on Democracy in
Culturaily Diverse Societies. Seminar, #484, December 1999.
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social and cultural barriers.72 Rather than weakening the national character, or presenting
a siippeiy siope whereby ail groups may appeal for separate (read special) treatment
based on every imaginable difference, it strengthens national identity by binding citizens
to a single moral community. In this respect no contradiction exists between the goals of
unity and diversity. A policy ofpluralist integration, therefore, represents a conscious
choice among a range of options in handiing ethnocultural diversity. It is flot an
admission that nothing can be done to manage diversity. In other words, the state has flot
resigned itself to increasingly heterogeneity in the absence of another method. Quite the
opposite, to choose integration is to signai that such a strategy is viewed as the preferred
option for maintaining unity while at the same time respecting cuiturai differences.
The second argument draws ïts insight from neo-liberal judgments about the role
ofthe state in market driven economies. Although flot ail who share this view may be
considered neo-liberal. fiscal restraint, one may argue, does flot necessarily impiy neo
liberaiism. Nonetheiess, for these cntics ofmulticulturalism their interest is less with the
potentially destabilising affects of cuiturai diversity than with the search for a rationalised
world order based on capitalist economic liberty in which particular cultures are of less
importance. Proponents of this view hold that cultural and social issues shouid take a
back seat to free-market economics.73 More to the point, they argue that the state should
72 R. Stam, “Multiculturalism and Neo-conservatives” in Dangerous Liaisons: Gende, Nation, and
Postcolonial Perspectives, eds. Anne McClintock , Aamir Mufti, Ella Shohat (Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of
Minnesota Press, 1997).
There are at least two strains to modem neo-iiberalism represented by conservative views on social and
fiscal matters. The first faction, variously known as paleo-conservatives, the New Right, Christian Right,
etc., consider cultural and social issues to take precedence over economics. The second faction, known as
neo-conservatives, may be motivated by liberal doctrines in ail fields except economics. It is this second
that has been the most influential in its opposition to multiculturalism. Admittedly, one does not have to be
a neo-conservative to agree with the contention that state funded support for diversity is misguided.
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flot be involved in funding a policy of cultural diversity as a point ofprinciple. Even
though they may uphoid the freedom of individuals and families to nurture aspects of
culture that are important to them, they argue that multiculturalism as a taxpayer-funded
program is ill-conceived.74 Neo-conservatives are for the most part in agreement with the
liberai left on such things as ethnic differences, inter-ethnic marnage, and immigration.
For them there are no significant inteilectual or behaviourai differences between ethnic
groups. What they decry about multiculturalism is the view that ethnicity deserves state
encouragement and assistance. In effect, their support for multiculturalism, if at ail, is
based on a weak or thin conception. The strong or thick from of multiculturalism on the
other hand advocates state protection for, and material support of, cultural communities.
The crucial difference between the two arguments is that the latter believes that in
effect ail citizens regardiess of ethnicity compete on an equal piaying field. For some
neo-iiberais, this is accepted as an article offaith. Critics argue, on the other hand, that
this in fact a myth designed to make extreme levels of inequality dictated by
untrammeiled market forces more acceptable. The belief in an equal playing field is
habitually reinforced by anecdotal evidence designed to reinforce the conviction that if
only an individual can tap into their inner strength, if only they can unleash their
potential, they too will succeed.
The “strength” of multiculturalism uitimately depends on the practical meaning of
encouraged and assisted. In Australia, this encouragement and assistance has taken a
number of forms and is perhaps the best example to consider in relation to the Canadian
This view of multiculturalism is a direct reflection of the Conservative Party of Canada thinking on the
subject. See Areas ofAgreement: Conservative Party ofCanada Partial Policy Statement, February 4,
2004. http://www.conservative.caJenglishldocuments/policy.pdf, 10.
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case. With a similar history of immigration, the presence of abonginal populations, and
membership in the Commonwealth, Austraiia’s experience with managing diversity
ciosely mirrors that of Canada’s. Through an openiy biased immigration process and the
officiai White Australia Poiicy which justified it until 1973, the state initiaiiy pursued an
exciusionary strategy. Mounting pressure from non-white ethnie groups, that by the
1 970s constituted approximateiy 10 per cent ofAustralia’s population of fifieen million,
led to a shifi in state policy. At the same time as Australia becoming party to the
International Convention on the Elimination ofAil Forms of Racial Discrimination in
1975, the government began to make public pronouncements on the country’s changing
racial composition. In that year the ministry concerned with immigration became the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, foliowed by the creation of an Ethnic
Affairs Branch in 1977. However, the initiative that had perhaps the most profound effect
on the direction ofstate policy, was the 1978 Report on the Review ofPost-Arrival
Programs and Servicesfor Migrants; known wideiy as the Galbally Report.75 Within its
many recommendations for improving the integration of immigrants was the proposai to
create an institute of multiculturai affairs to provide advice and information on
muhicuituralism. With the creation of the institute and the acceptance of culturai diversity
more generally, multiculturaiism was adopted as the officiai policy of the main politicai
parties. This appears, ïnitially at Ieast, to have been done for overtly political objectives.
The first action by the Liberal govemment ofthe day was to attract a substantial portion
ofthe “migrant” vote that had emerged primariiy through Asian immigration, and the
Commonwealth ofAustralia, Migrant Services and Programs: Report 0fthe Review ofPost-Arrival
Programs and Servicesfor Migrants (Canberra: Australian Govemment Publishing Service, 197$).
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second was to continue reductions in govemment spending by shiffing the burden of
migrant social welfare away from state agencies and onto the ethnic communities
themselves.76
Over time multicultural rhetoric in Australia has become increasingly linked to
the promotion of an inclusive national image.77 Internationally, the policy serves to
demonstrate that Australia has overcome its racist past, but also the emergence of an
ideological consensus among such principles as democracy, inclusivity, and national
economic policy. The idea that Australia should make it self more acceptable, and
accepted by, its major trading partners in Asia came to be viewed as a major priority by
many state leaders and academics in Australia.78
Conclusion
A consensus among multinational and etbnocultural states about the sources of
cultural unity which affirms rather than denies their national differences lias yet to be
fully realised. As we have noted, one reason lias been that demands for polyethnic and
representation rights based on inclusion and membership in multinational societies have
traditionally been seen as potentially destabilising and a threat to social unity. This
76 Freda Hawkins, “Mu]ticulturalism in Two Countries: The Canadian and Australian Experience,’ Journal
ofCanadian Studies, 17: 64-80 (1982), 77.
While multiculturalism was a common feature of national debate under the Labor govemments of the
1 980s and 1 990s, more recent criticism of the policy (including the Prime Minister Joim Howard) is evident
in the reluctance of state officials to use the term multiculturalism. In its place there is frequent mention of
shared citizenship or a shared national identity. On this issue see Brian Galligan and Wùisome Roberts,
Australian Citizensht (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2004).
On the subject ofAustralia’s relationship with East Asia see Stephen FitzGerald, 1$ Australia an Asian
country? (Melbourne: Allen & Unwin, 1997).
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necessity to maintain order, a common requirement of ail societies, may partiy explain
the different approaches that have been brought to bear by the various states introduced
here. This does flot mean that the specific national context is ii-relevant to the policy
process — far from it. For the countries examined in this chapter, their histories,
institutions, and cultures have constrained the policies they can adopt and the success
new policies can achieve. And although several authors have suggested that a policy of
multiculturalism is the ïdeal towards which most states should be striving, it is clear that
movement in this direction if and when it occurs is ofien incremental.
Our discussion of multiculturalism also exposed the criticisms to be as compelling
as the arguments in favouL This stems from the fact that the policy lias many dimensions,
including an ambiguous and oflen misunderstood view of state-society relations. Stili, the
poiicy marks a significant departure from the past. It entails both an instrumental and
symbolic order designed to manage relations among cultural groups. This understanding
ofmulticulturalism suggests that public policy is capable ofproviding a context for
sliaping social identities. Yet state institutions are also environments within which
individuals and groups seek recognition of their identity and their historical and
contemporaly contribution to society. From this perspective, the first step towards
understanding multiculturalism as public policy was to understand tlie relationship
between citizen and the state. We did so by explonng the literature on citizenship both in
Canada and abroad, presenting the increasing saliency of cultural identity as a challenge
to traditional understandings of belonging and membership in ethnicaliy diverse societies.
We also revealed that the re-emergence of ethnicity and its relationship to social
cohesion in the literature ofthe past decade is a product of oui- times. A great deal ofthis
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attention has been directed towards the gathering momentum of neo-liberalism,
especïaily as a challenge to the character of public institutions. Yet, despite the growing
literature on the reonentation of federal fiscal poiicy in response to neo-iiberaiism, very
littie is known about the impact of macroeconomic policy on citizenshïp. As a political
doctrine, neo-liberaiism supports the logic of laissez-faire economics and is
fiindamentally about shifiing decision-making power to the marketplace. Moreover, it
upholds as a basic tenet the belief that the entitiements of the liberal weifare state can be
scaled back and the design of ftee market enterprise restored. In Canada, graduai
movement towards a neo-liberai policy agenda was first evident in the mid- I 970s, but it
was oniy in the mid- 1 980s with the election of the Conservative Party that a methodical
shifi in this direction occurred at the national level. Mthough cutbacks to social spending
have often functioned as a response to the cyciicai nature of advanced capitalist
economies, there is an important distinction to be made between normai policy variation
associated with periods ofrecessionary pressure and neo-iiberalism. Accordingly, what is
new is flot simpiy “quantitative” cutbacks of financial resources for social services but
rather “qualitative” attacks to undermine them.
The political advantage ofneo-liberalism generally has been its appeal both to
individuals concemed with the reach of the modem state and those who decry the decline
of traditional moral values. Understandably, these views have found there greatest
resonance among the right. But politics, as the saying goes, makes strange bedfeilows,
and the current emphasis on restructuring the welfare state places ieffist intellectuals
alongsïde right-wing conservatives. This ideological convergence breaks down when the
fundamental issues of state intervention and public expenditures are elaborated and
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defended. Specificaily, those on the right who hold to a neo-liberal agenda believe that if
there is to be a welfare state it should be a residual one in which social spending becomes
the public expenditure of iast resort.
In the end we are mindful that ail societies are continuously in the process of
being constructed and transformed under the impact of internai and externai forces. There
are times, however, as Raymond Breton reminds us when the process is accelerated,
when change is precipitated, when a variety of circumstances and interventions converge
to generate a significant reorientation or reconstruction of the collective identity and the
character of public institutions.79 Given sucli changes in the policy environment the
dynamics of policy choice and the management of ethnocultural diversity in Canada
deserve an informed analysis. For more than twenty-five years multicuituralism in
Canada has served as an expression of the federai government’s commitment to
ethnocultural diversity and has ftequently been subject to both public and politicai
opposition. Disagreement over the merits and direction of federal policy is an important
story, as among other things it reveals the differences in opinion over the terms of
recognition in Canadian society. To begin to consider how multiculturalism as an
expression of citizenship is being refashioned, we have to recali what the policy
represented histoncaiiy. The next chapter undertakes this task and begins our detailed
examination of this transformation with a study of multiculturalism’s beginning as state
policy in the mid-1960s.
Raymond Breton, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building,” in Folitics of Gende, fthnicily and
Language in Canada, eds. Alan Cairns & Cynthia Williams (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1986),
28.
CHAPTER 3
Building the Mosaic: The 1960s and 1970s
Introduction
This chapter begins our detailed investigation ofpolicy paradigms and the
management of ethnocultural diversity in Canada. It traces the development of
multicultural ideas, analysing how this conceptual ftamework overtook pre-existing
thought and practice about Canadian state-society relations. It uncovers the intellectual
origin ofthe policy process and institutional setting that guïded Canada’s passage towards
an inclusionary model of integration. We argue that in the late 1 960s, state-sponsored
activity functioned as a catalyst for adjusting the goals of ethnocultural integration and
structured a wider and more complex debate over the nature of citizenship in Canada.
Govemment policy came to represent an increasingly broad identity based model of
membership, and in so doing reinforced the notion that citizenship was about recognition.
Our focus in this chapter is on the interplay between ideas and institutions in the
federal govemments of Lester Pearson and Pierre Elliott Trudeau covenng the years
1963-1981. Special attention is directed at understanding the power of the state to both
legitimise identity daims and provide institutional recognition and opportunities for
ethnocultural groups. Following an analytic viewpoint established in earlier chapters this
emphasis privileges a role for the state as a key player in structuring the citizen’s
perceptions of self and community.
Our work follows several related themes and concentrates on two pivotai events.
The first theme involves the development of postwar citizenship and the graduai
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abatement ofthe Anglo-cenfric model ofCanadian identity. This analysis moves us
towards two events, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism
established in 1963 and the unveiling of multiculturalism policy in 1971. The
govemment’s response to the recommendations ofthe commission and the emergence of
multiculturalism are then examined in the context of ethnocultural mobilisation and the
federal government’s political agenda for national unity. Ail told, the measures
considered here serve to establish a major thematic link connecting ethnocultural policy
to citizenship around three fundamental issues: how the boundaries ofmembership within
a polity should be defined; how the benefits and responsibilities of membership should be
allocated; and how the boundaries of membership should be understood and legitimised.
In focusing on the emergence of multiculturalism and its consolidation in the
1970s, it is evident that the policy was part ofa larger nghts ftamework that has evolved
over time. Multiculturalism may have had its ongins in the 1960s, but developments of
the late 1940s and 1950s laid the basis for several important changes that have shaped the
Canadian political landscape. These included; the growth of the postwar citizenship
regime based on the welfare state, the rise of new forms of identity politics, and the
liberalisation of Canadian society following an international trend towards individual
nghts. Foremost among these transformations was the debate over identity concems and
the connection to membership in the Canadian political community. Our first section sets
out to consider the evolving relationship between citizens and the Canadian state in terms
of the development of citizenship and immigration policy from the postwar penod to the
This list is adapted and borrowed ftom Douglas Klusmeyer, “Introduction,” in Citizensht Today: Global
Perspectives and Practices, eds. Thomas Alexander Aleinilcoif and Dougas Klusmeyer (Washington, D.C.:
Camegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 1.
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mid-1960s. Before it thought about recognising ethnocultural diversity, the Canadian
state had first to ciarify its position on citizenship as a matter of iaw, and reconcile the
demands for loyalty with the requirements of immigration to drive the postwar economy.
3.1 Postwar Citizenship and Immigration Policies: Opening the Door to Diversity
From the mid-1940s to the late 1960s, Canada’s political direction setting the
boundanes of citizenship underwent a graduai transformation. The first postwar
pronouncement on the subject, the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946, operated primarily
to identify and reinforce the notion of a single national community to which Canadians
were bound. Aithougli the legislation marked the end of a centuries-old definition of
Bntish subjecthood, the needs ofthe economy and the preservation ofthe country’s
national identity meant that, as before the war, English-speaking immigrants from Britain
and the United States were the most highly sought after.2 Whiie the new citizenship
legislation signalled Canada’s intention to define its own identity, it was not inspired by,
nor was it intended, to accommodate Canadian diversity in any shape. But with time,
other policy choices dedicated to social rights along with increasing immigration wouid
operate to undennine that narrow definition.
The substance ofthe Citizenship Act centred on the identification ofcitizenship
with the elaboration of a formai iegai status. This narrow citizenship-as-legal-status
conception reflected the established understanding of citizenship defined by a set of
2 Freda Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada andAustratia Compared (Montreal, MQUP,
1989).
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limited rights that the individual held against the state.3 The legislation also exposed
lingering concems about loyalty. The prevailing wisdom of state actors was that any form
ofpluralist integration, or even the more modest goal ofrecognition, was antithetical to
the larger objective of supporting national unity and purpose.4 Affirming Canada’s status
as a sovereign nation coupled with reforming its naturalisation laws were the major
preoccupations of the day. In sum, the concerns of identity had yet to fully overtake
concems about loyalty.5
This limited ambition, however, was important, albeit for reasons different than
those provided above. Despite being narrowly defined Canadian citizenship immediately
following the war was linked to a broader social theory that included an idea of
citizenship as an institution capable ofcreating an Ïmage ofmembership.6 This was made
possible because citizenship grants rights.7 While there was no universal principle that
Fieras and Eliiott contend that the Citizenship Act was part of a trend towards the erosion of the Anglo
conformity model in the aftermath ofthe Second World War. In our view, although it is correct to suggest
generally that the postwar period marked a transition towards a more “liberal” model of accommodation
and toleration; the act should flot be held out as an example ofAnglo dominance on the wane. See
Engaging Diversity: Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto: Neison, 2002), 61.
In keeping with this view immigration poiicy in the immediate postwar years was concemed primarily
with the abiiity ofnewcomers to be readily assimilated. As a consequence, language, customs, and general
social mores were the factors most often cited as absorptive criteria — flot economic requirements. On this
issues see Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada andAustralia Compared, 38.
On this topic and a discussion ofthejuridical nature ofCanadian citizenship see Janine Brodie, “l’hree
Stories of Canadian Citienship,” in Contesting Canadian Citizenship: Historical Readings, eds. Robert
Adamoski, Dorothy E. Chunn & Robert Menzies (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002).
6According to Ronald Beiner, the utiiity of citizenship is that it offers a sense of belonging that other
discourses fail to provide. See Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizensh;: Essays on the Problem ofPolitical
Community (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).
In either understanding of citizenship — as the elaboration of a formai legal status, or by virtue of a shared
membership in a politicai community — joint rights and obligations are the outcome. On the implications of
a state-centred national citizenship see W. R. Bmbaker, Citizenshtp and Nationhood in france and
Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Randali Hansen Citizensh4p and Immigration
in Post- War Britain: The Institutionat Origins ofa Mutticulturat Nation (New York: OUI 2000).
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determined what the rights and duties would be, at a minimum, to associate rights with
citizenship was to make a proposai about how membership in Canada could be
conceived. This had the affect of advancing the meaning of rights by broadening the
scope of its application. To speak of rights in the context of citizenship was to entertain
the possibility that the state wou!d intervene to enrich the quality ofpeople’s iives.
Citizenship, in other words, was flot simply a matter of formai status.
Between the 1 930s and 1 970s, state intervention in Canada demonstrated the
evolutionary development of citizenship towards a welfare-nghts version that promoted a
mode! of more inclusive membership. The growth ofthis postwar “citizenship regime”
had evolved to a point where the state came to recognise both the indïvidua! and
collective rights ofcitizens.8 This regime aiso reinforced the changing relations between
lega!!y defined status to other dimensions of citizenship, most notably social inequality.
The inspiration for this regime can be found in the domestic political consensus taking
shape in postwar democracies. Paramount among these ideas was the changing attitudes
ofpo!iticians and the public towards social we!fare.
In the interwar years, a wide vanety of charitable and philanthropic organisations
existed, yet there was only modest backing for a comprehensive system of weifare
support. Nonetheless, the desire for social justice was challenging laissez-faire notions of
state involvement in social policy. Governments, it was believed, could enforce limits on
the market and individuals should not be forced to engage in market activities that denied
their dignity. Given the inequalities of the market place the national community saw itse!f
8 Jenson and Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practice in Canada,” International Journal of
Canadian Studies. 14: 111-35 (Fail 1996).
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as responsible for the basic weli-being of ail its citizens. Successive govemments in
Canada responded by introducing a number ofmeasures, including; a national
unemployment insurance program (1941); the creation of a universal family allowance
(1945); a federal universal old age pension scheme (1951); the establishment ofCanada’s
universal Medicare program (mid- 1 960s); and the development of the Canada Assistance
Plan (1966) to provide a means ofcost-sharing with the provinces for social sewices.9
These programs were intended to provide a social safety net on which the
fortunate could build, and the less fortunate could depend. The impact of these provisions
and entitlements, however, was far greater. for the first time the state was actively
involved in the extension ofrights and the advancement ofequality on a national basis.
Underlying access to these programs was the notion of collective responsibility with the
state as prime architect. This meant extending pan-Canadian social and economic rights
of citizenship, several of which established a direct link between individuals and the
federal government.1°
Changing the face ofCanada. Immigration Folicy
Like the citizenship legislation it was designed to dovetail with, immigration
sought to foster population growth by encouraging resettiement among those selected to
become part ofthe dominant English-speaking, or to a much lesser extent, french
For a more complete list of programs and objectives, see Keith Banting, The We’fare State and Canadian
federalism, 2’ ed. (Monfreal: MQUP, 1987); and Dennis Guest, The Emergence of$ocial Security in
Canada, 3rd cd. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).
‘° Jenson and Phillips, 116.
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speaking culture.” As Prime Minister Mackenzie King noted, “the essential thing is that
immigrants be selected with care, and that their numbers be adjusted to the absorptive
capacity ofthe country.”2 The new policy revisions were stiil far from colour blind. The
federal govemment actively recruited “preferred” immigrants based on a nationality
preference — those ofBritish, American, and European ethnic backgrounds.’3 Most
immigrants granted access were European, with large numbers coming from Southem
Europe. Eastern Europeans, in contrast, continued to share the objectionable distinction
along with Asians of being viewed as simply too far removed from Canadian values to
integrate successfiuly within Canada’s host society.
Canada’s comrnitment to the international community in the wake ofthe Second
World War briefly forestalled the countiy’s insistence on taking only “acceptable”
candidates. Beginning in 1947, Canada along with many of its war time allies agreed on
the permanent resettiement ofEuropeans uprooted by the war. Two categories were of
immediate concem. The first was composed ofdisplaced persons and the second
refugees, including many who were survivors ofthe Holocaust.’4 These actions marked a
departure from the highly restrictive guidelines during the war that had denied entry to
most, including Europe’s persecuted.
A historical survey of Canadian immigration policy cari be found in Valerie Knowles’ Strangers at Our
Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration PoÏicy, 1540-199 7 (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1997).
12 Canada, House ofCommons. Debates, 2Oth Parliament, 3 Session, May 1, 1947, 2644-2646.
‘ The direction of immigration policy after the war was modified without a new Immigration Act. The
Immigration Act of 1952 marked the first formai legislative change since 1910.
‘4Approximately 25 0,000 were admitted between 1947 and 1962, making Canada for several years host to
more displaced persons than ail overseas countries combined. Sec Valerie Knowles, forging Our Legacy:
Canadian Citizenship and Immigration, 1900-19 77 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1997), ch.5.
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The 1950s offered a modest liberalisation in immigration policy, evidenced in part
by the expanding class of admissible immigrants. Stili, immigration strategy deviated
liffle from postwar custom — the preference for immigrants from the Anglo-American
democracies remained in place. This meant a continuation of immigration through
selective discrimination. The building of Canada’s workforce continued unabated, with
demographic estimates predicting shortfalls in key areas ofthe economy. Beyond the
needs of a growing economy, Canada was also stili seen by many as an essentially
unfihled country that needed more people to realize its full potential.’5 Immigration policy
in this context was therefore to some degree seen as a limited triumph of economics over
discrimination, in the sense that economic demands could only be met by turning to
countries formerly excluded from selection.’6 In total, between 1946 and 1961 roughly
two million immigrants came to Canada — the second largest influx since the tum ofthe
twentieth century that combined with the natural growth ofthe population to produce the
largest increase in Canadian history.’7
Significant change, in the form of a less discriminatory immigration policy,
however, would have to wait until the 1960s.’6 First in 1962, and later in 1967,
immigration policy was overhauled to remove the preference for Europeans and institute
freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Monfreal: MQUP, 1972).
16 C.E.A. Passaris, “The Economic Determinants of Canada’s Multicultural Integration,” International
Migration. 1984, 22(2), 91.
‘ Canada, Department of Manpower and Immigration. A Report ofthe Canadian Immigration and
Population Study (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974).
18 The story of shifiing immigration pattems in this period is told in Ninette KeIley and Michael
Trebilcock, The Making ofthe Mosaic: A History ofCanadian Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 199$).
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a less biased system for the selection of independent immigrants through a point system.
This second innovation was the product of the 1966 federal government’s White Faper on
Immigration. Under the point system immigration officers assigned points up to a fixed
maximum in each of several categories, including education, technical and professional
training, age, labour market experience, and knowledge of one or more of the country’s
official languages. This policy stressed that the privilege of immigration should be
bestowed upon those immigrants who could compete in the economic marketplace. In so
doing, it reinforced the notion developed by the authors of the White Paper that the
country’s admission criteria should flot be based on one’s nationality or ethnicity.’9
Accounting for these and other modifications to Canada’s immigration policy of
the 1960s leads us to identify two factors. The first, and more obvious ofthe two, pushes
us towards an understanding of these changes as a tangible response to structural
adjustments in the postwar economy. Changes to policy, in this vein, were evidently
influenced by a shortage of skilled workers and a conviction that increasing immigration
could play an important part in assisting Canada’s expanding labour market.
The second, and we would suggest equally important trend, is the elaboration of
an equity and social justice discourse through which immigration policy was increasingly
filtered. A central element in the construction ofthis “rights frame” included an
awareness of identity concems and the daims for recognition that arise within modem
society.
Canada, Citizenship and Immigration. White Faper on Immigration (Ottawa: Public Works and
Govemment Services, 1966).
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These ideas surfaced both internationally and domestically.2° On the international
scene Canada was engaged along with other Western states in the movement to promote
greater freedom and democracy throughout the world through institutions such as the
United Nations. Anti-imperialist and anticolonial strnggles joined with the powerful
symbolism of the American civil rights movement to discredit tyranny and cail into
question European ethnocentrism.21 Domestically, it became difficuit for the federal
government to continue the justification of immigrant selection on the basis of ethnic
prejudice. The passage ofthe BiIl ofRights in 1960 gave notice that discrimination by
reason of race, colour, national origin, was to be expressly rejected. Moreover, past
practices now seemed untenable in an era when provincial govemments were legislating
against discrimination on the basis of race in such areas as employment and education.22
The sociopolitical context ofthis era bas been summarised by Raymond Breton:
[TJhe penod can be described as a configuration of changing circumstances, events
and state activities, as well as a set ofunfolding processes. These processes were an
integral part ofthe evolving situation. They were, 50 to speak, its underlying
dynamics
— a dynamic... consisting ofthe interaction between various
circumstances, groups pursuing their symbolic interests, and the state pursuing its
institutional interests.23
20As a by-product, in part, of the civil rights movement the United States passed the Immigration and
Naturalization Services Act of 1965, thereby eliminating various nationality criteria. See Aristide R.
Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning ofAmerica (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press 2006). Similarly, the discriminatory “White Australia policy” was dismantled in the mid
1960s as a response to attitudinal changes, and the growing recognition ofAusfralia’s responsibilities as a
member ofthe international community. On this issue see lames Jupp, from White Australia to Woomera:
The Story ofAustralian Immigration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). In Canada,
eliminating the last vestige of racial discrimination in immigration policy and the introduction of the point
system by 1967 were a consequence of this new era. See Kelley and Trebilcock, and Gerald Tulchinsky,
Immigration in Canada: Historical Perspectives, ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994).
21 Morton Weinfeld and Lori A. Wilkinson, “Immigration, Diversity, and Minority Communities,” in Race
and Ethnic Relations in Canada, 2 ed., ed. Peter S. Li (Don Milis: OUP, 1999), 60.
22 Knowles, forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizensh4 and Immigration, 1900-1977, ch.6.
23 Raymond Breton, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation Building,” 39.
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Our contention here is not that any trend (including, but not limited to those
described above) was necessarily more responsible for changes in the way the federal
govemment viewed immigration in the 1960s. Rather, our point is to retum to a key issue
raised earlier in this thesis about the power of state institutions to reflect ideas and convey
messages about membership and inclusion in society. Changes to citizenship and
immigration policy in the 1 960s provided a context within which citizens of an
increasingly diverse society could recognise themselves. for instance, when the Minister
ofCitizenship and Immigration Ellen Fairclough declared in 1962 that immigrant
families should be entitled to the same social benefits as other residents of Canada, she
signalled to Canadians, and especially to ethnocultural minonties, that the citizenship
regime being constructed was indeed theirs.24 Recognising themselves in the values and
meanings of these evolving institutions provided reassurance that there was a growing
congruence between their own identities and public life. In short, the period demonstrated
that public policy was capable of assuring those whose values it reflected that Canada
was a society capable ofmeaningful recognition.
Although state action in the first two decades of the postwar penod was fuelled in
part by social justice concems as well as the international attention to displaced persons
and human rights, the challenge offostering a more inclusive society extended beyond
social and economic rights. If the Canadian state remained tightly wedded to the idea of a
single-national identity, changing demographic realities along with the demands
emanating from nationalist circles in Quebec would encourage change.
24 Canada, Flouse ofCommons. Debates, 24 Parliament, 5th Session, March 29, 1962, 2279.
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3.2 The Royal Commission on Bitinguatism and Bicutturatism
The agenda-setting process responsible for the birth of multiculturalism was
inextricably linked to biculturalism and socially constructed in the reaim of public and
private discourse. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism is then the
inevitable starting point for any discussion of multiculturalism policy in Canada. Not
only did the commission’s recommendations drive the development of multiculturalism,
but its analysis was the first senous attempt to corne to grips with issues of language,
ethnicity, and mernbership in Canadian society.
The commission emerged primarily out of concems about national unity. In the
1 960s, the growing nationalist movement in Quebec presented the Canadian state with
one of its most significant challenges. The period of sociopolitical awakening had cast
Quebec nationalism, in the eyes ofmost English-speaidng Canadians, as a threat to the
territorial integrity of the federation. The importance of this perceived threat stemmed flot
only from the objectives of the independence movement but also from its rapid growth
and sense ofurgency. Seen in light ofthe changes that were transforming Quebec society
in the 1960s, the “Quiet Revolution” served notice ofa French-speaking majority
conscious of its vulnerability and concemed with its collective suwival. Among the
obvious consequences of this era, English-spealdng Canadians became increasingly
conscious ofthe will ofthe French-speaking majority in Quebec that had adopted an
interventionist posture through their provincial government and voiced grievances
towards the federal govemment.
Leading these grievances was the prevailing view that institutions both within
Quebec and at the federal level failed to incorporate a Francophone identity. For instance,
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English-speaking dominance of the economy became an obvious target for Quebec’s
Quiet Revolution.25 While numerically a minority, Quebec Anglophones enjoyed a
disproportionate measure of influence within Quebec society. Even by the 1960s, this
enabled English-speaking Quebecers to act as if they were the majority rather than the
decreasing proportion of the population they truly represented. Substantial gains made by
French speakers in the work force were therefore seen as a move to change the balance of
economic and political power in Quebec. Federally, the institutions of the Canadian state
prior to the 1 960s reflected the Anglo-centric model of identity that undermined the
“French Fact”. Most notably English was the principal language in the public service.26
French-speaking candidates seeking employment in the federal public service had to be
both bilingual and prepared to work almost exclusively in their second language. Not
unexpectedly, they were underrepresented in the bureaucracy, especially at higher levels.
Deeply concemed with the loyalty of its citizens and the state of Canadian unity, these
challenges became one ofthe central themes ofthe 1960s.
To defuse the looming crisis the federal govemment responded in part through the
appointment ofthe Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The
commission was designed in 1963 to examine existing bilingualism and biculturalism and
to recommend ways of ensuring wider recognition of the basic cultural dualism of
Canada. The mandate ofthe commission was:
25e economic power of the English-speaking minority in Quebec during and before the Quiet Revolution
is discussed in Paolo Prosperi, The Dynamics offthno-Linguistic Mobilisation In Canada. A Case Study of
Alliance Quebec (M.A. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1995).
26 discussion of this history can be found in Milton J. Esman, ‘The Politics of Officiai Bilingualism In
Canada,’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), 233-253.
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[TJo inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism
in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian
Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races,
taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural
enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that
contribution.27
Although instructed to investigate the nature of French-English relations, there
was no definitive sense at the outset of how the work would proceed. Given the
appointment ofAndré Laurendeau as co-chair and de facto leader ofthe ten member
commission, however, there should have been liffle doubt as to the overail direction.
Until his unexpected death in 1968, and replacement on the commission by Jean-Louis
Gagnon, Laurendeau was driven by his belief in dualism as a guiding pnnciple of
Canadian life.28 He was to make this clear in early pronouncements when he sidestepped
questions about the govemment’s directive to investigate the contribution of “Other”
ethnic groups, and in tum focused almost single-mindedly on the issue ofbiculturalism.
According to Kenneth McRoberts, for Laurendeau, who was in many respects
responsible for advancing tlie idea of a commission, this was understandable. Dualism, he
notes, “was fiindamental to his own vision of Canada; indeed, it was only on this basis
that lie would have been prepared to co-chair the commission.”29 Laurendeau’s views on
biculturalism were certainly known to Prime Minister Lester Pearson. In creating the
commission Pearson shared the conviction with others that the cause of national unity,
threatened as lie saw it from Amencan cultural influence and Quebec nationalism, could
27 Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and BicuÏturalism, Volume 1, General Introduction: The
Officiai Language (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1967), appendix 1, 173-174.
28 See Guy Laforest’s discussion ofLaurendeau in Trudeau et la fin du rêve canadien (Sillery, Québec:
Septentrion, 1992).
29 Ken McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The $trugglefor National Unity (Toronto, OUP 1997), 118.
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be advanced by promoting greater reconciliation between the two solitudes.30 Displaying
his interest and optimism for the project, he maintained:
[ThatJ the rapprochement between the two groups requires among other things that
English Canada become more aware ofthe aspirations ofFrench Canada and that
French Canada not be too impatient if it finds that this awareness is slow in
expressing itself Some genuine progress is being made from one generation to the
next. For example, the Bourassa doctrine on Canadian nationaiism, which was
considered heresy one generation ago, is now accepted by almost ail ofEnglish
Canada. After ail, if we are flot evolving at quite the same pace, we are at ieast
changing in the same direction. In my opinion, that is what is essential.3’
For Laurendeau, meagre but sympathetic attention to the daims of non-Charter
groups (non-British and non-French) was acceptable because biculturaiism reflected the
reality of Canadian society and its growing acceptance offered the best hope of continued
positive relations between the Engiish and French. Uniike other ethnocultural groups,
Laurendeau believed that the two founding communities were more than an assemblage
of individuais with a common mother tongue. They constituted soc ieties equipped with a
full set of institutions that aliowed them to function within a complete social ftamework.
And through the commission he made it clear that non-British and non-French groups
would ultimateiy have to choose between the Engiish or French-speaking communities,
in order that their participation in Canadian iife be considered “real”.32
30 Pearson’s memoirs are revealing on the subject. He believed national unity to be the most important issue
facing the country and agreed with the commission’s “realistic analysis ofCanadian disintegration”. See
Mike: The Memoirs ofthe Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 3, 1957-1968, eds. John A. Munro
andAlex I. Inglis (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1975), 239-242.
31 Lester B Pearson, Text ofSpeech delivered by the Right Honourable Lester 3. Pearson, Prime Minister of
Canada, at the Annual General Meeting ofthe Canadian french Language WeekÏy Newspaperr
Association, August 17, 1963 (Ottawa: Library ofParliament, 1963), 7. The Bourassa doctrine, to which
Pearson refers, is the view expounded by Henri Bourassa the founder of the Montreal daily, Le Devoir. In it
Bourassa attacks the imperial connection and advocates an independent and biculturai Canada.
32 Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturatism, Volume 1, XXV. It is generally accepted
that Laurendeau was the main if not the sole author of the “blue pages” (that proceeded the main body of
the report) where these comments were made. See McRoberts, 118.
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In their stance on bilingualism and biculturalism Laurendeau and lis fellow
commissioners made a conscious attempt to downplay the importance of ethnicity. This
was to have weighty implications in 50 much as it allowed the commission to see french
and British as the primary basis (i.e. the true limits) for culmral pluralism at the heart of
Canadian socïety. Specifically, they conceded that the term “etbnic group” mentioned
within their terms of reference implied a sense of identity but argued that their task was
focused on “linguistic and cultural matters, or linguistic and cultural aspects of political
and socio-economic matters.”33 In this way an “ethnic group” was defined primarily as a
social identity, flot in terms ofone’s cultural origin. However, the commission, according
to Jean Bumet, “then inconsistently chose to substitute the term cultural group for ethnic
group, reserving the term ethnic for origin category.”34 Moreover, by subsequently
embracing a linguistic and flot an ethnic basis for membership they were constructing a
paradigm that restrained ethnicity as a possible basis for inclusion in Canadian society.
In the final analysis, while Laurendeau’s belief in biculturalism was central to the
commission and its guiding preoccupation, it was certain to run into resistance.35
u This reference cornes from the abridged report. See Hugh R. Innis, Bilingualism and Bicutturalism: An
abridged version ofthe Royal Commission Report (Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart Limited in co
operation with The Secretary of State Departrnent and Information Canada, 1973), 2-3.
Jean Bumet, “Ethnic Relations and Ethnic Policies in Canadian Society,’ Paper Presented to the Ninth
International Congress ofAnthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Chicago, August, 1973, 14, quoted in
John Berry, Rudoif Kalin and Donald Taylor, Mutticutturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977), 5.
Laurendeau’s disinterest in the contribution of other ethnic groups bas in recent years been eclipsed by
wider attention to his personal comments on bilingualisrn. In the fali of 1965, well into the conimission’s
work, he wrote privately that bilingualism would neyer work and suggested instead that two “distinct
societies,” each with separate rights were needed to keep Canada together. His devotion to biculturalisrn,
and the notion of equality between citizens as members of one of two cultures, however, appeais to have
remained intact. See The Diary ofAndré Laurendeau: Written During die Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and BicuÏturalism, 1964-1967; frans. Pafricia Smart and Dorothy Howard (Toronto: Lorirner,
1991).
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Opposition emerged from various camps, including those who disagreed with the
promotion ofbilingualism, or resented the recognition ofthe French language on an
equivalent basis with English. Included in the former category was commissioner
Rudnyckyj, who would ultimately produce a dissenting opinion in the commission’s final
report on the issue of officiai languages.36 Unable to recommend that oniy two languages
be officially recognised, he made the case for the recognition of languages other than
English or french on a regional basis, where sufficient numbers warranted.
3.3 Ethnoculturat Mobilisation to the Royal Commission
The most coherent opposition to the royal commission came from groups and
individuais who took issue with the commission’s terms of reference. In their view, the
commission was preoccupied with the idea of an “equal partnership” between the two
founding peoples to the exclusion of other groups within Canadian society. As Leo
Dnedger notes, “to many people, these expressions of dualism seemed a continuation of
the age-old battie ofthe European Bntish and French nation-states, which could think in
terms only of unitary sovereignties and who had faced each other across the Ottawa river
for centuries.”37
This opposition was expressed in two ways; through bnefs submitted to the
commission, and public heanngs held throughout the country in 1964. In both instances,
although admiftedly to a lesser degree in the public hearings, the issue rested on the
apparent indifference shown by the commission towards the ongoing contribution of
36 Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume 1, 155-169.
Leo Driedger, Race and Ethnicily: Finding Identities and Inequalities (Don Miils: OUP, 2003), 100.
91
ethnocultural minonties to Canadian society. They were flot, to be clear, objecting to
assessments ofthe seriousness ofthe national unity crisis; they were opposed to their
exclusion from proposed solutions. They were acutely aware, as no doubt many other
Canadians were, that the commission’s work had been devoted to bridging the gap
between Canada’s two main groups. This analysis led naturally to considerations ofwhat
Canadian society had become, and possibly could be. Ethnocultural minorities, in short,
wanted to be recognised as contributing rather than detracting from Canadian unity.38
The unintended consequence ofthe commission hearings, therefore, was to
provide the locale where these groups were able to articulate their place in Canadian
society and make their concems known. In effect, by limiting itselfto the “contribution”
of other ethnic groups, and similarly be referring to the presence of “two founding races”,
the commission had awakened a quiescent movement.39 Spokespeople for the non-
Charter groups (estimated to be equal to roughly one third of the population) appropriated
the concept of a “Third force” to both announce their difference, and signal their
willingness to mediate relations between the two major communities.40 It was the
Ulcrainian groups that had the greatest influence and were most vocal. They requested to
know why the federal government assigned less importance to their culture, for instance,
than to that ofthe much smaller french-speaking minonties in the Western provinces.
38 See, for example, ‘Content Report on Vancouver Regional Meeting,” Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and3iculturaÏism. Prepared by Peter findlay, April 27, 1964, 3.
These identities were not created by the B&B Commission; they were aiways carried by groups and
individuals. As Jenson has pointed out, daims for recognition arise within civil society and are the product
of collective action. See “Citizenship and Equity: Variations across Space and Time,” in Janet Heibert, ed.
Political Ethics: A Canadian Perspective (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1991).
° Jean R. Bumet with Harold Palmer, ‘Coming Canadians’: An Introduction to the Histo,y ofCanada ‘s
Peoples (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 224.
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Within Parliament the Ukrainians would find at least one aily, in the person of
Paul Yuzyk. Appointed to the Senate in february 1963 by then Prime Minister
Diefenbaker (who himselfexpressed concem with the limits ofthe commission’s term of
reference), Yuzyk spoke in defence of an expanded notion of cultural recognition. In the
same way as Pearson was undoubtedly aware of Laurendeau’s political convictions,
Diefenbaker’s appointment ofYuzyk signalied identification and acceptance ofthe
Saskatchewan native’s commitment to broadening the representation of Canada’s ethnic
groups. in his maiden speech as a senator entitled “Canada: A Multicultural Nation,” the
former history professor spoke about bilingualism and reminded the B&B Commission
that Canada “was more a mosaic ofpeopie than an envelope composed oftwo halves.”4’
Credited with being the first parliamentary officiai to champion multiculturalism, the
senator argued, “in keeping with the ideals of democracy and the spirit of Confederation.
Canada should accept and guarantee the principle of the partnership of ail peoples who
have contributed to her development and progress.”42
While Yuzyk and the ethnocultural groups who appeared before the royal
commission may have spoken in similar terms of the need to reconsider the terms of
partnership, the commissioners believed the dissent expressed in the public hearings
stemmed from fear of exclusion. In their preliminary report released in the spring of
1965, the commissioners recount that they were frequently called upon to reiterate their
commitment to explore the contribution ofother ethnic groups in the face of pressure
Christopher Gully, “The Father of Canadian Multiculturalism,” The Ukrainian Weekly, June 16, 1996,
No. 24, Vol. LXIV.
42 Canada, Senate. Debates, 26th Parliament, 2” Session, March 3, 1964, 50-63.
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from ethnocultural minorities. These groups, they note, “repeatedly advanced one specific
point: ‘If two groups are privileged,’ they pointed out, ‘that makes ail the others, and that
means us, second-class citizens.’ Some were even aftaid that they might be witnessing a
manoeuvre intended to take away rights they already had.”43 Both types of comments
were especially reveaiing, for they exposed the commission’s role as part of an ongoing
process that would define the identity ofCanadian society and the vision ofCanadian
citizenship
When ethnocultural minority groups spoke through the commission they were
engaging in a cuituraliy and politically symbolic process of defining who they were. They
were equaily passing judgment on the way the commission had singled out and elevated a
model of Canadian identity that marginalised their contributions. They were not,
however, questioning the ability of the commission to provide status and recognition. On
the contrary, their concems demonstrated an understanding of the commission both as a
powerfi.il institution and as a process capable of determining status. This was possible, in
the first instance, because royal commissions serve as a representation of state power and
expression of its collective will and identity.” In the same way as national celebrations
become symbols of our collective identity, commissions provide statements about the
prionties of the nation and desirable forms of development. As Breton notes, “the
symbols ofthe collective identity can be objects (e.g. flags, monuments), rituals, public
ceremonies, constitutions, public policies, institutional activities, and the pronouncements
Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bicutturalism, Preliminary Report (Ottawa: Queens
Pnnter, February 1, 1965), 28.
“See Neil Bradford, Commissioning Ideas: Canadien National Policy Innovation in Comparative
Perspective (Toronto: OUP, 199$).
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of authorities... They are important because what they express relates to the members’
own identity”45 As an institutional practice, commissions embody a series of daims and
grant status to a set ofpolitical actors, some, as in this case, that have been denied or
marginalized. In this way the commission process can 5e viewed as having played a
central role both as an idea factory and an institutional locale for adjusting the boundaries
ofmembership at an important juncture in Canadian society.
3.4 Beyond Mobilisation: New Ideas and Public Prescriptioits
The government’s direct response to the commission’s pnmary recommendations
was to adopt the Official Languages Act in 1969. Although the legislation was directed
towards both main language groups, it was generally accepted that the principal aim was
to improve the status of the French language and provide more equitable treatment to the
country’s French-speaking minority.46 While this did flot deny the existence of
ethnocultural identities, it emphasised officiai language communities as a symbolic basis
for the deveiopment of Canadian identity.
This linguistic basis for membership did flot appeal to ail ethnocultural
communities, many of whom were looking for a broader understanding of identity Iinked
to their ethnieity. Indeed, faced with pressure to validate the role of ethnocultural
minority groups a compromise was ultimately struck when the commission produced a
fourth — and late — volume in its study entitled, The Cultural Contribution ofthe Other
‘ Raymond Breton, “Intergroup Competition in the Symbolic Construction of Canadian Society, in Race
and Ethnic Relations in Canada, 296.
46 Stacy Churchill, Officiai Languages in Canada: Changing the Language Landscape (Ottawa: Canadian
Heritage, 1999), 15.
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Ethnie Groups. Published in 1970, Book IV as it became known, produced sixteen
recommendations, inciuding fair employment practices and anti-discrimination measures,
extending the legal rights of citizenship to ail immigrants, the expansion of non-officiai
language teaching at various educationai levels, the removai of restrictions on private and
public broadcasting in the non-officiai languages, and that the arts and iefters of ethnic
groups other than the British and French be supported by ail leveis of govemment.47
In one of its iast recommendations the commission did acknowiedge the iink
between culture and ethnicity and recommended financial assistance be extended to
ethnocultural minority groups to support cultural initiatives.48 This concession, however,
ieft the commissioners far short of embracing a policy ofmulticulmraiism. The
Commission members acknowledged that although they had taken a specific position in
support of biculturaiism, there were “many ways to preserve and reinforce the other
cultures in Canada”.49 In other words, cultural diversity was a sociological fact that
deserved recognition but not to the same degree, and certainiy not at the expense, ofthe
two founding cultures.
This position revealed the commission’s understanding of culture as applied to
ethnocuitural minority groups, along with some ofthe probiems inherent in discussions
of culture. In the first instance the recommendations advanced by the commission in
Book IV indicate that they were prepared to treat culture as it appears in its common and
Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and BiculturaÏism, Volume IV (Ottawa: Queens Printer,
1970), 228-230. A complete list ofthe recommendations and the federal govemment’s officiai reaction to
them in October 1971 are reproduced in the reports Appendix 1.
48 Canada, Royal Commission on Bilinguatism and Bicutturalism, Volume IV, 230.
Canada, Multiculturaiism Canada. Multiculturalism and the Government ofCanada (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, 1984), 8.
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otherwise straightforward usage; as an aspect of leisure, recreation and entertainment
based upon such institutions as “cultural centres” and cultural festivals.50 In so doing it
may appear that they were choosing a representation of ethnocultural minority culture
least Iikely to be objectionable to most Canadians. What they were implicitly rejecting,
however, was a deeper understanding of culture and this was for caiculated political
reasons. They rejected a broad version of culture synonymous with an identity based on a
system ofbeliefs, social practices, common histoiy and language.5’ They opted for a
“thin” as opposed to a “thick” version of culture characteristics because ofthe implication
that the latter might detract from the fundamental premise of duality. Ultimately, if this
charactensation of the commission’s recommendations is to be beiieved, it appears that
they were motivated flot simply by their defence ofbiculturalism, but out ofconcem that
a broader understanding of culture might invite the politicisation of ah group identities
based on culture. Not only were they unprepared to concede that ail cultures were
deserving of equal recognition, they signalled in their recommendations that all cultures
need flot be publicly affirmed in the same way.
This said, Book IV was stihi an important concession. Yet it is occasionally
dismissed in the literature as being only marginahly influential in estabhishing a path for
official multiculturahism. This is a serious charge which we will consider in the following
sections. For the moment, it is the view taken here that the release ofBook IV was
consequential precisely because of the collective action it provoked and the potential it
50The definition of “thin” culture represented here is taken from John Berry, RudolfKalin and Donald
Taylor, 4-5.
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represented. True, the commission neyer strayed in its final recommendations from its
support for biculturalism.52 However, Book IV, released under pressure five years afier
the first volume on officiai languages was completed effectively enlarged the debate on
citizenship by suggesting a broader pluralism beyond the limits officiaily sanctioned by
the commission.53 And while muiticulturalism may flot have emerged directly from the
recomrnendations they were suggestive of the need to more closely consider the
distinction between linguistic duality and cultural pluralism, as well as their possible
relationship.
3.5 Making Claims: 11w Ideas and Identity ofa Third force
The achievement of Book W’s existence was an example of collective action on
the part of ethnocultural minority groups. For them, opposition to biculturalism quickly
became an identity-defining issue. And the political environment, represented by the
commission, served as a conditioning factor
— or intervening variable
— for mobilisation.
This part of the story, therefore, is of a movement sensitive to its environment, capable of
exploiting its chances. Seeing the political opportunities presented by the commission,
however, is only part of the story; a sense of empowerment was created through
This is a characterization of culture based on John Horton’s discussion in “Liberalism and
Multiculturalism: Once more unto the breach,” in Multiculturatism, Identity and Rights, eds. Bruce
Haddock and Peter Sutch (London: Routledge, 2003), 32.
52 In fact the commission issued what can be considered a broad disclaimer in the opening pages of Volume
IV where they restate and reaffirm their commitment to biculturalism. See Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume flÇ 3.
This is also the conclusion reached by Jean Bumet. See “Myths and Mutticulturalism,” Canadian Journal
offducation, 4:43-58, 1999.
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mobilisation around a collective identity that would continue into the next decades.54
Their collective action was a signal of the growth in self-consciousness among Canadians
who claimed neither Frencli nor Britisli background. As the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on
National Unity was to conclude only a few years later: “It was indeed the very definition
ofthe country in dualistic terms, both in the mandate and outlook of the B&B
Commission, which helped to stimulate the assertiveness ofthese ethnic groups, an
assertïveness which was consecrated in 1971 by the Trudeau govemment’s policy of
multiculturalism.”55 Therefore, partly as a resuit ofthe government’s policy and the
response to it in the ethnic communities, the terms of membership in the Canadian polity
were being redefined, and citizenship rights and recognition were changing.
The activism and successful mobilisation of ethnocultural groups, which included
an understanding of a collective identity (named the “Third-Force”) and the elaboration
of a strategy, is best understood as emerging a result of external opportunities. Their
action spoke to the distress of many etbnocultural groups who had flot been able to
reconcile themselves with the commission’s strategy ofbiculturalism. Prime Minister
Pearson’s inability to see beyond a bicultural definition of culture fed the fears ofsome
ethnocultural communities that they had been forgoifen in the debate over Canadian
Despite the well known limits, indeed confusions, long associated with the concept ofpolitical
opportunity structure, we have chosen to speak of it here because we are interested in the interaction
between ethnocultural groups and the extemal environment it faced. The concept was first developed in
order to account for the “when” of social movement mobilisation, identifying the conditions facilitating or
accounting for mobilisation. It also served as a conceptual escape hatch from the ongoing confroversy
between students of the ‘1how” of social movement action
— the resource mobilisation school
— and the
“why”
— new social movement approaches. See Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements,
Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modem State (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), 83.
Canada, The Task Force on Canadian Unity, A future Together: Observations and Recommendations
(Ottawa, January 1979), 15-16.
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unity. It is true that the commission spoke oftheir contribution to Canadian society and
noted that the part played was flot incidentai, but such declarations took second place to
the hand tendered to officiai ianguage communities.
Seen in this way, the Royal Commission on Biiingualism and Bicuimralism, and
especiaily the release ofBook IV was a crucial moment in rendenng these groups visible.
Who they were, (Third force, “Other” ethnic groups), and the vision ofthe country they
advanced was made visible to the federai government. And although the mobilisation of
ethnocuitural groups did flot seize the imagination of the commission, it exposed their
desire for recognition as the basis for a modem Canadian identity. The commission was
therefore compelied to treat the daims of ethnocuiturai minorities as meaningful, albeit
not equivaient, to the daims ofthe “two founding nations”.56 This had the impact of
making the content ofany future state poiicy on culturai piuralism the subject of
negotiation. By 1971, this “opening” or “window” would aiso provide the federai
government with a counterforce to the potentially unstabie dichotomy posed by
bilingualism and biculturalism and lead to the creation of a new policy paradigm.
3.6 The Mutticulturatism Agenda Emerges
In an announcement before the House ofCommons on October 8, 1971, the
federai govemment made its iatest views on cultural policy known with the unveiiing of
officiai multiculturalism. Coming only a year afier the release ofBook IV, the policy
The discourse on Canadian culture and diversity in the 1960s failed regularly to view ffie contribution of
Aboriginal peoples as siguificant or as meaningful as the role played by Europeans (French and British) in
building Canadian society, hence the frequent use ofthe “two founding nations’ concept which had the
effect of marginalising Aboriginal identity.
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represented a significant departure from the royal commission’s recommendations. While
the commission had accepted the maintenance of ethnie minority identity within the
context oftwo (i.e. Bntish and French) dominant societies, Prime Minister Trudeau
presented multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. In short, the representation of
Canada had become multicuitural and bilingual rather than bicultural and bilingual.
The difference was intentional, although Trudeau was shrewd in presenting the
new policy as the product of similar conclusions reached by the commission and the
federal govemment. Wrapped in the language of citizenship, he noted:
It was the view of the royal commission, shared by the govemment and, I am sure,
by ail Canadians, that there cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians ofBritish
and french origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for ail others. for
aithough there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any
ethnie group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other
than Canadian, and ail should be treated fairly.57
By suggesting that Canadian citizenship depended on no officiai culture while
embracing bilingualism, the prime minister had constructed a peculiar policy blend. As
Fieras and Ellioft suggest, the policy seemed to both affirm and deny the relevance of
diversity as a basis for living together.58 The departure from the royal commission here
could flot have been more obvious. In his endorsement of multiculturalism within a
bilingual framework, Trudeau had chosen to refute a basic premise supported by the royal
commission, and in so doing had opted for a policy focus that disassociated two variables
often understood as connected. Consistent with their position on the status ofthe two
founding nations, the commissioners’ noted, “language is the most evident expression of
Canada, House ofCommons. Debates, 28e” Parliament, 3rd Session, October 8, 1971, 8545.
58 FIeras and Elliott, 63.
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a culture. In ternis ofour mandate, this means that the probÏems ofbilïngualism and
biculturalism are inseparably linked.”59 The net effect oflrudeau’s decision was to
engage the Canadian state on a course that, while separating the major components of
identity, accorded officiai status oniy to language.6° A new and more coherent vision of
“culture,” however, was stili to be created.
Multiculturalism as Policymaking
A full accounting of multiculturalism policy is considerably more involved that
the brief analysis presented above. Coming to terms with Trudeau’s decision leads us to
focus on the role ofpolicymaking, with an understanding that the definition of public
problems invanably shapes the nature ofthe policy response.6’ Therefore, central to our
understanding ofmulticulturaÏism policy is an appreciation ofhow these probiems were
defined.62 Before the announcement in the fail of 1971, the federal government had
developed an ideational framework to help structure its thinking and inform its action.
More accurately, in the language ofpolicy analysis, it had developed a “problem
definition”, or an argument about the nature ofthe policy problem that led it to identify
specific instruments and goals to resolve its concems.
Canada, Royal Commission on Biingualism and Biculturatism, Volume 1, xxx.
60 Churchill, 16.
61 Leslie A. Pal, Beyond Policy Analysis. Public Issue Management in Turbulent lîmes, 2m1 cd. (Toronto:
Nelson, 2001), 93. In keeping with our view expressed in Chapter 1, Pal argues that the central component
ofidentifying and framing public problems is the role ofideas.
62 In policymaking, the usual course followed is to elaborate a policy and its goals and to differentiate
between the two. This means providing an explanation of what the policy is, and how it will achieve certain
ends. Usually relevant goals that are logically connected to the policy are made explicit. Less apparent in
constructing a policy argument in favour ofsome course of action are the impÏicit goals ofpolicy decisions.
102
Looking back to the fail of 1971, the formulation of multiculturalism policy was
proceeded by the federal government’s acknowledgement of a public problem. There was,
however, no single “focusing event” in the sense ofa sudden crisis that shaped the
govemment’s evaluation of a specific issue.63 Rather there were a set of concerns, as we
noted earlier, that stemmed from apprehension over the state of Canadian unity that
became linked to the royal commission and ultimately emerged in the govemment’s
response to Book IV. Why then did the federal govemment’s response depart from the
recommendations handed down by the commission? To answer this question our analysis
must retum once again to the early 1960s. As we discuss in the next section, the federal
government offered its own mix ofpolicy prescriptions because it had developed a
fiindamentally different definition of the problem. As a resuit, events at this early stage
would have a decisive impact on the policy process.
From Recognition to Definition: The FrobÏem Takes $hape
The federal govemment’s multiculturalism policy may have taken shape in
response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, but the root
problem ran deeper. By the 1960s Canadians were confronting, in a way they neyer had
before, their fundamentally divergent conceptions of Canada.64 The transformation of
nationalist discourse in Quebec had propelled Canada and its constitutional system
towards a protracted state ofcrisis. Before the federal govemment could present possible
63A great deal of our understanding of how issues appear on the government agenda has been shaped by
John Kingdom. See Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Littie, Brown, 1984).
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solutions in the form of a national unity strategy, it first had to offer a persuasive
argument about the nature ofthe problem threatening to divide the country.
The prevailing mood of a national malaise was no less apparent in Quebec where
some francophone Quebecers had become convinced that liffle accommodation could be
hoped for with English-speaking Canada and that the future ofFrench Canada lay in an
independent Quebec. Much, it was clear, had changed through the course ofthe Quiet
Revolution. for much of its history, Canada has existed as society in which linguistic
cleavages became politically relevant through the creation of a federal system in which
the division ofpowers recognized and protected two different communities. The
representation of Canada that matched this institutional division of powers was the vision
of Canada as a bicultural and bi-national country. Consequently, the history of
intergovernmental relations was marked in part by the question ofhow to engage the
minority community, that is to say Quebec, within the scope of Canadian federalism.
From the 1 940s through the 1 960s, an era characterised by “co-operative
federalism”, the federal govemment sought to fashion its pan-Canadian welfare state
through cost-sharing programs with the provinces.65 Successive Quebec govemments
resisted such actions for both ideological reasons, in the case of the conservative
Duplessis government’s opposition to state intervention in the social realm, as well as
concems about state autonomy. The latter concems were especially evident afier 1960,
when a progressive Liberal govemment came to power in Quebec. The Quiet Revolution
McRoberts, 31. As the author goes on to explain, the discontent was apparent in that “the pre-eminent
status of Quebec was made much more explicit as nationalist thought and strategies were fiindamentally
recast”.
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ushered in by Jean Lesage’s govemment was devoted to modernizing Quebec society and
building a modem state that could provide social services and serve as a motor of the
Quebec economy. This involved a struggie with the federal govemment over autonomy in
areas of provincial jurisdiction — culminating in the opting-out of some domestic federal
policy initiatives.
Under Lester Pearson, these issues and events took on great importance pushing
the national unity question to the top of the govemment’s domestic agenda. Pearson’s
strategy had hinged on elevating the importance of Quebec’s position in the federation.
This was to be accomplished by meeting the demands of Quebec or by negotiating a
compromise.66 Accordingly, Pearson noted, “National unity does flot imply subordination
in any way of provincial rights or the alienation of provincial authority. It does require a
government at the centre strong enough to serve Canada as a whole; and its full
realization demands a strong Canadian identity with the national spirit and pride that will
sustain and strengthen it.”67 For the prime minister who called Quebec “a nation within a
nation” and “the homeland of a people”, this represented an accommodative approach to
national unity. While Pearson had attempted to forge a framework that would be
acceptable to English-Canadians but win the active support of Quebeckers, his successor
had settled on a more confrontational approach.
65 Richard Simeon and lan Robinson, State, SocietE and the Development ofCanadian federalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
66 Examples of this strategy beyond the royal commission include the resolution of the national flag debate
on terms acceptable to Quebec, and the negotiation of a more equitable division of federal taxes between
Quebec and Ottawa. For an account of this period see Donald V. Smiley, The federal Condition in Canada
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987).
67 Lester Pearson, Address to the Empire Club, Toronto, October 15, 1964.
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Trudeau joined the federal liberal party in 1965 at the behest ofPearson.68 His
views on the national unity file and more directly on the topic of nationalism we already
well known. Along with lis colleagues at Cité Libre, a dissident journal he helped co
found in 1950 that helped provide the intellectual basis for the Quiet Revolution, Trudeau
would launch a concerted affack against the excesses of Quebec nationalism. His views
on the danger of nationalism more generally stemmed in part from a liberal position in
favour of individual rights against the state. Moreover, he believed that the rights of
individuals should supersede the collective rights ofa people. As McRoberts attests,
Trudeau and his colleagues at Cité Libre believed that “equality within a given state could
only be among individuals. Equality between collectivities necessarily implied separate
states.”69 This idea was at the foot ofhis baffle against Quebec nationalists, whom he
viewed as a sectarian throwback to the era when the Roman Catholic Church dominated
the social reaim and much of the political life of the province.
By the mid- 1 960s, Trudeau had firmly rejected the belief of Quebec sovereigntists
that change to protect the collective rights of Francophones in the province could be
achieved only through political independence. More fundamentally, upon becoming
prime minister in 1968 he challenged the assumption that Quebec was the national
govemment ofFrench-speaking Canadians and insisted that the protection and
development of the French culture in Canada was as much the task of the federal
government as that ofthe govemment ofQuebec. His strategy was therefore aimed at
68 Pearson’s courting ofthe three “wise men” from Quebec that included Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier and Jean
Marchand, was an example of his sfrategy to elevate the power of the province in the federation.
69McRoberts, 121.
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responding to Quebec flot through appeasement, but through the encouragement of an
alternative representation of Canada as a pan-Canadian “union.” Instead of an emphasis
on resolving cleavages based on traditional notions of dual nationhood, the management
ofdiversity became associated with reconciling provincial interests.70 Throughout the
course ofhis tenure as prime minister, this was to lead to new forms ofconflict in
intergovemmental relations and in constitutional politics, in which provinces, rather than
nations, became the principal vehicles for the promotion of societal interests.
From this perspective, Trudeau’s enduring view of Quebec nationalism was to
form an ideational prism through which major policy decisions would be influenced. The
national unity strategy to which he would subscribe was part of a larger policy paradigm
that inspired hïs demand for govemment action. And it was precisely lis identification,
then estimation ofthe root causes ofthe national unity crisis that led him to consider
possible policy solutions. In short, for Trudeau the pre-political, or at least pre-decisional
process of defining the national unity problem was to play a critical role in the policy
process, both in regards to what measures would be considered and what choices would
ultimately be made.
from Definition to ImpÏementation: The Folicy is formuÏated
Trudeau’s understanding of the problem definition at the heart of the national
unity debate played a central role in the emergence ofmulticulturalism.7’ But the story of
70 Samuel V. Laselva, The Moral foundations ofCanadian Federalism: Paradoxes, Achievements, and
Tragedies ofNationhood (Monfreal: MQUP, 1996).
71 Our use of “problem definition” is based on D.A. Schon’s interpretation ofthe concept’s contribution to
political discourse. See, for example, The Reflective Practitioner (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
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the policy’s origins is flot limited to its perceived utility as a tool to frustrate Quebec
nationalism. Even though labels such as “Quebec nationalism”, “separation”,
“independence”, “other ethnic groups”, are examples of suitable answers to the question:
“Which issues were on the agenda?”, such answers do not reveal how these issues were
defined. The context within which a national unity strategy was formed, and
multiculturalism policy was debated, was established in the 1960s. Trudeau’s ideas, or his
principled beliefs about role ofthe state in this period — the policy paradigm we referred
to earlier — influenced the public policy process by helping him make sense of complex
problems and realities.72 As the former prime minister wrote, “make no mistake, we were
an ideological govemment
— ideological in the sense that we were motivated by an
overarching framework.”73 This framework ofien associated with the term “Just Society”
was more than a convenient phrase; it was the inspiration that provided an element of
coherence across policy fields and unified his fifteen years as prime minister. Informed
by the values of cultural democracy and participatory citizenship, Trudeau recognised the
importance of creating and expanding new possibilities for a common space of cultural
and political exchange. Dunng this period, liberal human rights concems were espoused,
with the aim of expanding citizen access to a whole range of public services on an
egalitarian footing. The objective that assumed the highest priority in the pursuit ofthis
Just Society became equality. As Trudeau added, “For where is the justice in a country in
which an individual has the freedom to be totally fulfflled, but where inequality denies
72 On the significance ofpolicy paradigms in the policy process see Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social
Leaming and the State: The Case of Economic Policy making in Britain,” Comparative Politics 25:3, 1993.
Pierre Trudeau, Towards o Just Society: The Trudeau Years, ed. Thomas S. Axworthy (Markham,
Ontario: Viking, 1990), 4.
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him the means? And how can we cail a society just unless it is organized in such a way as
to give each his due, regardless ofhis state ofbirth, hïs means or his health?”74
The democratic vision ofTrudeau’s Just Society also welcomed the continued
existence of Quebec as an integral part of the Canadian Confederation. His early writings
on federalism traced the problem of Canadian unity to the absence of a shared goal
among Canadians and he suggested that the goal of building a Just Society could fil! this
vacuum.75 The 1982 Canadian Charter ofRights and freedoms is probabiy the most
important and conspicuous item on this agenda, but muiticulturalism policy met the new
standard of a state responsibility to provide equal status, equai opportunity, and fair
treatment for ail Canadians. Other examples ofthis paradigm in action in the decade
following the introduction ofmulticulturalism poiicy inciude the passage ofa new
Immigration Act in 1976, which for the first time included a non-discrimination clause,
and the adoption of the Canadian Human Rights Act in 1977 which established a new
legislative framework to foster mutuai respect among Canadians of ail backgrounds.
While national unity and participatoly citizenship were the main catchwords in
Ottawa by the 1 970s, this did not preclude the value or existence of other explanations for
the emergence of multiculturalism. The fact that the mobilisation of ethnocultural groups
was precipitated by the govemment’s action to embark upon a royal commission presents
itself, in our estimation, as a key casual story that cannot be dismissed out of hand.
“Our Trudeau,” Globe and Mail, Saturday, September 30, 2000. The day after Trudeau won the
leadership of the federal Liberal party on April 7, 1968, he was quoted as saying “I will use ail my sftength
to bring about ajust society to a nation living in a tough world.”
The ideas that represented the Just Society, however, tended to be very diffuse and did flot necessarily
translate easily into specific views in ah policy sectors. World views or ideologies, as Howiett and Ramesh
note, seldom do. See Studying Public Policy: Poticy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, 2d ed. (Don Miil, Ont.:
OUP 2003), 127.
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With this in mmd, if the opposition to biculturalism was a direct outcome of state
intervention in matters of cultural policy, one might expect to find a govemment that is
more responsive than usual. This is precisely the point we wish to make. In Canada,
govemment fiinded commissions have ofien served as important instances ofpolicy
leaming, where the state has been made aware of the presence, or more ofien the extent
ofpublic problems. They have contributed greatly to the development ofthe country by
considering policy arguments in the face of deep uncertainty and growing fragmentation
among various societal interests.76 In the case ofthe Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism, the presence of sufficiently organised ethnocultural groups would not
have come as a surprise to the federal govemment. Yet the level of dissent directed
towards the commission suggested something more informative. The fact that the federal
govemment validated the interests of ethnocultural groups through the production of
Book PvÇ groups that were, by McRoberts own estimation “uneven, and heavily
dominated by Ukrainian-Canadian groups”, is testament to the growing political and
economic power of ethnocultural communities. A similar conclusion was reached by
Burnet and Palmer:
The fact that the government heeded the pressure of lobbyists for the other ethnic
groups is an indication that those groups had already gained economic and political
strength. While the cynics hold that the government acted only in order to have a
counterpoise to French-Canadian aspirations, the other ethnic groups would not have
been seen as a potential counterpoise if they had not been strong. It had been
possible in the past to ignore them. Now they included senators, members of
Parliament, prominent and wealthy business people, academics, and public
servants.77
76 Bradford, 159-160.
“ Bumet and Palmer, 224.
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While the mobilisation ofethiiocultural groups may flot have been tsufficiently
broad-based”, as McRoberts has charged, to independently move the government to
action, the capacity ofthe groups to make their identity daims known and resonate with
the Canadian state outweighed the significance oftheir numbers.78 This developing
conversation can be viewed as an adjunct to the prevailing “identity climate” of the I 960s
that stressed human rights and was coming to terms with ethnicity as a source of strength.
Even the royal commission that had tried to retain its focus squarely on biculturalism
contributed to this frame of mmd. As Day concedes, “despite its relative sophistication in
textual construction, the commission managed to unwiftingly invoke the settiement and
expansion phases of the Canadian discourse on diversity as a means of setting up a
solidarity between the Other Ethnïc Groups and the Two founding Races.”79
At this point several daims need restating whule others should be clarified. The
foregoing analysis has highlighted the way in which multiculturalism emerged within a
specific political agenda. It is not, as Kymiicka has suggested, that multiculturaÏism was
introduced without any real idea ofwhat it would mean.8° On the contrary, the complex
nature of multiculturalism revealed its intention as a policy that could offer symbolic
recognition and endorsement ofethnocuÏtural diversity while ftilfihling a larger policy
project. This larger mission entailed promoting cultural differences as a public good, but
also as a potential fou to Quebec nationalism. In this sense multiculturalism policy was
McRoberts, 124.
Richard J.F. Day, Multiculturalism and the History ofCanadian Diversity (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002), 181.
° It is Iikely that what Kymiicka meant by this is that as a tool to support cultural pluralism it was unclear
that the govemment had any real sense of what sort of policy instrument it had created. See finding Our
Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: OUP 1998).
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created out of the ideas, attitudes, and beliefs of its chief architect Trudeau, and
encapsulated in the prevailing national unity discourse of the penod. An important
question, however, remains. Was multiculturalism policy devised to accomplish both
goals equally?
At the very least the policy did not emerge after a lengthy decision-making
process. The subtext here is that the central stages in the policy cycle (from recognition to
implementation) proceeded without extensive consideration ofthe problems brought to
light by the royal commission’s Book W Coupled with this, the fact that Trudeau spoke
so infrequently about multiculturalism has only strengthened convictions that the policy
was not as vital to the government as his introductory speech in the House of Commons
might have suggested.8’ This supports the position that the implicit aim of the policy, a
scheme devised to bolster national unity, superseded the emphasis on fostenng cultural
pluralism. It may also suggest that multiculturalism was in part a “spillover problem”
drawn into an existing govemment agenda devoted to national unity.82 Trudeau’s decided
emphasis on certain aspects ofthe policy in lis unveiling ofmulticulturalism does flot
appear to undermine this judgment.
As introduced, the policy was constructed in such a way as to allow for individual
freedom while ensuring national unity. This was made possible by separating the question
of language rights from that of individual cultural fteedom. The pnnciple here was to
V. Seymour Wilson, “The Tapestiy Vision of Canadian Multiculturalism” Canadian Journal ofPotitical
Science, 16: 4 (December 1993), 657.
82 On policy windows and spilloverproblems see Howlett and Ramesh, 135-138.
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ensure equality among citizens through state assistance. Thus, the poiicy conmiifted the
federal government to work in four key areas:
First, resources permiffing, the govemment will seek to assist ail Canadian cuiturai
groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to
grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak
groups no iess than the strong and highiy organized. Second, the govemment wiil
assist members of ail cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full
participation in Canadian society. Third, the govemment wiii promote creative
encounters and interchange among ail Canadian cultural groups in the interest of
nationai unity. Fourth, ffie govemment will continue to assist inmiigrants to acquire
at least one of Canada’s officiai languages in order to become fuii participants in
Canadian society.83
The order in which the govemment’s targets were announced may have suited
ethnocultural communities interested in preserving their culturai distinctiveness, but
Trudeau’s speech cleariy focused on the second purpose. In so doing lie was able to cast
the poiicy in a light more consistent with his beiief in the primacy of the individuai.
Therefore, as McRoberts adds, “for Trudeau multicuituralism was more about freeing the
individual from constraints than promoting the development ofcultural groups.”84 Yet the
prominence of individual autonomy in the prime minister’s speech reveaied the balance
between individual and coiiective nghts at the heart of the policy. In so far as
muiticuituraiism was designed to fit within a bilingual framework, freeing individuais
from constraints necessarily meant recognising ethnoculturai differences to a degree flot
afforded before by the Canadian state.85
83 Debates, Parliament, 3 Session, October 8, 1971, 8546. The full text ofTrudeau’s speech (including
the federal response to ffie recommendations ofBook IV) is reproduced in Appendix 1 ofthis thesis.
84McRoberts, 126.
85 for McRoberts the symmeùy we refer to here is more appropriately understood as a conflict, others such
as Claude Couture see both bilingualism and multiculturalism as a balance between individual and
collective rights. See La loyauté dn laïc: Pierre Elliott Trudeau et le libéralisme canadien (Montréal:
Harmattan Inc., 1996).
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These observations notwithstanding, in the final analysis the main concems of
ethnocultural groups had been met by the policy. They had received ostensibly what they
had been looking for — inclusion and recognition of their daims. The significance
attached to each or any ofthe govemment’s targets was secondary to the symbolic victory.
ofthe poiicy’s announcement. In this vein, what counted was that Canada had become the
first country in 1971 to officially affirm and support the value of ethnocultural diversity
as a strategy for managing the social order.
From Implementation to Evaluation: Phase One Begins
Despite grand plans and considerable rhetoric, the first years after
multiculturalism’s announcement produced mixed resuits. Most of the programmatic
elements of the poiicy were inadequately funded, subj ect to reorientation, or iacked
strong consistent stewardship. Ail were symptomatic of a policy that suffered in this
initial stage from an ambiguity ofpurpose. Yet by the mid-point ofthe decade a new
policy direction sharpened the federal government’s resolve and was more in tune with
Canada’s changing demographic realities.
At the outset the federal government had attached six programs to implement its
multiculturalism policy in response to Book IV. Most of the core initiatives were to be
carried out under the auspices of the Citizenship Brandi of the Department of the
Secretary of State, they included programs that provided muiticulturai grants; culture
development; ethnie histories; Canadian ethnie studies; teaching of officiai languages;
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and programs of the federal cultural agencies.86 The most significant and interventionist
of these was the grants program that ushered in state ftinding to support ethnocultural
associations.87 Eligible activities within this program included multicultural encounters;
organisational meetings for new cultural groups; citizenship preparation and immigration
orientation; and ethnocultural conferences.
As constituted the programs met with general approval among ethnocultural
groups precisely because they reflected their primary interest in cultural development
activities. On the other hand, for groups that had resen’ations about the policy as a whole,
it was flot viewed so much as unwelcome as subject to greater question. As the federal
govemment was to find from its own study ofthe issue there was lack of understanding
conceming “the basic pnnciple” ofthe policy that was a factor in most, but flot ail
opposition to the policy.88 In this respect it appeared not only that the character ofthe
problem affected the nature of the government’s response, but it also influenced the
public’s understanding of the policy. As Pal notes, complex problems are flot always well
defined and adequately understood so that the policy response seems evident and
uncontroversial.89 Nonetheless, although the policy became popular with ethnocultural
communities, the complicated nature ofthe policy would form part ofits endunng legacy.
86 Recommendations proposed by the federal cultural agencies were to be directed by the agencies
concemed and coordinated through an Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, which although it existed
neyer functioned in a real capacity. See Debates, 28g’ Parliament, 3rd Session, October 8, 1971, 8580-8585.
87 Leslie A. Pal, Interests ofState: The PoÏitics ofLanguage, MuÏticuituratism and feminism in Canada
(Montreal: MQUP, 1993), 115.
Canada, Non-Officiai Languages: A Study in Canadian Muiticuituratisrn, Minister ResponsibÏefor
Muiticulturaiism (Ottawa, 1975), 347.
89Pal, Beyond Poiicy Anaiysis, 94.
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From this perspective it appeared, initially at least, that the groups that had
championed multiculmralism were willing to live with any perceived ambïguity of the
policy in exchange for a precedent setting framework by which they could pursue state
resources and recognition.9° Even the somewhat modest sums aftached to the policy in
the first years afier 1971 did flot appear to dampen enthusiasm for the policy or become
the subject of significant debate; by and large the upbeat mood was shared by members of
the Citizenship Branch who saw their profile within the federal bureaucracy grow.91
Despite its original relationshïp with the Citizenship Branch, the federal
govemment decided in 1972 to foster a more autonomous identity for multiculturalism
policy and its programs. This resulted in the creation of a multiculturalism portfolio
through the appointment of a Minister of State, and the establishment in 1973 of the
Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM). On the surface both
measures were intended to convey, and certainly suggested, an elevated status for the
policy within the federal government. Yet both came under criticism as examples of the
increasing politicisation of multiculturalism. The policy that had benefited at its inception
from an all-party consensus, one which coveted favour with Canada’s growing
ethnocultural communities, had quickly lent itselfto political manipulation. Such was the
conclusion reached by John Jaworsky in his study ofthe policy’s first decade. As the
author notes:
90Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “The Politics of Race and Ethnicity as a Contested Arena.’ Canadian Potitics, eds.
James P. Bickerton and Alain G. Gagnon (Peterborough: Broadview, 1994), 246.
‘ In 1972 the budget for the Multiculturalism Program was approximately $4 million, while that ofthe
Citizenship Branch was $44 million. Canada Consulting Group, “Improving the Management Effectiveness
of Citizenship Branch,” Department of the Secretary of State (Ottawa, Nov. 1971), I-4, quoted in Pal,
Interests ofState, 112.
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Although it is unlikeÏy that partisan political considerations were of primary
importance in leading to the announcement of the policy, multiculturalism rapidly
achieved a higher political profile than may originally have been intended. Several
senior servants who worked in the Citizenship Branch ofthe department ofthe
secretary of State in the early seventies were of the opinion that multiculturalism
policy became more “politicized” following the October 1972 federal election, when
the number of seats held by the Liberals in Ontano decreased from 64 (1968) to 36.
Several Conservative and NDP candidates were elected in traditional Liberal ridings
in Toronto where a large number of voters were of “other” ethnic origin, and this may
have encouraged the Liberal party to pay more attention to voters of non-Anglo
Saxon and non-French background.92
The multiculturalism portfolio was therefore viewed to a certain degree as a symbolic
gesture underlined by political motives.93 The fact that no fewer than six secretaries of
state would be handed the multiculturalism portfolio in the course ofthe first decade did
liffle to dispel the belief that the policy held a low profile within the cabinet.
The other significant move made by the federal government was the creation of
the CCCM. The council was formed as an advisory body to the Minister responsible for
Multiculturalism, but one which functioned in part as an exercise in public relations. The
Council had been created following the prime minister’s decision to establish a “body of
persons well qualified to make recommendations designed to ensure the full participation
of all Canadians in the cultural development of this country.”94 While its membership
initially included representatives of no fewer than 47 ethnocultural groups, including
those of British and French descent, it came to be regarded as an organisation devoted
primarily to the interests of ethnocultural minorities. In its capacity as a source ofpolicy
92j0 Jaworsky, A Case $tudy ofthe Canadian federal Government Multicutturalism Policy (M.A.
Thesis, Caneton University, 1979), 100-101.
The history of Canada’s Ministers of State (now Secretaries of State) demonsfrates that they may be
assigned to areas the govemment deems sensitive, but they are less important that full cabinet portfolios.
Canada, first Annual Report ofthe Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, Minister of
State Multiculturalism (Ottawa, 1975), vi.
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advice the council became an important institution by organising conferences and
promoting researcli emphasising the reality of ethnicity as a factor of Canadian society.
Its political profile notwithstanding, the council was disposed to cali upon the federal
government to become more visible in its support of multiculturalism, arguing in 1977
that “[aJlthough ultimately the real backbone ofa workable cultural pluralism will be
public acceptance, participation, and initiative, the Council is convinced that government
too has much to do.”95
Criticisms by stakeholders and allies alike in these first years acted to reinforce
the impression that the policy was both in need of clarification and stronger state
guidance. By 1975, and wïth the appointment of John Munro as the second minister
responsible for multiculturalism, it appears the government had reached similar
conclusions. For the first, but flot the Iast time in its history, multiculturalism would
undergo an extemal review that paved the way for a reorientation of established policy. In
his public announcement ofthe review’s recommendations and the govemment’s
intended action Munro indicated the policy’s shifi ftom an emphasis on cultural retention
to a concern for reducing intolerance and discrimination, with special attention devoted to
“visible” minorities.96 The new direction appeared to be designed to dispel the perception
that the govemment’s commitment to multiculturalism was primarily aimed at financing
Canada, Report ofthe Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism, Minister of State
Mutticulturalism (Ottawa, 1977), 8.
96e fact that Munro chose first to speak publicly through the Globe and Mail was flot lost on the CCCM.
At their second biennial conference several months after the minister’s announcement, delegates were
reportedly preparing a “pointed reaction” to the statements. As detailed in Jorgen Dahuie, “Ottawa report: A
Note on the Second Biennial Conference ofthe Canadian Consultative Council on Multicuhuralism,’
Ethnie Studies, Vol.8, No 11, 1976.
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the various foikioric activities and celebrations ofethnocultural groups. It was also a
signal of the changing composition and dynamics of Canada’s ethnocultural milieu.
The federal govemment was increasingly sensitive to the grievances of new
immigrants whose concems differed from those ofearlier groups, primanly ofEuropean
origin, who had been the first to mobilise in support of the policy in 1971. Cultural
retention and the celebration of diverse identities were ofless importance to the new
category of immigrants, many of them visible minorities, than breaking down economic
and political barriers due to racism and discrimination. This was of course the second
priority announced in 1971, and the direction that was most agreeable to Trudeau, given
his concems with a Just Society and so on.97
By aligning itself more closely with issues ofequity rather than identity, the
federal govemment could more fruitfully address two issues — one increasingly
problematic and one longer standing. As a response to critïcism oftheir empliasis on
cultural retention, from those who opposed it or altematively sought a more robust
emphasis on fighting racism, the government could now optimistically hope to target any
confusion about the cohesive nature ofthe policy. By moving multiculturalism in a new
direction the govemment could, by the late 1 970s, provide a stronger focus for the policy.
More directly, they could address any scepticism about the policy’s true intention by
promoting a goal that was presumably more readily acceptable to the population at large.
In practical terms the new prominence of an anti-discrimination focus would also
contribute to this remedy by helping to dispel the perceived incompatibility ofa
97McRoberts, 127.
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multiculturalism poiicy within a bilingual framework. Suspicion that major concessions
to ethnocultural communities would corne at the expense ofthe “two founding nations”,
and detract from officiai bilingualism, could therefore be allayed.
The desire to focus squarely on promoting equity and ending exclusion was
echoed by John Munro in 1979 at a conference devoted to rnulticulturalism and
biiingualism. 11e noted: “We must avoid locking sectors of our society or groups of
Canadians out ofany part ofthe national life ofthis country. We must continue to work to
eliminate those conditions that either make people insecure and defensive or place them
in an adversarial role.”98 Altogether, this new emphasis involved a certain deviation from
the vision evoked by the idea of the cultural mosaic, since what was being encouraged
was overcoming cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society and flot cukural
retention as a primary instrument of state policy.
The decision brought the policy doser in une with what some were calling the
“polyetic” nature of Canadian society. The difference here with multiculturalism is
more than just semantics. Commentators were beginning in the mid 1 970s, some no
doubt in response to the shifi in the policy’s emphasis, to suggest that the term
muiticuituralism represented a misnomer, because what the govemment was increasingly
promotïng through its policy was a diversity of ethnic expression and recognition rather
than the maintenance ofmany cultures.99 As summarised by Roberts and Clifion, with
98 John Munro, “Multiculturalism — the Policy,” in Mutticulturatism, Bilingualism and Canadian
Institutions: Papers Presented ut a Conference Sponsored by the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews
in Co-operation with the Faculty ofEducation, University oflianitoba, ed. Keith A. McLeod (Toronto:
University ofToronto, 1979), 34.
99This position is supported by Alan B. Anderson and James S. Frideres, Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical
Perspectives (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981).
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this position “the notion ofpluralism shifts from the traditional picture ofthe mosaic of
intemally integrated ethnic groups toward a collection of individuals who use ethnic
characteristics when and if it suits their psychological needs.”°° In short, the character of
ethnic identity that was being promoted was almost purely symbolic.
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter we have given an overview ofthe ideas and concems that
guided Canada’s passage towards a multiculturalism policy. In the mid-1940s, a
monolithic view of membership built upon an Anglo-centric model was the prevailing
representation of Canadian identity. The model was supported by the perception that state
strategies designed to promote pluralist integration risked endangering national unity. By
the late 1960s, the Canadian state began to envisage that while individuals might retain
“other” cultural traditions in their private lives, they would in other respects
accommodate to the national culture and public institutions of Canada. In other words,
within limits the recognition of diverse identities was not dismissed as incompatible with
Canadian unity.
From the standpoint oftrying to explain the emergence ofmulticulturalism policy
we focused on the role ofpolicy-making as an exercise in political thinking. Political
ideas were highlighted as an important determinant ofthe policy process because they
influenced the conceptualisation ofthe problem, and underscored potential courses of
action. Describing and analysing Prime Minister Trudeau’s views on Quebec nationalism
‘°° Lance W. Roberts and Rodney A. Clifton, ‘The Ideology ofCanadian Multiculturalism,” Canadian
Public Policy, VIII: 1, 1982, 92.
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allowed us to understand the ideational framework through which a national unity
strategy was constructed. Even though the national unity problem played a central role in
the policy process from which multiculturalism emerged, the story of the policy’s origin
is not limited to a single explanation. Multicultural ideas gathered momentum and once
engaged with Trudeau’s conception ofthe Just Society fuelled an innovative anempt to
deal with matters ofcultural policy. $imilarly, the mobilisation ofethnocultural groups in
response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism figured as an
important causal factor. The ideas and agendas associated within this period did more
than advance political interests, they revealed an ongoing attempt by state and societal
interests to fashion a consensus on how the boundanes of membership within a polity
should be defined; how the benefits and responsibilities of membership should be
allocated; and how the boundaries of membership should be understood and legitimised.
The main focus ofmulticulturalism policy in the first halfofthe 1970s was on the
provision of culturally appropnate services with the understanding that cultural
maintenance, especially involving etbnic diversity, should be supported. Following this
period the focus of concem shified from cultural maintenance to concems about inequity
and social disadvantage. The response was flot, however, to set up parallel institutional
structures but, as noted, to reorient existing priorities within the multiculturalism
portfolio. In sum, phase one ofthe policy’s development underlined an evolving response
to ethnocultural diversity, yet it also indicated that the management of diversity
necessitated a pro-active state response.
This state response was suggestive of an environment shaped by the postwar
citizenship regime where govemment intervention was evident in several areas of social
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policy. And by the end of the 1 970s, an agreement existed on the appropnateness of state
support for ethnocultural groups with multiculturalism as a key element in the symbolic
expressions ofCanadian citizenship.’°’ This symbolic recognition, backed-up by
institutional support, is significant in its own right but must be understood as part of a
larger rights framework that included more than multiculturalism policy. The federal
govemment’s commitment to diversïty and the idea ofcitizenship it supported were based
on policies and initiatives such as immigration, human rights and social justice. As
Jenson notes, “the strategy for building Canadian citizenship rested on a notion ofrights
and responsibilities that recognizes individuals’ right to maintain an identity defined in
terms oftheir ethnocultural ongins. This dimension also recognised the need to spend
public funds to make this nght more than formai.”°2 Social policy was flot viewed as an
end in itself. Nor were the recipients of entitiements ends in themselves. On the contrary,
both policies and people were the means to the end of attaining a more uniform condition
ofjustice.
What is striking about this period is the fact that a consensus had been reached on
the vision that the provision of “welfare” in the widest sense, ought to be carried out by
the institutions of the state. The nineteenth century conception that private and much of
social life constïtuted a sphere of natural liberty of which the state should take no
cognizance was conspicuous by its absence.’°3 Indeed state leaders increasingly gave
101 Abu-Laban, 246.
102 Jane Jenson, “Building Citizenship: Govemance and Service Provision in Canada,” in Building
Citizenshi: Governance and Service Provision in Canada, CPRN Discussion Paper No. F 17 (September
2001), 16.
‘° Jose Harris, “Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-1940: An Intellectual Framework for Bntish
Social Policy,” Past andfresent, No.135 (May, 1992), 135.
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voice to the opposite point of view. As the British historian Richard Titmuss explained
the phulosophy behind the welfare state, “it was increasingly regarded as a proper
function or even obligation of govemment to ward off distress and strain flot only among
the poor but among ail classes of society. And because the area of responsibility had so
perceptibly widened, it was no longer thought sufficient to provide through vanous
branches of social assistance a standard of service hitherto considered appropriate for
those in receipt ofpoor assistance.”104
Achieving social justice and equity were, therefore, very much legitimate goals of
state action. As the next chapter details, these principles were to prevail in the
expansionary phase of multiculturalism policy on into the 1980s. However, by the end of
the decade, a penod considered to be synonymous with the policy’s growth, political
ideas began to find persuasive expression among actors whose institutional position gave
them both the motive and the opportunity to consider policy reform. It is to the stoiy of
these contrasting ideas and policy agendas that this thesis now tums.
104 Robert Titmuss, Problems ofSocial Policy (London: HMSO, 1950), 506.
CHAPTER 4
Consolïdatïng ami Contesting Multiculturalism: The 19$Os
Introduction
This chapter extends our study of ideas and institutional settings as detenninants
of ethnocultural policy. It traces the development of multiculturalism throughout the
1980s, examining the events and processes that contributed to the consolidation ofthe
multiculturalism framework as well as those that served to contest the policy’s passage
into the 1990s. While the 1980s are usually treated in the literature as years of
consolidation, and indeed they were, the election ofthe Progressive Conservatives plus
the advent of world-wide neo-liberalism brought a new set ofideas.’ Although these ideas
did not upset the existing ways ofunderstanding multiculturalism, by the end ofthe
decade the edges ofpolicy began to ftay. Moreover, the events ofthe Meech Lake Accord
brought a retum to the old paftem and discourse on dualism reminiscent of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, thereby demonstrating that
multiculturalism would again be hostage to national unity. We suggest that this episode
sewed to announce the way in which multiculturalism would be debated in the 1990s.
Policymaking in the multiculturalism sector during the 1 980s was punctuated by
episodes of incremental reform. As we demonstrate in this chapter, while the pattern of
Consolidation and growth during the 1 980s is a central theme in much of the work on multiculturalism.
See, for example, Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “The Politics of Race and Ethnicity as a Contested Arena.”
Canadian Politics, eds. James Bickerton andAlain G. Gagnon (Peterborough: Broadview, 1994); Peter S.
Li, “The Multiculturalism Debate,” in Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, 2”’ ed., ed. Peter S. Li (Don
Miils: Oxford University Press, 1999); Marc Leman, “Canadian Multiculturalism,” Farliamentary
Research Branch, Current Issue Review 93-6E (Ottawa: Library ofParliament, 1999); and Jean R.
Bumet with Harold Palmer, ‘Coming Canadians’: An Introduction to the History of Canadas Peoples
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988).
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policy change varied, multicuitural policy as a whole retained a high degree of internai
consistency.2 In effect this meant that on the surface adjustments to the federai policy
were often compatible with the existing poiicy paradigm. For the long-term stability of
multiculturalism, however, we argue that the changing circumstances and ideas that were
charactenstic of this policymaking era would uitimately serve to inspire efforts towards
more fundamental change. In this regard we see the 1 980s as a pivotal decade, one that
proved flot to be an era oftrue policy innovation, but one that triggered intellectuai and
bureaucratic debate around new policy goals and practices. Policy innovation on the scaie
indicated here implies a transformation in the ideas, institutions and interests that
underpin public poiicy. The end resuit is to upset the internai consistency of a given
poiicy thereby representing a break from past practice.
Before contestation became representative ofthe policy discourse aimed at
redefining federal multicuituraiism in the 1 990s, there were elements of policy growth in
the 1 980s that stemmed from the iaunch of additionai legislation, strategies, and
institutionai structures. These examples of consolidation were a response to policy goals
identified in the late 1970s and eariy 1980s, and reflected in multicuituralism’s new
emphasis on equity and improving race relations. The first part ofthis chapter focuses on
two events that sharpened the policy’s focus in such a way; the enactment of the Charter
ofRights andfreedoms of 1982, and the passage ofthe Muiticuituralism Act in 1988. In
the last section of the chapter our discussion moves from consolidation to contestation.
2 InternaI consistency or stability within public policies is generally understood to include three elements:
the problem definition, policy-centred goals, and policy instruments to achieve those goals. In other words,
this means that while elements of the policy may change, the core meaning and purpose do flot. See Pal,
Beyond Policy Analysis, 11-13.
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Here attention is directed at indicating that the era of expansion associated with the 1980s
was also a time when ideas in the Canadian polity served to challenge Canad&s
commitment to multicuitural principles. Two pivotai events are discussed; the
Employment Equity Act of 1986, and the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord of 1987.
Both measures served to weaken an inclusive piuralism in public debates and state
contributions to the representation of ethnocultural identities in Canada. This
conversation plays a central role in establishing a point ofreference that allows chapter
five to examine the impact ofpolicy change on multiculturalism in the 1990s.
4.1 Embedding Ideas
The 1 980s are commonly understood to be the golden years of multiculturalism
policy. Underiying conflicts were, however, neyer entirely overcome. The decade began
with criticism that multiculturalism was overly focused on cultural retention when racial
inequaiity had become a greater threat. Indeed, the dramatic increase in visible minority
immigration to Canada in the latter part of the 1 970s almost guaranteed attention would
shifi to the problems of racism and discrimination.3 Contributing to the impact of
Canada’s new demographic reality was the gravitation of immigrants to its major cities,
making the country’s muiticultural nature ail the more real for Canada’s mainly urban
population.4 The federal govemment responded by making the fight against racism
Non-European immigration then accounted for six ofthe top ten countries oforigin. This was due, in
part, to the Immigration Act of 1976 which placed new emphasis on labour market skills, assisting
family reunification, and honouring Canadas international obligations with regard to refugees. See Leo
Driedger, Race and Ethnicity: finding Identities and Inequalities (Don Milis: OUP, 2003), 53-54.
By the 1970s, more than three quarters ofCanad&s ethnic-origin population was urban, a large increase
from the tum ofthe century when the number was slightly more than one third. Ibid, 58.
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pivotai component of their strategy linked to overcoming barriers in Canadian society.
Jncluded in these efforts was the creation of the Race Relations Unit within the
Multiculturalism Directorate ofthe Secretary of State in 1981, and the commitment to
double the program budget by 1984.
While the reality of Canad&s changing ethnic composition held a variety of
political implications — including but flot limited to electoral considerations in mainly
urban areas — there was no overt indication that the increasing multicultural nature of the
country figured decisively in the federal govemment’s ongoing national unity strategy.
The impact of diversity on national unity would only acquire a special dimension in
Canadian politics during the early 1 990s, primarily because it coincided with a
constitutional crisis following the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. 6 For the most part,
ethnocultural diversity, and the demands that it gave risc to, were viewed by the Canadian
state as something altogether different than the daims being made in the name of Quebec
and Aboriginal nationalism. The political articulation of Quebec and Aboriginal demands
were designed to force a re-evaluation of their constitutional status, and therefore
represented a serious challenge to the constitutional order. In contrast, the daims being
made by, or in the name of ethnocultural groups challenged the idea of a monolithic
conception of citizenship, flot the integnty of the federation.7
Canada, Annual Report ofthe Department ofthe Secretary ofState, 1982-3 (Minister of Supply and
Services Canada).
6Alain Cairns, “The Fragmentation of Canadian Citizenship,” in The Meaning and future ofCanadian
Citizensh%v, cd. William Kaplan (Montreal: MQUP, 1993), 208.
7As Kymiicka suggests, this reveals the general nature of ethnocultural rights that are intended flot to
promote some measure of self-government, but to facilitate integration within a political community.
None of the demands being made in the name of ethnocultural identity or preservation suggest a des ire to
establish a separate or seif-governing society. The prevailing ambition continues to be the reform of
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By the early l980s, it was obvious that multiculturalism would not function as a
definïtive response to the problems of Canadian unity. Admittedly it was constructed with
some national unity role in mmd, but Prime Minister Trudeau had neyer expressly
designed the policy to deal with the range ofproblems that comprised the ongoing cnsis.
In particular, the policy was flot crafied as an instrument to mediate or remedy
intergovemmental disagreements between competing govemments which had become
such an indelible characteristic of Canadian federalism. Even if one takes into
consideration an expanded role for multiculturalism in the first part ofthe decade, the
policy and the vision it supported was to be part of a much larger scheme. First
articulated in the mid-1960s, the ovemding objective ofthis elaborate social and political
project was to find a constructive basis for strengthening Canadian unïty through the
promotion ofa new, more uniting national identity.8 This was to be carried out in a
number ofways that ultimately demonstrated a broad commitment to equity: through the
encouragement of political advocacy and participation that became the hallmark of the
Secretaiy of State’s activity by 196$; the adoption of language and cultural policy in the
1970s; and in the 1980s through developing a sense of national consciousness by linking
individuals and groups directly to the state by the vehicle ofrights.9 In this latter respect
mainstream institutions to make them more responsive to the diverse nature ofCanadian society. See
“Citizenship and Identity in Canada,’ in Canadian Folitics, 3rd ed., eds. James Bickerton and Main-G.
Gagnon (Toronto: Broadview Press, 1999), 26.
$ 0f course, it is a mafter of interpretation whether the measures supported by Trudeau were tmly
“constructive”, or a positive basis for supporting national unity. Many Quebecers, no doubt, were likely
to have viewed multiculturalism as a negative rather than a positive instrument designed to blunt their
cultural distinctiveness. Moreover, according to Peter Russeil, Trudeau’s initiatives rather than unifying
the country gave a “sharper” ideological edge to its constitutional politics. See Constitutional Odyssey:
Can Canadians Become a Sovereign Peopte?, 2T1d ed. (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1993).
The complexity of the crisis before the federal govemment suggests that no single policy instrument,
no matter how sophisticated could solve the problem of national unity. Whether unity would have been
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the Charter ofRights and Freedoms, which would form the centre ofTrudeau’s national
unity strategy, would play a much more pivotai role.
The Charter ofRights and freedoms
The Charter is more than a legai rearrangement of the machinery of government.’°
Among the principal pursuits ofthe Charter was the endorsement ofa constitutional
process to guide Canadians away from an excessively provincial conception oftheir
national identity.” In keeping with this philosophy the Charter spoke about rights in a
novel way. It was the first major constitutional initiative in Canada to focus on the rights
ofindividuals and groups, as opposed to listing the rights ofgovemments. By focusing on
the citizen as the bearer ofrights the Charter opened the constitutional process to a
variety of daims upon the state by politicised groups and individuals whose perspective
was distinctly indifferent to the battie over federalism. For the federal govemment, this
development would flot have been wholly unexpected, nor would it have been cause for
great concem. The idea of creating a national community composed of individuals owing
their pnmary allegiance to Canada and its central institutions depended on citizens taking
ownership of the Charter.’2 Specifically, they believed that an entrenched Charter of
better served, as Robert Fulford has noted, “by a less ferociously combative and more conciliatory prime
minister,” is an entirely separate matter. National Post, September 29, 2000.
‘°The single most important constitutional innovation according to Banting and Simeon. See And No One
Cheered: federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1983), 21.
“This contributed to the view ofthe Charter as democratising institution with an overtly political
nationalising objective. See Alan Cairns, Disruptions: Constitutional StruggÏesfrorn the Charter to Meech
Lake, cd. Douglas E. Williams (Toronto: McCIelland and Stewart, 1991), 113.
12 Consequently any discussion of contemporary citizenship in Canada becomes quite abstract without
reference to a constitutional framework supported by the Charter. See for instance the comments ofPeter
Russeil, Constitutional Odyssey, 111.
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Rights with the individual Canadian citizen at the centre would strengthen national unity
in two important ways: by uniting Canadians of ail origins through a powerful statement
of shared political values and by defiising conflict between the two main language groups
by providing constitutionai protections for minority language and education nghts. Even
thougli these goals had the support oftbe majority of Canad&s population, they would in
the final analysis be constrained by the commitment ofvarious constituencies to the
entrenchment of certain rights and guarantees.13
This part of the Charter’s story exposes the struggle between Trudeau’s defence of
individual rights and the opposition mounted by provinces and group interests committed
to their own particular daims.’4 Neither side, however, would declare complete victory.
Aithough the Charter spoke about individuai rights the constitutionai process equally
conferred legitimacy on social identities, including a new set of status seeking groups by
guaranteeing certain collective rights. The result was to transform the balance of power
between citizens and the state. Yet the explosion ofrights daims and group interests that
emerged in response to the Charter also had the affect of attenuating the primacy of
Canada’s English-French cleavage, thereby contributing to a new social vision that was
incorporative and pluralistic.’5 A case in point is the role played by the Charter in
13 According to Michael Behiels, the origins ofthis resistance rested in the existing political culture ofthe
country which the Charter could flot escape. See “From the Constitution Act, 1982 to the Meech Lake
Accord, 1987: Individual Rights for ail Versus Collective Rights for Some,” in Democracy with Justice:
Essays in Honour ofKhayyam Zev Paltiel, eds. Alain-G Gagnon and A. Bnan Tanguay (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1992), 127.
14 David Milne, The Canadien Constitution, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Lorimer, 1991); and Garth Stevenson,
Unfuflhled Union: Canadien Federalism and National Unity, 4’ ed. (Monfreai: MQUP 2004).
from this perspective, the coexistence of individual and collective rights is evidence of the Charter’s
eclecticism. Behind its liberai individualism a distinct communitarian orientation was built into the new
constitution. As Trudeau would attest more than a decade afier the Charter’s inception, “Ifpeople have
certain fundamental rights including fteedom of association and therefore, forming groups
— and that is
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extending multiculturalism’s reach beyond its original statutory level. Two sections
within the Charter are especially relevant in this regard, Sections 15 (s. 15) and 27 (s. 27);
both are responsible for elevating the status of multiculturalism and equality seeking
constituencies within the new constitutional order.
The first of the two sections is the most important equality provision in the
Charter. In recent times the courts have moved beyond their understanding of equality
reflected in s. 15, in other words treating everyone the same without distinction based on
race, language, sex, religion or other characteristics. Instead they have argued that
procedural equality is not sufficient to guarantee equality in practice. In a 1989 landmark
ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that equality under human rights codes
and the Charter are fundamentally the same, and that the relief of the disadvantage
experienced by specific groups was the purpose of s. y5•16 The impact ofthe decision was
to move towards a more “substantive” version of equality, that is, the courts recognize
that in some cases differential treatment may be necessary to achieve full equality.17
what builds a civil society, the existence of various groups between the individual and the state, whether it
be the provincial state or the federal state; that is what makes the richness of our democracy
— flot the
individual pitted against the state or the authoritarian state pitted against the individuai
— but the existence
of ail those intermediate groups...” Pierre E. Trudeau, “The Debate,” in Debating the Constitution:
Proceedings ofa conference held in May 1993 under the auspices ofthe Royal $ociety ofCanada, eds. Jean
Laponce and John Meisel (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1994), 83.
16 Justice Wilson was also prepared on behaif of the Court to extend this protection to other groups not
mentioned specifically in 1982. She argued: “I believe also that it is important to note that the range of
discrete and insular minorities has changed and will continue to change with changing political and social
circumstances... In enumerating the specific grounds in s. 15, the framers of the Charter embraced these
concems in 1982 but also addressed themselves to the difficulties experienced by the disadvantaged on the
grounds of ethnic origin, colour, sex, age and physical and mental disability. It can be anticipated that the
discrete and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups flot recognized as such today. It is
consistent with the constitutional status of s. 15 that it be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to ensure the
unremitting protection” of equality rights in the years to corne.” Law Society of3ritish Columbia y.
Andrews, ([19891 1 S.C.R. 143).
‘ Previously, under s. 15(1) the courts had been primarily interested in whether ail individuals were
geffing the same treatrnent. Now ffiey are more apt, for example, to assess the impact of public policy on
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At its core the ruling indicates that our understanding of equality has changed
while acknowledging that patterus of disadvantage and discrimination exist in society. 1$
Apart from these grounds, one of the key considerations taken into account by the courts
is whether the difference of treatment, or discrimination, describes a group which is
vuinerable to prejudice, or stereotyping. for ethnocultural groups this interpretation is
significant, because true equality requires challenging common stereotypes about group
characteristics that may underlie law or government action, as well as ensuring that
important differences are taken into account.19
In effect, by adjusting the interpretation by which equality might be achieved, and
in particular by constitutionalising the Iegitimacy of affirmative action to overcome past
discnmïnatory treatment, s. 15 balances the liberal recognition and protection of
individual nghts with collective interests. Indeed, the drafiers of the equality clause added
language on affirmative action out of precaution. Their intent was to boister the
substantive approach to equality relative to individual rights out of concem that
affirmative action programs would be over-tumed on the basis of reverse
discrimination.20
equality seeking groups to make sure they are receiving equivalent resuits to others. On this subject see
Yvonne Peters, “Twenty Years ofLitigating for Disability Equality Rights: Has it Made a Difference? An
Assessment,” Councit of Canadians with Disabitities, January 26, 2004.
18 One of the concems with s. 15 is that it does no define racism, discrimination, or race; such definitions
and interpretations have been left to the courts.
‘9Hence, the Supreme Court has argued that the goals ofthe equality clause are, “to prevent the violation of
essential human dignity and fteedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or
social prejudice, and to promote a society in which ail persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human
beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of concem, respect and
consideration.” Law y. Canada (Minister ofEmployment and Immigration), ([1999] 1 S.C.R. 497).
20 The power ofthe message conveyed by s. 15 and the utility ofstate policy were explained by the
Court: “Govemment actions carry the imprimatur ofauthority. Silence and action carry social messages.
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This bas not stopped cntics of this interpretation from arguing that such a
generous reading of equality further encourages the fragmentation of Canadian
citizenship already supposedly encouraged by the nature ofthe Charter itself.21
Nevertheless, for ethnocultural minorities s. 15 was viewed as an example of state action
that accepted and accommodated differences. This pointed to the heightened salience of
ethnicity in public life by recognizing that minority rights (writ large) could strengthen
solidarity by removing the bamers and exclusions that prevent groups from embracing
political institutions.22 As such, it aided an increasingly self-conscious and politicised
minority who were seeking full inclusion in the rights of citizenship, rather than some
special or differentiated citizenship status. 23
Section 15 is joined in the Charter by section 27 in emphasising the values of a
democratic society. The only section in the document to specifically recognize the
multicultural heritage of Canada, s. 27 unlike s. 15, would emerge in the final text
This sits at the base of much anti-discrimination legislation. For govemment to speak provides flot only a
greater power to rectify wrongs but carnes a moral message that discriminatory behaviour does flot have
a place in that society.” R. y. Zundel, ([1992] 2 S.C.R. 731), 826.
21 These critics point out that the “rights talk” generated by equality seeking groups has created the false
impression that the constitutional process has been democratised and made more participatory. They argue
the Charter and the attachment ofparticular groups to clauses such as s. 15 have made group competition a
central feature, perhaps the central feature of Canadian constitutional politics. On the first point see F.L.
Motion and R. Knopfl The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Toronto; Broadview, 2000); and on
the second argument see lan Brodie, Friends ofthe Court: The Privileging oflnterest Group Litigants in
Canada (Albany NY: State University ofNew York Press, 2002).
22 Will Kymiicka, “Multiculturalism and Citizenship-Building in Canada,’ in Building Citizenshtp:
Governance and Service Provision in Canada, CPRN Discussion Paper No. F117, September 2001, 62.
23 Jane Jenson and Martin Papillon, The Canadian Diversity Modet: A Repertoire in Search ofa
framework, CPRN Discussion Paper No. F19, November, 2001, 14. Even Trudeau, in his much vaunted
defence of individual rights conceded that group equality was a necessary response to disadvantage. He
notes, “we seem to think that freedom may 5e alt right but equality is something we should express concem
about because it might lead to the formation ofwhat? 0f a civil society? Surely the answer is that men or
women or aboriginals or immigrants or others use their rights to equality in order to form a society which is
destructive ofthe common wealth, then it is prohibited by law.” “The Debate”, 84-85.
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primaniy as the product of advocacy work by concemed groups and organizations.24 In
the earliest drafi of the Charter the federal government had repeated the promise of
respecting the customary rights of non-officiai languages in Canada, but overlooked the
more central issue of multicuituralism. For ethnocultural organizations, and particularly
the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism which provided the most
comprehensive and spinted defence of multicuituralism, this was a serious omission.25
Throughout much of the 1 970s the federally funded organization had been the most
consistent advocate of entrenching the concept of multiculturalism in legislation. It was
therefore understandable that the CCCM, which had demonstrated a capacity to criticize
inaction or delay on the part ofthe federal govemment in the past, would make full use of
its time before the Parliamentary Committee studying the Charter to press for
muiticulturalism’s inclusion.
Whiie the CCCM recognized that s. 15 was an important tool to enhance the
rights of Canadians and protect against discrimination, the Charter in its view would
remain imperfect to the extent that it faiied to incorporate multicuituraiism in its portrait
of Canadian society.26 In their presentation before the committee the CCCM argued flot
24 While the lobbying of ethnocultural groups was the main reason for the inclusion of s. 27, it is
worthwhile to note that outside ofreservations about the impact ofmulticulturalism on bilingualism there
was no known concerted effort ofthe part ofthe commiftee or the federal govemment to exclude it.
25 In total, of the more than 100 witnesses who appeared before the Special Joint Committee of Parliament
on the Constitution in the pre-Charter consultation phase, nearly 011e-quarter expressed an interest in
multiculturalism and protecting the rights ofminorities. See Michael R. Hudson, ‘Multicukuralism,
Govemment Policy and Constitutional Enshrinement — A Comparative Study,” in Muïticulturalism and the
Charter: A Legat Perspective, Canadian Human Rights Foundation (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), 74.
26 In making its case the Council reminded the committee that as a national policy unanimously adopted
by ah federal parties in 1971, and reflecting an integral part of the Canadian reality, multicukuralism
should be included in the Canadian constitution. Canada, Minutes ofProceedings and Evidence of the
Special Joint Committee ofthe Senate and House ofCommons on the Constitution ofCanada, Session
ofthe 32d1 Parliament (Ottawa, 1980), 29: 124.
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for a specific clause, but the addition of a preamble to the Charter in which the
multicultural nature of the country would be ciearly recognized. Their insistence on
formai emphasis in a preamble appeared to stem from the beliefthat multicuituraiism
needed to be interpreted in its broadest sense to protect the collective rights, cultural
integrity and group dignity ofCanada’s many ethnic groups. In effect, they were looking
for a stronger commitment to multiculturaiism than the committee would ultimately
recommend or the federai govemment wouid eventually accept. They were also
conscious of the impact other sections might have on multiculturalism and suggested
several modifications to the proposed draft resoiution.27
In the end the federal govemment chose a separate section as opposed to the
preamble to recognize multiculturalism. The language of s. 27 required the courts to
interpret the Charter “in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of
the multicuitural hentage ofCanadians.” In this sense s. 27 is appropnately understood as
an interpretative clause; directing the courts to see the constitution in a manner that takes
into consideration the existence of constitutionally entrenched values. Admiftediy less
than what the CCCM had caiied for; s. 27 had nevertheless met the generai objective of
providing the courts with a basis for interpreting the constitution. Furthermore, s. 27
would rank among the select, fiuiy entrenched sections that wouid flot be subject to a
legislative override as indicated by s. 33.
for the architects of the Charter the inspiration for a muiticuitural clause came
from a number of documentary sources that ultimately found expression in s. 27. Among
27 They were notably concemed with sec. 1 which permits such “reasonable restrictions” on rights “as cas
be demonstrably justified in a ftee and democratic society”. See Minutes ofFroceedings and Evidence of
the Special Joint Committee ofthe Senate and House ofCommons on the Constitution ofCanada, 29: 125.
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these was the government’s own multiculturalism policy, and Article 27 ofthe 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Folitical Rights, ratified by Canada in 1976.28 Yet
multiculturalism’s inclusion as one ofthe core, entrenched values ofCanadian society is
only part of s. 27’s achievement. The success ofthe clause can be measured in two ways
—
on a legal basis and as a symbolic statement of values outside ofthe courtroom.
On a legal basis the Charter has been instrumental in projecting the idea of a
tolerant society in which cultural minority rights deserve protection. Several high profile
cases have been significant in promoting this precept, including R. y. Big M Drug Mart
(1985), R. y. Keegstra (1991), and R. y. Zundel (1992).29 In the first case, the Supreme
Court ruled that s. 27 was a determining factor by suggesting that in a pluralistic society
the state must be ready to accommodate differences that arise from religious practices
that are recognized as permissible exceptions to otherwise justifiable homogeneous
requirements. In short, the Charter ofRights played a significant role in permiffing
minority groups in Canada to express their cultural practices. In the other two cases the
issue tumed on alleged violations ofthe Cnminal Code through the promotion ofhate
against an identifiable group. In Keegstra, the Supreme Court made explicit reference to
the value of s. 27 to support the reasonableness ofthe limits on fteedom of expression
provided by the hate literature sections ofthe Criminal Code. While the Court noted the
importance of free expression in a democratic society, they pointed to the country’s
28 Article 27 states, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shah not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, Enfry into force 1976.
29R y. BigMDrug Mart Ltd., ([1985] 1 S.C.R. 295); R. y. Keegstra,[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; R. y.
Zundel,([1992] 2 S.C.R. 731).
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commitment to multiculturalism, both in law and as a sociological reality, as a value
integral to any assessment of limiting that freedom. This supported the disposition that s.
27 was flot only a statement offact, but a medium needed to legitimise and strengthen the
nature of the govemment’s main objective; in this case the prohibition of hate towards
groups on the basis oftheir colour, race, religion, or ethnic origin.3°
In Zundel, although the Court narrowly found in favour of the appellate, the case
is informative because ofthe reference to s. 27 in the dissenting opinion delivered by
Justices Gonthier, Cory and lacobucci. While the court held that limits on free expression
under the Cnminal Code were not justifiable under s. 1 ofthe Charter, the dissenting
justices argued that it was important to recognize the significance of s. 27 in assessing the
importance ofprohibiting hate literature (s. 181).’ They maintained that in light ofthe
interrelationship of sections 27 and 15 of the Charter, the banning of hate literature
encouraged the goals of tolerance and equality and supported the protection of the
cultural integrity and the dignity of Canada’s ethnic groups. In effect, they were prepared
to adopt a broad protective stance on how legislation that protects the multicultural nature
ofthe country could be viewed as a reasonable limit upon free expression. They argued
compellingly that:
30 In this instance the Court agreed wiffi the logic expressed by Justice Cory who, in writing to uphold the
Criminat Code in R. y. Andrews (1988), said: “Hate propaganda seriously threatens both the enthusiasm
with which the value of equality is accepted and acted upon by society and the connection of target group
members to their community... Multiculturalism cannot be preserved let alone enhanced if free rein is given
to the promotion ofhafred against identifiable cultural groups.” R. y. Andrews (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 161,
quoted inR. y. Keegstra, ([199013 S.C.R. 697), 758.
31 In this case hate literature refers broadly to s. 181 of the Criminal Code which prohibits, “wilful
publication of false statement or news that person knows is false and that is likely to cause injury or
mischief to a public interest.”
13$
Section 27 ofthe Charter is not merely the reflection ofa fleetingly popular concept.
Rather it is a magnificent recognition ofthe history of Canada and of an essential
precept for the achievement of those elusive goals ofjustice and true equality. People
must be abie to take pride in their roots, their religion and their culture. It is only then
that people of every race, colour, religion and nationaiity can feel secure in the
knowledge that they are truly equal to ail other Canadians. Thus secure in the
recognition of their innate dignity, Canadians of every ethnic background can take
pnde in their original culture and a stili greater pnde in being Canadian. Section 27
strives to ensure that in this land there will be tolerance for ail based on a realization
ofthe need to respect the dignity of ail.32
The Zundel decision may well be a bittersweet victory for freedom of expression,
but it demonstrates that s. 27 can be invoked as a legal instrument to enhance the dignity
and sense of self worth of every individual member of a defamed group, and thereby
enhance the equality rights of society as a whole. As both Keegstra and Zundet establish,
in instances where s. 27 was not even the principal clause under scrutiny, it provides a
functional “interpretative prism” in which to balance individual and collective rights in
the constitution.33
Outside of the courtroom the symbolic value of muiticulturalism’s inclusion in the
Charter cannot be dismissed. Section 27 confirmed the commitment to principles
supported publicly by the Canadian state in 1971. It also spoke of the effort to strike a
balance between the idea ofdualism and the concems ofethnocultural communities; by
y Zundet, 817-818.
These cases confirm that it is a reality of the Charter and the legal system in Canada that judges are
without precise mies to guide them in their deliberations. More than one constitutional authority in Canada
has noted that the constitution is viewed as an organic document open to interpretation and capable of
responding to changes in society. Sec The Charter ofRights and freedoms, 2uid cd., eds. Robert J. Sharpe,
Katherine E. Swinton and Kent Roach (Totonto: Irwin Law Inc., 2002), 54. As a consequence, s. 27 cari
become, as Joseph E. Magnet notes, “a flexible but unpredictable tool in the hands of the judiciary.” But
this Iikely has as much to do with the issue ofwhether s. 27 better protects collective vs. individual rights,
as with the ambiguity of multiculturalism as a concept. The inherent difficulty with multiculturalism has
always been its tendency to elicit a wide variety of meanings, and its use in the Charter has not resolved ils
ambiguous nature. Joseph E. Magnet, “Multiculturalism and Collective Rights: Approaches to Section 27,”
in The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, 2d ed., eds. Gérald-A. Beaudoin and Ed Ratushny
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989), 754.
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constitutionally entrenching the officiai languages and educational rights of English and
French-speaking minorities, whiie acknowledging the need to preserve and enhance the
multicultural heritage of Canadians. More to the point, the Charter was successful in
establishing a measure of consistency between the ideas of biiingualism and cuitural
diversity through the Officiai Language Act and the policy ofmulticuituralism.
Taken as a whole, the formai ernphasis on equality in the Charter communicated
the desire on the part ofthe state to elevate the social standing of ail Canadians. These
measures were consistent with attempts by the federal govemment to integrate new
Canadians into public institutions.34 For ethnocultural minorities this provided needed
proof that the pressing issues of discrimination and racism were given constitutionai
priority, but it also suggested something just as meaningful. Now that legal remedies
were in place to facilitate the fuii participation of ail Canadians, this would help create a
befter position from which to assert the need for sensïtivity to cuiturai differences. In the
decades to corne the Charter would consequently prove an important resource as the
divergence of opinion on the need to foster ethnoculturai diversity would become
increasingly apparent.
The MulticulturaÏism Act
Throughout a period ofnearly two decades the debate surrounding
muiticulturalism continued to involve calculations about the appropriate levei of
34According to Kymiicka, the commitment to multiculturalism in the Charter is an example ofpolyethnic
rights that “help[s] ethnic groups and retigious minorities express pi-ide in their cultural particularity
without this hampering their success in the economic and political institutions ofthe dominant society.”
[my emphasisj See “Citizenship and Identity in Canada,” 26.
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commitment to pluralism as a democratic ideal. Accordingly, the story of
multiculturaiism’s passage from strategy to officiai act in 1988 had an element in
common with our account of the poiicy’s early deveiopment detailed in chapter three. As
in the 1 970s, even though the discourse over the symbolic and material benefits of
multiculturalism policy was debated, they remained iargely unchallenged at the state
level. Multiculturalism was stiil considered a “motherhood issue” by Canada’s main
political parties, and the deeper consideration ofhow this value binds, or fails to bind the
country together had not greatly influenced public poiicy. The end ofthe decade would
bring with it new players and challengers to this orthodoxy who were commifted to
moving state policy in a new direction. Included in this mix was the Reform Party whose
critique of social spending and the liberal pursuit of social justice joined a growing
discourse determined to contest the ment of state activity in the reaim of ethnocultural
management. Public intellectuals would also play a role, debating the virtues of
multiculturalism at a time when the policy was increasingly viewed as a threat to national
unity. Even government commissions were destined to contribute by iegitimizing a
political discourse that degraded state-sponsored pluraiism. For the time being, however,
despite partisan differences the Progressive Conservative govemment was prepared to
uphold the elite consensus on the merits ofpiuralism and accept the legacy on
multiculturalism inherited from the Trudeau government.
In the absence of strong opposition to multicuituraiism, and in keeping with a
view ofthe poiicy that operated primanily at a symbolic ievei, the Progressive
Consenvatives were able to plot a course of modest incremental change. Ethnocultural
consent wouid be sought, and a policy capable of being sustained across class unes would
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be defended. In certain other respects the Progressive Conservatives were prepared to
improve on the Liberal record. Many of the developments in their first mandate were
designed to further the connection between multiculturalism and equality by emphasizing
the fight against racial discrimination. Notably, the govemment sponsored federal
provincial conferences on multiculturalism, created a House of Commons Standing
Committee on Multiculturalism in 1985, and released a progress report the same year
outiining actions taken to address the recommendations in Equality Now!35 Also new to
this mix was the conscious aftempt in 1986 to marry multiculturalism to capitalist
morality as demonstrated by a govemment funded conference organized under the theme,
“Multicukuralism Means Business”; with a key note address delivered by Prime Minister
Mulroney.36 The redirection of public attention to the role of the market place, it
appeared, was to extend to the conceptualization of multiculturalism as a “business
friendly” enterpnse.
for the Progressive Conservatives multiculturalism also held out the promise of
serving as an important political resource. Indeed it was difficuit to dismiss the judgment
that the multiculturalism portfolio could operate on a practical level as an instrument to
aftract the votes of ethnocultural minorities. The suggestion that multiculturalism would
be used as an electoral pioy in the interest of winning votes was nothing new — a similar
indictment had been levelled at the Trudeau govemment pnor to the 1972 election. What
is interesting about this allegation, is that for the first time the Progressive Conservatives
See Daiva Stasiulis, “Symbolic Representation and the Numbers Game: Tory Policies on ‘Race and
Visible Minorities,” in How Ottawa Spends, 1991-92: The Politics offragmentation, ed. frances Abele
(Ottawa: Caneton University Press, 1991).
36 Stasiulis, “The Symbolic Mosaic Reaffirmed,” in How Ottawa Spends, 1988/1989: The Conservatives
Heading into the Stretch, ed. Katherine A. Graham (Ottawa: Caneton University Press, 1988), 101.
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were prepared to use multiculturalism, or more appropriately, to appropriate it from the
Liberals as a resource to entice ethnic voters towards the party. The Liberal record on
immigration and multiculturalism had long been viewed as a critical tool in helping the
party in Canada’s urban and ethnically mixed areas.37 In the interest of securing these
Liberal friendly votes, the Progressive Conservatives were prepared to put their own
stamp on the policy and end what was perceived to have been an electoral monopoly.
The timing ofthe Progressive Conservative govemment’s pursuit ofmulticultural
legislation helps to establish this point. Almost four years into, and nearing the end of the
govemment’s first mandate, the effort to provide a legislative framework for
multiculturalism was revived.38 The process began in 1984, when in response to the
recommendations emerging from the House of Commons Special Committee Report
Equatity Now! the Lïberal govemment had agreed to pass a Multiculturalism Act. The
legislation was then viewed as an answer to the request, primanly from bodies such as the
Canadian Ethnocultural Council, to formally strengthen the govemment’s commitment to
multiculturalism. While the planned legislation was considered quite limited in scope, its
acceptance by most ethnocultural organisations indicated their satisfaction with state
recognition of ethnocultural diversity, even as it confirmed the status of multiculturalism
as a marginal policy. b their dismay, however, the Liberal govemment was not prepared
37According to Pal, while multiculturalism had flot been established with “narrow partisan purposes in
mmd,” the 1972 federal election demonstrated the utility of the policy for attracting minority voters. See
Interests ofState, 119.
3tAs with employment equity, the decision to establish multiculturalism as a principle of Iaw began flot
with the Progressive Conservatives, but with the previous Liberal govemment. The first Conservative
minister to take over the multiculturalism portfolio, Jack Mut-ta, had used Bili C-84 as a basis for
discussions with ethnocultural organizations across the country. The Liberal legislation served as a rough
template ftom which the new legislation could develop.
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at this stage to transfer responsibility for multiculturalism from the Secretary of State to a
separate department. This was followed by greater disappointment when the legislation
designed to establish the Multiculturalism Act died on the Order Paper after first reading
due to the impending election.
The Mulroney govemment’s decision to formally restart the process late in 1987
was therefore encouraging but somewhat overdue. Two years earlier in June of 1985, the
newly created Standing Committee on Multiculturalism had been given a mandate to
“encourage and monitor the implementation of the principles of the federal
multiculturalism policy throughout the Government of Canada”.39 In the following year
there had been a promise in the Throne Speech to resurrect the legislative process begun
by the Liberals.4° But from the outset constitutional and economic policy programmes
were more integral to federal objectives and took precedence on the goveming agenda.
By the end of 1984, the Progressive Conservative government had already seftled on an
economic plan that identified their economic pnorities as deficit reduction, deregulation,
and privatization.4’ No such extraordinary speed was devoted to passing a
Multiculturalism Act. Nor could the govemment credibly argue that it was searching for a
blueprint to create a new policy model for multiculturalism. The sincerity of any such
argument is brought into question by the fact that the government chose to dismiss a great
Canada, House of Commons Standing Commiftee on Multiculturalism, Minutes ofProceedings and
Evidence, 1st Session, 33id Parliament (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985), 1:3.
40 Canada, House ofCommons, Speech from the Throne, 2n4 Session, 33r4 Parliament (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1986), 4.
41 In November 1984, the Department of finance under Michael Wilson prepared an economic policy
statement, A New Direction for Canada: An Agenda for Econornic Renewal, that formed the basis ofthe
govemment’s economic agenda. The Macdonald Commission would later provide the govemment with
continental free trade as another policy direction.
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deal of the policy advice it received from the first report of the Standing Committee on
Multiculturalism in 1927. In particular the Progressive Conservatives rejected the idea of
a separate department, arguing that such a reorganization of resources would “ghettoize”
multicultural issues within one area of govemment. Instead they decided on a legislative
course that in truth was flot strikingly different from the one pursued by the short-lived
Liberal govemment under John Turner.42
By resolving to seffle for a policy agenda that had been roughly established by
1984, the Progressive Conservatives were in fact doing liffle to deflect criticism that their
interest in a Multiculturalism Act was linked to the impending federal election.43 Indeed,
it appears that the timing and substance ofthis policy approach could not be separated
from the larger Progressive Conservative election strategy. The Progressive
Conservatives had won in 1984 by achieving an effective electoral coalition among
Quebec nationalists and Western conservative voters, but this coalition showed many
signs ofinstability during the government’s first term. By mid-1986, the govemment had
experienced a drop in national support which lefi the party trailing the opposition
Liberals in public opinion poiis for the first time.tW Even the modest popularity ofthe
impending free trade deal with the United States negotiated by the Progressive
42 On balance the proposals for action within the Standing Committee’s report had echoed previous calls for
new legislation and a separate department. See Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on
Multiculturalism, Building the Canadian Mosaic (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987).
Interests ofState, 140.
Lawrence LeDuc, “The Canadian Voter,!? in Introductory Readings in Canadian Government & Folitics,
eds. Robert M. Krause and R. H. Wagenberg (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), 312. As the author
points out, the recovery of the Progressive Conservatives in the poils in the last three weeks of the
campaign, combined with the volatility of the NDP vote, demonstrated that the outcome of the eiection was
in doubt untii the very end.
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Conservatives was flot considered, nor initially designed as, a campaign strategy to set
the govemment clear of its rivais. As Timothy Lewis has argued, this led the Progressive
Conservatives to crafi an election strategy that was designed to entice voters by
downplaying the urgency surrounding the deficit and by announcing new spending in
various program areas.45
Set against the backdrop of a looming election the decision to proceed with
multiculturalism legislation was conspicuously packaged with several other timely
announcements. In late May of 1988, minister of state for multiculturalism Gerry Weiner
announced that the government would inject an additionai $62 million into
multiculturalism over five years, increasing the annual expenditure for programs to $42.2
million by the 1992-93 fiscal year from $29.8 million in 198889.46 In July the
Multiculturalism Act was passed. In September, two months short of the federal election,
the govemment made two important decisions. In a minor cabinet shuffle with major
implications for multicuituralism, the Progressive Conservatives now seemingly relieved
of their earlier concems about a separate department, announced the elevation of
multiculturaiism to full cabinet level. The new Department of Multiculturalism and
Citizenship which would become operational in 1991, would oversee an annual budget of
$130 million. Furthermore, towards the end of September and less than two weeks before
calling a federal election, the prime minister announced an agreement worth $288 million
to provide redress for the intemment of Canadians of Japanese ancestry during the
45According to the author, from late 1987 until the budget of 1988, the “political business cycle had kicked
in” with noted increases in program spending announced (some of it to be cancelled in the next parliament).
See Timothy Lewis, In the Long Rua We’re Ail Dead: The Canadian Turn to fiscal Restraint (Vancouver,
UBC Press, 2003), 127-128.
46 Paul Gesseli, The Ottawa Citizen, May 31, 1988, A4.
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Second World War. As a remedy the govemment offered each individual $21,000 for
injustices suffered, $12 million to the Japanese community, and the creation and funding
of a Canadian Race Relations Foundation.47
The core strategy on multiculturalism, however, was the successful passage of
Biil C-93, the Multiculturalism Act. Even the prime minister appeared to acknowledge
the controversy surrounding the timeliness of the government’s agenda. In a news release,
the prime minister told reporters, “you can quarrel with the way it was done, and when it
was done, but it was overdue.”48 Mulroney’s somewhat Iight-hearted assessment also
reflected the character ofthe debate within the legislative committee hearings into Biil C-
93. Specifically, ail efforts by opposition members to strengthen the wording ofthe hill
were rejected by the Progressive Conservative controlled committee. Additïonally, rather
than sending the Bili to the Standing Commiftee on Multiculturalism which appeared to
be the logical destination, the govemment saw fit instead to send it to a simple legislative
committee. One might surmise that this decision was at least partially motivated by
political considerations. Although the Standing Committee had demonstrated the breadth
ofits expertise through the release of Building the Canadian Mosaic, with an election in
the flot too distant future it appeared that the govemment was concemed both with the
speed with which it could send the legislation back to the House, and perhaps more
importantly, the substance of any potential policy recommendations.49 Among the
‘ Val Sears, Toronto Star. Sep 15, 1988, A30. Japanese-Canadian redress payments would comprise the
majority of departmental expenditures from 1988-90. See Canada, Secretary of State, Multiculturalism and
Citizenship Canada, Annual Report, 1989-90 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), 51.
‘ Daniel Drolet, “New department meant to woo ethnic vote,” The Ottawa Citizen, September 16, 1988.
49The Standing Committee held 16 public meetings and heard from a variety of witnesses throughout its
two year investigation. In comparison, the smaller budget allocated to the House legislative committee
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numerous proposais made by the Standing Committee in Building the Canadian Mosaic,
had been the request to position Canada’s cultural agencies under the jurisdiction of a
proposed new muiticulturaiism department. The initial rejection of this recommendation
by the govemment may have estabiished the view that support for the policy wouid be
extended when it operated primariiy on a symbolic level. But as Stasiulis argues, it
confirmed that the “chiefly symbolic and piecemeal character” ofthe Conservative
approach to muiticulturalism was in une with a neo-liberal agenda that was preoccupied
with deficit reduction and generally reluctant to expand the size of the federal
bureaucracy.5°
From the first day of its operation, it became clear that the Progressive
Conservative members of the legislative committee were focused on retuming Biil C-93
to the Commons as quickly as possible. They appeared to share the concems ofat least
one witness, Dr. Louis C. Meiosky, National President ofthe Canadian Multiculturalism
Council, that the quicker the Bili moved through the committee, the befter it would look
for ail concemed. For Melosky, however, there appeared to be no partisan considerations
behind this desire. The longer the Biil stayed before commiffee, he calcuiated, it was
more likely to provoke “misunderstanding in the country as to what it really signifies.”5’
Even the Canadian Ethnoculturai Council, which initially had argued that the Biii was
would flot permit them to travel, nor would it allow them sufficient time to allow for extensive testimony
on the part of witnesses. Canada, House of Commons. Minutes ofFroceedings and Evidence ofthe
Legislative Committee on Biil C-93. 33td Parliament, Session, April, 18, 1988, 2:2 1.
50 Stasiulis, “Symbolic Representation and the Numbers Game: Tory Policies on ‘Race’ and Visible
Minorities,” 131-132.
‘ Minutes ofProceedings and Evidence ofthe Legistative Comrnittee on Biti C-93, 2:2 1.
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principally a symbolic gesture, eventually acquiesced and cailed for its quick passage.52
Most of the ethnocultural organizations that wouid speak on the legisiation gave the
impression that an imperfect and limited design was stiil better that no legislation at ail.
Unlike immigration or bilinguaiism, the legislative hearings into the
Multiculturaiism Act did flot seem to capture the public’s attention. When Bu! C-72, the
new Officiai Languages Act, was being studied by a Commons committee, dozens of
groups opposed to the biil either appeared or sought to be heard by the commiftee. In
contrast, not a single dissenting voice was raised against multicuituralism in hearings on
Bili C-93; in fact, virtualiy eveiyone who appeared was from an ethnoculturai group.53
The fact that the legislation was largely viewed as a symbolic statement and an exercise
in public relations was not dispelled by Minister of State Gerry Weiner. In the House of
Commons during debate on the bill, he argued, “The passage of this bu! will send a signal
to every corner of the globe that Canada trnly is a land of equality and opportunity. We
wiiI show clearly that Canada is a land which respects and chenshes individual liberty
and allows every person the freedom to chensh and maintain his or lier own heritage.”54
As passed by parliament in July of 1988, the Multiculturalism Act comprised a
preamble and fine separate sections. The intent of the preamble was to situate the Act
within the broad framework of civil, political, social and language rights which have been
entrenched in the Constitution. Other pieces of landmark legislation, such as the Officiai
Languages Act, the Citizenship Act, and the Canadian Human Rights Act, are also cited
52 Canada, House of Commons. Debates, 33 Parliament, 2m1 Session, March 15, 1982, 13745.
Daniel Drolet, “Multiculturalism policy adopted without debate,” The Windsor Star, August 6, 1988.
54Debates, 33rd Parliament, 2”’ Session, July 11, 1988, 17428.
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as sources from which the Canadian Multiculturalism Act drew its inspiration. The most
important part ofthe legislation, Section 3, set out ten general policy objectives. They
oblige the govemment to work in several areas: 1) to foster and promote multiculturalism
through encouragement and assistance rather than through coercive measures; 2) to
affirm that multiculturalism is a fundamental charactenstic of our Canadian identity; 3) to
identify barriers of discrimination and prejudice which limit participation and to
eliminate such barriers; 4) to increase public awareness of the contributions made by
ethnocuiturai communities, and to enhance their development and full participation; 5) to
underline the commitment made in Sections 15 and 27 ofthe Canadian Charter ofRights;
6) to recognize that ail institutions within Canadian society can benefit if they respect and
respond to this country’s rich cultural diversity; 7) to recognize that the social, economic
and cultural life of the country is strengthened by bringing together Canadïans of
different backgrounds; 8) to assist Canadians to understand and share the many cultural
influences across Canada; 9) to preserve and enhance the use of languages other than
English and french; 10) and to clarify that the policy of multiculturalism is to 5e
implemented in a way that complements Canada’s commitment to its two officiai
languages.55
The bu! feu short of opposition expectations in two key areas: the absence ofa
government-appointed commissioner (along the unes ofthe Officiai Languages
Commissioner) to monitor treatment of Canadians from ethnocultural groups and the
much sought aller full govemment department to oversee multicultural affairs.
Ultimately, both opposition parties supported Bili C-93 as part of a unanimous vote in the
Canada, The Canadian Multiculturalism Act, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada (Ottawa, 1988).
for the act in its entirety see Appendix 2 ofthis thesis.
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House of Commons, despite concerns that it was weak. This, along with the relative
smooth sailing of the legislation through the committee stage reinforced the idea that
multiculturaiism was stiil viewed by the main political parties as a “motherhood issue”.
In the end, Biil C-93 had laudable objectives and was a modest improvement over
the policy legacy inherited by the Liberai government. In particular it affirmed that ail
ministers and federal institutions have a responsibility to advance multiculturaiism. As
such, it raised the federal govemment’s capacity to play a more active role in the
promotion and defence of ethnocultural equaiity. But it does fali short in certain areas.
The Act requires the federal govemment to work in a manner consistent with Canada’s
multicultural character, but such a promise is quite vague. Although it recognizes that
Canada is indeed multicultural, the legislation does not provide a clear indication of what
multiculturalism means, or how to be consistent with it. In this sense it does littie to
counter the perception that multiculturalism is an abstract concept with littie substantive
ment over and above its symbolic functions. Further while it says the govemment should
ensure that Canadians of ail origins have equal opportunity to work and be promoted in
federal institutions, it does flot say how this will be accomplished. The most significant
requirement of the Multiculturalism Act is for the government to provide annual report
detailing how they have been “multicultural” over the past year. But there are no specific
guidelines, no penalties for failure, and no signficant efforts to link multiculturalism to a
wider discourse.56 More significant structural reforms aimed at making multiculturalism
an operating principle ofthe Canadian state and private institutions, such as the Standing
56Audrey Kobayashi, “Multiculturalism and Making Difference: Comments on the State of
Multiculturalism Policy in Canada,” Australian-Canadian Studies, Vo.17, No.2, 1999, 35.
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Commiftee’s recommendation to place the major Canadian cultural agencies under the
junsdiction of the proposed Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, were
rejected by the Progressive Conservative government.57 In practice, the legislation
confirmed the increasing institutionalization of multiculturalism, but did SO without
deviating from a vision ofthe policy that operates primarily to affirm the existence of
ethnocultural diversity in the symbolic realm. Nonetheless it conveyed the desire on the
part of the state to elevate the cause of ethnocultural groups in the federal policy process.
This had the net affect of extending material (albeit modest) and symbolic benefits of
citizenship to politically marginalized identities.
4.2 Contesting Ideas
The commitment to the equity through the Charter process and the cautious
continuation of multicultural support through the Multicultural Act demonstrated a
willingness on the part of the Canadian state to embrace ethnocultural diversity. But even
the limited and largely symbolic success of these commitments is brought into question
when held up against other and ofien concurrent policy decisions made during the 1 980s.
These decisions, on issues ranging from employment equity to constitutional reform
exposed the degree to which the govemment was prepared to wilfully contain the role of
the federal state in dealings with the pnvate sector and in the interests of national unity.
Equity and support for multiculturalism would flot be abandoned, but it would have to
compete with a discourse that viewed ethnocultural diversity as a challenge, if not a
Stasiulis, “The Symbolic Mosaic Reaffirmed,” 103.
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burden. As the next issue shows, the passage of employment equity legislation in the late
1980s was designed to project an image ofa national govemment sensitive to Canada’s
ethnocultural reality, but in a direction that displayed an unwillingness to jeopardise the
market oriented strategies that had become such a central feature of its political agenda.58
Employment Equity
Unlike the Charter process, which onginated independently of the desire to
evaluate or strengthen the representation of ethnocultural identities, multiculturalism was
linked to employment equity as a means oforienting the policy towards new pnorities
while responding to its perceived shortcomings. In particular multiculturalism would be
connected to employment equity as a means of furthering federal efforts to counter
discrimination. Similarly, employment equity began an extension ofthe Liberal agenda in
areas of social policy to promote greater social justice through equality of opportunity. In
keeping with this program, in its 1983 Throne Speech the last Trudeau govemment said it
was time to expand the emphasis on equity by creating the “Just Society for women”. The
Charter had begun the process by constitutionally affinning the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law, and guaranteeing that such protection did flot preclude affirmative
action programs. But despite the emphasis on equality in the Charter, discnminatory
practices did not cease to exist, and more importantly the nature of the Charter did flot
offer specific prescnptive remedies. Designed as a passive instrument subject to
Stasiulis and Abu-Laban argue that multiculturaÏism and employment equity gave the Progressive
Conservatives “an image ofbeing a government ofliberal conscience on race and ethnic issues.” See
“Ethnic Minorities and the Politics ofLimited Inclusion in Canada”, in Canadian Potitics: An Introduction
to the Disct,otine, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and James Bickerton (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press,
2000), 598.
153
limitations — secs. 1 and 33 — the equality clauses ofthe Charter do flot require
govemments to promote equality. As David Matas notes, it does flot oblige them to do
something, itjust prevents them from doing certain things; govemments that do nothing
to improve the plight of minorities are in full compliance with the Charter.59
In response to these shortcomings, especially the absence of a proactive
instrument to build equity, the case for employment equity legislation was made. As an
institutional approach, any prospective policy tool would need to examine the
composition and treatment ofthe workforce, and remedy some ofthe disadvantages that
led to the unfair treatment of certain groups. The overali goal would be to legislate fair
treatment and equitable representation in the workplace, with an understanding that
employment opportunities have a significant impact on a person’s life chances and social
position.6° While research in the social sciences had supported this hypothesis, what was
needed was the political will to operationalise the underlying principles. In effect, support
for employment equity would stand as a clear test of the resolve to implement the Just
Society; to demonstrate the link between social nghts on the one hand, and individual
freedoms and guarantees such as those found in the Charter on the other. This depended
on accepting that employment equity was a commitment to the social and economic
rights of welfare distribution and without these guarantees, rights with respect to the state
would diminish in importance.
David Mattas, “The Charter and Racism,” Constitutional forum, 2:82, 1990, 84.
60 See Herrnann Kurthen, “The Canadian Experience with Multiculturalism and Employment Equity:
Lessons From Europe,” New Community, 23(2): April 1997, 255.
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Throughout 1983, the Liberal commitment to this relationship was evident
through a number ofdecisions.6’ The govemment instituted an affirmative action
program introduced to bnng about the equitable representation and distribution of
women, Aborïginals, and persons with disabilities in the federal Public Service.62 The
House of Commons established a Special Committee on Visible Minonties in Canadian
Society, which made its report public in March 1984. The report Equatity Now!, called
for the removal of obstacles that prevented the full participation of citizens in the cultural,
social, economic and political life ofthe country.63 Anticipating the response ofthe
Committee, the Liberal government established in July of 1983 a Royal Commission
chaired by Judge Rosalie Abella to thoroughly investigate equal employment
opportunities. Towards the end of 1983 these initiatives were augmented by the National
Strategy on Race Relations established through the Multiculturalism Directorate of the
Department of the Secretary of State. As fiirther evidence of the government’s willingness
to promote social justice, the Strategy was designed to develop and implement programs
aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in Canadian institutions.64 The purpose here
61 One could certainly argue that the Liberals waited until very late into their mandate to move on
employment equity, thereby leaving, as fate would have it, a new Progressive Conservative govemment to
implement one of the comerstones of the equity agenda.
62 Pilot projects were first introduced by the Treasury Board in 1980, experience from these projects was
used to establish the guidelines adopted on a wider scale in 1983. Arecent suwey ofemployment equity in
Canada since its inception is, Annis May Timpson, Driven Apart Women ‘s Employment EquaÏity and Child
Care in Canadian Public Policy (Vancouver; UBC Press, 2001).
Canada, House of Commons, “Equality Now!, Report ofthe Special Cornmittee on Partictation of
Visible Minorities in Canadian Society, 32nd Parliament, 2nd Session, 1983-1984 (Ottawa, 1984), 1.
M The commitment to social justice during the Trudeau era is evident in the confluence ofpolicies in areas
of immigration, multiculturalism, and citizenship according to Charles Ungerleider. See “Immigration,
Multiculturalism, and Citizenship: The Development ofthe Canadian Social Justice Infrastructure,”
Canadian Ethnic Studies, 24: 3, 1992.
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was in keeping with the dominant paradigm supported by an activist state; “enhancing the
role ofthe federal govemment in setting examples and playing a continuing role in
promoting institutional change to eliminate discrimination based on race.”65
The Liberals were, however, unable to pursue their strategy any further. In the fali
of 1984, the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney were elected with a
substantial majority govemment and a broad neo-liberal agenda. Even in its infancy it
became possible to discem a goveming agenda that called for a reduced role for the state
in the economy and in Canadian society.66 The central tenets of this strategy, borrowed
from British and American politics of the late I 970s and early 1 980s, rested largely on
market-based ideas of efficiency, productive growth, innovation and risk, individual
opportunity and responsibility.67 More than a casual convergence ofeconornic policies,
the new govemment’s embrace of neo-liberalism rested on the fundamental belief that a
reduction in the scale of public spending could control inflation and rescue the economy
from an overly intrusive state.68 Indeed, this meant subscribing to the prernises of
rnonetarist econornic ideas, with a series of extensive measures to widen the scope of
markets in social life as the natural resuit. These measures would corne to include
deregulation, privatization, tax cuts, dismantiing of social services, campaigns of state
65 Canada, Multiculturalism Canada, National Strategy on Race Relations (Ottawa, Dec. 1983) , 4-5.
As Michael J. Prince reports, in the months afier coming to power in September 1984, the Mulroney
govemment undertook a series of initiatives designed to scale back the size and influence of the federal
govemment. See “The Mulroney Agenda: A Right Tum for Ottawa,” in How Ottawa Spends, 1 986-8 7:
Tracking the Tories, ed. Michael J. Prince (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), 6.
67 M. Burke, C. Mooers and J. Shields, eds. Restructuring and Resistance: Canadian Public Folicy in an
Age ofGlobal Capitalisrn (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2000).
68 For a perspective on the economic ideas of the Mufroney govemment see the contributions to Canada
Under Mulroney: An End ofTerm Report, eds. Andrew B Goliner and Daniel Salée (Montreal: Vehicule,
1988).
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deficit and debt reduction, the opening of doors to foreign investment, and affacks on
trade-union rights.69
Social justice, to the extent that it could be pursued through public policy, would
flot be a central concem of the incoming prime minister. Rather, the newly elected
govemment was primarily interested in social policy through an attack on universality as
an effective means to address the deficit and rein in high government spending. This
conception of social policy implied a “residual” role for the state; providing direct
services to individuals when the family, local community, and market economy proved
ineffective at mediating relations and redistributing wealth.7° This differed appreciably
from the Liberal govemment’s approach under Trudeau and then John Turner, which in
spite ofhaving governed through a recession, had argued that major reforms in social
spendïng would endanger any economic recovery.7’
On employment equity, therefore, the Progressive Conservatives were at best
reluctant participants. Events, nonetheless, had a way of forcing the new govemment’s
hand. A year after their election victory the Abella Commission’s report, Equality in
Employment, was tabled before Parliament. Pressure from women’s groups, the disabled,
69 William K. Carroil and Murray Shaw, “Consolidating a Neoliberal Policy Bloc in Canada, 1976 to 1996,”
Canadian Public Policy, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 2001, 196.
70 Rather than an issue of equity, the newly elected govemment was chiefly interested in social policy to the
extent that the “defeat” of universality would be an effective means to address the deficit and rein in high
govemment spending. See Emie Lightman, Social Policy in Canada (Toronto: OUP, 2003), 154.
71 Initial assessments that the Progressive Conservafives were not interested in deviating from t.he LiSerai
record were wrong, but can 5e understood in light of comments made by Mulroney as lie entered the
leadership race in 1983. Spealdng against the economic policies ofRonald Reagan, Mulroney argued: “This
is not the United States. We have evolved over the years our own society which has aiways been
hallmarked by a degree of compassion which should under no circumstances ever be vitiated.” Quoted in,
Michael J. Prince, “What Ever Happened to Compassion? Liberal Social Policy 1980-84,” in How Ottawa
Spends, 1984: The NewAgenda, ed. A. M. Maslove (Toronto: Methuen, 1984), 113.
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and visible minorities to implement the recommendations within the report could flot
easily be discounted or ignored.72 The Commission had effectively set the focus of public
discourse by arguing in favour of an interventionist strategy that emphasized govemment
leadership in policy-making. The report consequently viewed employment equity as a
strategy needed to “open equitably the competition for employment opportunities to those
arbitrarily excluded”.73 In addition it expressed the belief that ah individuals, regardless
of their personal characteristics, should be treated fairly in recruitment, hiring,
promotions, training, dismissals, and any other employment decisions. Most importantly,
it argued that systemic discrimination was creating employment barriers that could only
be dismantled through instructive policy action.74 In effect, legislation was needed to
replace inefficient and voluntary good faith efforts to remedy workplace inequality.
following the report the Progressive Conservative govemment issued its response
in which it accepted the need to develop a legislative response to discrimination in the
workplace.75 Their suggested course of action, however, feil short of agreeing to ail of the
commission’s recommendations. While they were sympathetic to the idea that measures
were needed to remove barriers within the federal public service, they were hesitant to
interfere with private sector employers. Afier ail, at a time when Canadian firms were
being encouraged by the new government to become more competitive intemationally,
72 Cecille Marie DePass, from Peripheiy to Pertheiy: Employment Equityfor Visible Minorities in
Canada (Ph.D. diss., University ofCalgary, 1988), 196.
Canada, Report ofthe Commission on Equality in Employment, Royal Commission on Equality in
Employment (Ottawa, 1984), 1.
Systemic discrimination can be understood as the unintentional consequence of employment practices
and policies that have a differential effect on specific groups.
Canada, Employment Equity. A Response to the Abella Commission of Inquiry on Equality in
Employment. General Summary (Ottawa, 1985).
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how would the business community perceive the imposition of further regulation on
private industry? Impressions aside, the decision to move carefully on employment equity
reflected the prevailing neo-liberal philosophy within the govemment that viewed pnvate
enterprise as the engine of economic growth, and a sphere already restrained under the
burden of excessive state interference. In fact the growing disposition of the Mulroney
administration was that govemment itself was a problem. The degree to which
govemment was held responsible for inefficiency and mismanagement ofthe public purse
reflected the Progressive Conservative administration’s view that, at a minimum, its
primary responsibility was to limit its negative impact on the economy. For Mulroney, a
bloated and unwieldy bureaucracy exemplified the problems of an interventionist and
free-spending government, and should in most matters take a cue ftom the private sector
rather than prescribing that it follow it. As Donald Savoie notes, wanting the bureaucracy
to behave more like private firms the new prime minister “took dead aim at the civil
service, arguing that it had become unresponsive, costly, and largely ineffective. Like
Thatcher and Reagan, Mulroney wanted a public sector that emulated the private
sector.”76
Launched on a course they had flot chosen, the Progressive Conservative
govemment became focused on casting any prospective employment equity policy in the
best possible terms.77 This meant “spinning” employment equity as an exercise designed
76 Donald J. Savoie, Thatche, Reagan, Mulroney: In Search ofa New Bureaucracy (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1994), 10. Although flot as ideological as either Reagan or Thatcher, Savoie points out that
the course charted by Mulroney was sfrikingly similar to theirs.
It is likely that rejecting a policy viewed as a strategy to eliminate the effects of discrimination (or that
individuals be treated fairly in the workplace) would have resulted in strong opposition among the public,
and thereby would corne at a high political cost.
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to promote equal opportunity rather than affirmative action. Lessons from the American
experience with affirmative action, a history recorded in the report ofthe Abella
Commission, had exposed the controversial nature of any effort that was perceived by the
general population as intervening to improve the equality of a target group at the expense
ofmerit.78 It was therefore flot unexpected to hear Flora Macdonald, then Minister of
Employment and Immigration, in statements before the House of Commons speaking of
employment equity in the context of “fair access to training and development”
— avoiding
wherever possible making reference to the notion that the policy would lead to mandatory
preferences in hiring.79 This deliberate stance reflected the govemment’s predisposition
towards a passive and minimalist view of government responsibility to redress a widely
acknowledged and historically based systemic problem of exclusion. li also reinforced
the growing perception that policy innovation and leadership from the Progressive
Conservatives in maffers of social policy would be conspicuously absent.8°
Even though the Progressive Conservatives were willing to move forward on
employment equity, the sincerity of their commitment came into question when
countervailing decisions appeared to minimise the sfrength oftheir resolve. At the same
78 for a survey of employment equity programs in comparative perspective see Harish C. Jain, Peter J.
Sloane, and frank M. Horowitz, Employment Equity andAffinnative Action: An International Comparison
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).
Flora Macdonald, Statement to the Flouse ofCommons, March 8, 1985, quoted in DePass, from
Ferthery to Perthe,y: Emptoyment Equilyfor Visible Minorities in Canada, 204.
80Although it might be argued that the Liberals, had they been in power at this time, would have engaged in
a similar attempt to defuse opposition to employment equity, such a defence misses a central point. There is
a difference between frying to market a policy to the widest possible constituency, and defending a policy
because the central ideas that it embodies are believed to be infrmnsically defensible. Often a measure ofthe
commitment a govemment has to a policy is the degree to which it is in keeping with their guiding
philosophy (if any), or at Ieast an underlying principle to which they subscribe. On this mark the
Conservative agenda does flot display a particularly strong synergy with the principles espoused by
employment equity.
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time as the govemment was considering employment equity legislation, significant
reductions in the public service were being planned. One of the consequences of these
reductions, as revealed at the time by Swimmer and Gollesch, is that employees let go
would be classified as surplus, thereby allowing them to have priority over any new jobs
for which they were qualified over the next four years. With a significantly higher
proportion of men in the existing federal workforce, this meant that a predominantly male
surplus pool of employees would stiil have precedence over new jobs before women
could be considered under employment equity legislation. As the authors admit, “the
pnority system is a humane way to deal with potential layoffs but it further reduces job
opportunities for women. Whatever the merits of a smaller govemment on grounds of
restraint or ideology, its impact on affirmative action will be devastating. In this context,
the debate ofwhether targets are “quotas” is largely beside the point. The “targets” in
most affirmative action plans cannot be met.”8’
The view that the govemment was interested in promoting equal opportunity was
strengthened by action in 1985 to include visible minorities as a designated group in the
Public Service.82 Here the govemment effort was largely confined to mandating
departments to establish and implement “action plans”; no quotas, however, would be
fixed on the numbers to be hired. As a response to discrimination, the use of
administrative policy in this way can be an acceptable means ofpromoting equity, but as
Gene Swimmer and Darlene Gollesch, “Affirmative Action for Women in the Federal Public Service,” in
How Ottawa Spends, 1986-87: Tracking the Tories, ed. Michael J. Prince (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), 248.
82 Under the guidelines, federal departments were to draw up action plans to offset discriminatory practices,
establish numerical targets, and establish temporary measures to redress past discrimination. While most
govemment department were covered by this program, the Canadian Armed forces, the RCMP, Crown
corporations and federal agencies with few employees, were flot. See Canada, EquaÏilyfor Alt, Report of
the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights (Ottawa: October 1985), 107.
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the Abella Commission pointed out, mandatory programs that have the weight of law
behind them do more than simply encourage voluntary compliance, they have the chance
of greatest success. This stems from the view that the benevolence of employers and the
discretion of administrators cannot be entrusted with remedying obstacles in the
workpiace that are daunting and seif-perpetuating. In the face of these assumptions the
Abella Commission had put forward an extensive list ofrecommendations — 117 in total
— the essence of which called for legislation requiring: ail federally regulated departments
to implement employment equity; a requirement to collect and submit data conceming
the participation rates, occupational distribution, and income levels of designated groups;
and an enforcement mechanism.83 The resulting federal legislation, Biil C-62, introduced
before parliament in 1985 and passed in the following year would incorporate some of
these recommendations, but ultimately failed to capture the spirit ofthe Abella report.
On the surface the main objective ofthe legislation echoed the recommendations
of the Abelia Commission:
To achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shah be denied employment
opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability... and to correct the
conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by women, aboriginal
peoples, persons with disabilities and persons who are, because oftheir race or
colour, in a visible minority in Canada, by giving effect to the pnnciple that
employment equity means more than treating persons in the same way but also
requires special measures and the accommodation of differences.84
Apart from its symbolic message the legislation was far from successful in providing
substance and compliance for designated groups in the workforce. Among its major
83 Canada, Report ofthe Commission on EquaÏity in Employment, 255.
Canada, House of Commons, Bili C62, An Act Respecting Emptoyment Equity. First Session, 33rd
Parliament. Introduced June 27, 1985, PassedApril 23, 1986.
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limitations was its failure to incorporate an effective monitoring and enforcement
capability, sanctions for failure to implement employment equity, and the absence of
programs such as public day care and training.85 Moreover, while the Abella Commission
had argued for mandatory employment equity legislation for both the federally regulated
pnvate sector and the federal public service, the legislation applied only to federally
regulated firms with more than 100 employees — which at the time comprised
approximately five percent of the total Canadian labour force.
One ofthe most contentious provisions ofthe legislation dealt with reporting
procedures and enforcement of federal guidelines. Large companies under federal
jurisdiction were to file yearly reports on the number of women, Aboriginals, members of
visible minorities, and disabled people they employed, along with their corresponding
occupational and salary levels. In the event that some chose flot to comply, they could be
fined up to $50,000. The Canadian Human Rights Commission was to enforce
compliance by examining the companies’ reports. Those found to be discriminating
against members of the target groups could then be the subject of a complaint.
This arrangement had neyer satisfied the groups the law was supposed to have
helped, leading some to cail the legislation a “toothless sham” which politely asked
employers to voluntarily hire women and minorities.86 Unlike the policy of
multiculturalism, where targeted groups had rallied in support of govemment action, the
Employment Equity Act was opposed by a coalition of 20 organizations, including those
who represented constituencies that were meant to benefit from the legislatïon, such as
85See Patricia McDennott, “Pay and Employment Equity: Why Separate PoliciesT’ in Women and
Canadian Public Policy, ed. Janine Brodie (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996), 96.
86
“Take another stab atjob equity Iaw”; Editorial, Toronto Star, Mar 24, 1986, A12.
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the National Action Committee on the Status ofWomen and the Canadian Labour
Congress. They viewed the potential $50,000 fine for non-reporting as liUle more than a
distraction for major companies who would regard the figure as a cost of doing business.
In point of fact the legislation imposed a penalty only if the employer faiied to report,
nothing prevented the employer from indicating that no progress on employment equity
had been made. No matter how dismal an employer’s record with respect to hiring
practices were, nothing in the legislation obliged it to improve. The government’s
strategy was ostensibly designed to increase the representation of targeted groups through
voluntary “good faith” efforts. Even the Canadian Human Rights Commission found fault
with the logic ofthe approach. In its 1988 Annual Report to Parliament, they argued:
A complaint-driven mechanism may be effective where discrimination is an
exception to normal behaviour, and can be identified as such and remedied
accordingly. But experience has shown that in certain sectors, sex-based pay
inequities are the mie rather than the exception. Complaint initiation alone cannot
resolve this kind ofproblem... The evidence, in our view is clear that, without a
positive obligation to develop and implement pay equity lans, employers will
continue to show no more than half-hearted compliance.8
The criticism of the legislation also extended beyond stakeholders to include,
most notably, the Liberal opposition under the leadership of John Tumer. At the Liberal
national convention in 1986 he argued, “{t]here is no enforcement mechanism. It’s like
mobilizing a policy against stealing and then proposing no penalty against it when
somebody is caught. And what is worse, now that the legislation is there it’s been used as
an excuse to do nothing more. That’s flot good enough.”88 Although clearly partisan in the
87 Canada, Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report 1988 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1989), 34.
88 Quoted in, “Delegates Watch A Revitalized Leader Who’s Been Transformed By The Test Tumer The
‘Reformed Bum-Patter’ Impresses At Women’s Meeting,” The Whig
— Standard, Nov. 28, 1986, 1.
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debate over employment equity, the Liberal response was to cal! for strengthening the
enforcement procedures and extending the reacli of the legislation beyond its original
scope and application. The party would have to wait until their retum to power before
new legislation could clarify and strengthen employment equity.89 Whereas the original
1926 statute depended to a considerable extent on the complaints of discrimination
brought under the Canadian Human Rights Act, the revised Employment Equity Act in
1995 would place the onus to achieve representative workp!aces on employers by
creating comp!iance monitoring though a number of obligations.90 In companson, this
has !ed some to suggest that apart from the creation of a data bank on federally regulated
employees, the impact ofthe 1986 Emp!oyment Equity Act was largely symbolic.91
Despite the efforts of the Progressive Conservative govemment to mitigate
opposition to the policy, some of it reported!y within its own cabinet, the legislation was
stiil regarded as a failure in consensus politics.92 By enacting a weaker statement on
employment equity than had been called for by the Abella report the Progressive
Conservatives had hoped to appease two constituencies. But for opponents of
89The new legislation in the form ofBill C-64, approved on December 15, 1995, would contain three main
etements to amend the original Employment Equity Act, namely: the inclusion of the Federal Public
Service under ifie Act; the clarification and guidance regarding obligations of employers; and the creation
ofa mechanism to gain compliance and employment equity. The inclusion ofthe federal Public Service
under this Act increased its coverage to approximately 900,000 employees or about 8 percent of the
Canadian Labour Force. The history of employment equity in Canada is chronicled at,
http://www.hrsdc.gc.caJasp/gateway.asp?hr=enllp/Io/lswe/we/informationlhistory.shtml&hs=wzp
On the changes to Employment Equity in the 1990s see Kim England and Gunter Gad, “Social policy at
work? Equality and equity in women’s paid employment in Canada,” GeoJournal, 2002, VoJ.56, Issue, 4.
91 M.S. Mentzer, “The Canadian Experience with Employment Equity Legislation,” International Journal
ofValue-Basedlianagement; 2002; 15, 1, 38.
92 The policy apparently had few supporters in the federal cabinet. See, for example, Toronto Star, Editorial,
Mar24, 1986, A12.
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employment equity the mere suggestion of federal legislation was cause for alarm, while
for its supporters legislation “without teeth” was an expression ofweakness in the face of
corporate pressure. More to the point, the Progressive Conservative incursion into
employment equity revealed that the govemment chose flot solely to downplay the
strength of equality through its legislation; they chose to do so in a way that limited the
terrain of government intervention. Although the Employment Equity Act demonstrated
that the national government did have a role to play in promoting equity, it was
understood that the public interest would flot be accorded more weight in policy
calculations than pnvate interests. In effect it demonstrated that under Mulroney, the
Progressive Conservatives were prepared in certain policy reaims to transfer autonomy to
the market and thereby support the logic of a limited interventionist state.93
The Meech Lake Accord
The Charter process and the Multiculturalism Act demonstrated the willingness on
the part of the Canadian state in the 1 980s to recognize ethnocultural diversity. But true to
form established in the Trudeau years, the acceptance ofmulticultural principles under
the Progressive Conservatives would have to be measured against the requirements of
national unity. The message from Ottawa was that the future of Canadian federalism
Herein is one of the first lessons of public policy under the neo-liberal state. As Jessop maintains, while
the state under neo-liberalism continues to be responsive to democratic pressures and will engage in a
dialogue on the need to protect and promote the material well-being of individuals, it is nevertheless
prepared to subordinate social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural
competitiveness. See “Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post-fordist
Political Economy,” Studies in PoÏitical Economy, 40, 1993, 9. This view was reinforced by the prevailing
private sector argument during the first Mulroney term that public policy was insufficiently attuned to the
need for efficiency and increased productivity. A case in point can be found in the 1986 policy paper ofthe
Business Council of National Issues, in which the senior voice of business in Canada argues for major
reforms in social policy. See Social Policy Reform and the National Agenda (Ottawa, December, 1986).
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required efforts to reconcile national or linguistic cleavages. This meant that programmes
designed to recognise ethnocultural identities would not be accorded more weight in
federal policy calculations than initiatives designed to manage the ongoing, and by the
late 1 980s growing, constitutional crisis ïnvolving Quebec. Multiculturalism during this
period was flot seen as undermining social cohesion and a sense of community; rather it
was viewed as peripheral to federal efforts designed to enable the government of Quebec
to give its willing assent to the Constitution. To a lesser degree, affempts to minimize
discussion of multiculturalism at the national level would have the additional benefit of
deflecting a challenge to the Quebec govemment’s desire to be recognized as a distinct
society. As a consequence, multiculturalism could only exist in a constitutional context in
which the traditional two-nation concept of Canada would not be sacrificed.
Support for bilïngualism, for example, was defended by the Mulroney
govemment in part because it was viewed as serving rather than hindenng the defacto
special status that Quebec had secured in the Canadian polity.94 If one ofthe goals ofthe
new Progressive Conservative prime minister was to reintegrate Quebec in the
constitutional family with “honour and enthusiasm”, to secure dejure special status, then
it made sense at a very basic level to demonstrate to Quebecers the commitment ofthe
federal govemment to protect and support the french language throughout the country.95
For instance, program spending for multiculturalism in the first four years ofthe Conservative
administration, although higher than under the Liberals, would stili approximate the support for
multiculturalism relative to that ofbilingualism under the Trudeau government
— at no time during the first
term did it rise above eight percent. Based on public account figures reproduced in Daiva Stasiulis, “The
Symbolic Mosaic Reaffirmed,” 95.
Mulroney’s campaign in the 1984 election opened the door to debate about the need to induce Quebec to
formally (i.e. constitutionally) accept the Canada Act which it had not signed in 1982. This meant, of
course, going beyond bilingualism which from the perspective of most French-speaking Quebecers was
167
During the constitutional debate over the Meech Lake Accord the extent to which the
Progressive Conservative govemment and the Prime Minister were prepared to uphold
the traditional English-french cleavage of power in Canadian politics in their quest to
restore national unity was made clear. The story ofthe Meech Lake Accord from the
perspective of multiculturalism is consequently about the degree to which the policy was
relegated to the background in debates about the redesign of the constitutional order.
One of the familiar opinions about the successfi.tl negotiations that came to be
known as the “Quebec Round” was that the constitutional agenda was intentionally
limited by the provincial premiers and the federal government to Quebec’s demands.96
The exclusion ofother items and interests from the 1987 Constitutional Accord, such as
multiculturalism, was therefore not to be taken as proof that issues flot dealt with had
been ignored, rejected or deemed unimportant. Multiculturalism and Aboriginal rights in
the Charter ofRights were to be afforded some measure of protection by the Accord
— a
protection that was flot part of the original document. Specifically, the proposed
amendment to section 2 in the Constitution Act, 1867 that stated that the constitution
would be interpreted in a manner consistent with the linguistic duality ofthe country and
Quebec as a distinct society, was to be held in check by the inclusion of a protective
clause added subsequent to the meeting ofthe first ministers. Section 16 ofthe Accord
was to detail that constitutional provisions relating to multiculturalism and Aboriginal
neyer interpreted as a sincere gesture on the part of the Trudeau govemment to recognise Quebec’s special
constitutional status. But bitingualism as a marter ofprinciple would stili have to be defended.
96 Those demands were the following: the constitutional recognition of Quebec as a distinct society; the
right to opt out ofnew federal programs with full financial compensation; an expanded provincial veto for
constitutional amendments; a role in appointments to the Supreme Court; and the constitutional
enfrenchment of Quebec’s role in immigration. Other provisions in the accord, such as Senate reform, wete
flot among the demands from Quebec but came chiefly from the Westerns premiers.
168
rights, including two provisions of the Charter, would not be altered by the proposed
section 2. Appearing before the $pecial Joint Committee ofthe Senate and the House of
Commons on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, Senator Loweli Murray, then Minister of
Intergovemmental Relations, sought to justifr section 16 on the grounds that is was an
overly cautious measure that would offer some comfort to those concemed about the
impact of distinct society on the interpretive clauses of the Charter. He noted, “Franldy,
we do not think the interpretative clause respecting the distinct society or the linguistic
duality of Canada could conceivably detract or diminish from those other recognitions in
the Constitution. But because multiculturalism and native peoples related to groups with
a cultural aspect, it was thought appropriate to put in that nonderogation clause.”97
This view of section 16 was challenged by Daihousie University law professor
Wayne MacKay who claimed that the provisions dealing with Canada’s multicultural
heritage and with Aboriginal peoples conflicted with distinct society. He argued:
It [section 16] states that section 2, distinct society, will have no impact on
multiculturalism and no impact on native nghts. I think this is unlikely to be true. I
think what is going to happen is that the courts are going to have to make some
difficuit value choices in many cases between promoting a distinct society in Quebec
and in doing so limiting the rights of certain ethnic groups or multiculturalism in
Canada. In some cases there may be difficult choices between the rights of aboriginal
people in Canada and the distinct society in Quebec. The nature ofthese principles in
constitutional law is that they do conflict.98
Although direct evidence of the impact of section 16 is a matter ofjudgment,
there is established proof that ethnocultural groups viewed the 1987 Constitutional
Accord with both reservation and disappointment. In their protestations one is
Canada, The 1987 Constitutional Accord, Report ofthe Special Joint Committee ofthe Senate and the
House ofCommons (Ottawa, 1987), ch.6, sec. 42.
Ibid, sec. 38.
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immediately struck by the similarity with the objections raised by ethnocultural groups
during the hearings convened by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism in the 1960s. The issue of contention was flot that the Meech Lake Accord
described linguistic duality as a fundamental charactenstic of Canada; nor was it that
Quebec’s position within the federation merited some type of special recognition. The
major concern for ethnocultural organizations was that the definition of Canada being
advanced by the constitutional process included linguistic duality but made no mention of
multiculturalism. Moreover, it identified Quebec’s distinctness as a central feature of the
country’s identity but was suent on the contribution made by Canad&s ethnocultural
mosaic; thereby effectively placing linguistic duality above the multicultural reality of
Canadian society. As the committee would note: “Some saw this as a “backward step”
from the notion ofbilingualism and multiculturalism to bilingualism and biculturalism.
Others see the lack of mention of multiculturalism as either an intentional downplaying
of Canadians whose ethnic origin is neither English nor French, or as a telling lapse
which indicates that Canada’s political leaders are insufficiently sensitive to present
cultural realities.”99
The remedy advanced by the Canadian Ethnocultural Council was to amend
section 2 to include reference to the multicultural nature of the country, or altematively to
add a new subsection that would also recognize multiculturalism as an interpretive
principle within the Constitution. This position was directly supported by the Ukrainian
Canadian Commiftee and implicitly followed the sentiments ofthe Gemian Canadian
Congress and Chinese National Council, who in noting the powerful symbolic role of the
Ibid. ch. 5, sec. 97.
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constitution argued that insofar as the distinct society clause attempted to define
Canadian reality it was imperfect and erroneous. The Special Joint Commiffee politely
dismissed these concems by deferring the consideration of multiculturalism’s omission
from the Accord to a later time and place, and judged the document worthy of support in
its existing form. It noted:
“We see no reason to doubt that First Ministers, ail of whom have expressed strong
support for multiculturalism, will address this topic in their further constitutional
discussions and we have no hesitation in recommending that this topic be added to
their agenda at one oftheir forthcoming conferences. In the interim we do flot
believe that adoption of the “linguistic duaiity/distinct society” ruie of interpretation
will transform our cultural mosaic into a meiting pot and we would flot recommend
rejecting the 1987 Accord because its framers did not go beyond their agreed upon
agenda to give multiculturalism the prominence it may one day achieve.”°°
In the end, it appears that in the debate over the substance of the accord the architects of
the deal were preoccupied foremost with recognizing Quebec through special powers in
the service of constitutional peace. In other words, in order to facilitate a deal the prime
minister and provincial premiers were willing to accept that the province of Quebec was
pnmarily responsible for protecting its culture and people, and its govemment was to be
empowered with specific responsibilities that other provinces might flot otherwise want
to exercise.
The failure ofthe 1987 Constitutional Accord
— in somewhat dramatic fashion as
the seif-imposed deadiine to unanimously approve it expired in the summer of 1990
— can
not be explained simply by the relative indifference to multiculturalism demonstrated
throughout the constitutionai process. Although many English-speaking Canadians had
come to identify with multiculturalism as one of the defining elements of their politicai
‘°° Ibid. ch. 5, sec(s). 102-103.
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culture, for them the accord was flot a direct repudiation of multicultural principles.’°’
Their opposition to the accord and its eventual demise was due to a number of factors,
including the process that had created it — negotiations among first ministers behind
closed doors. But from the outset, the most disconcerting part ofthe accord for many
Canadians, especially in English Canada, was the distinct-society clause. For people who
subscribed to Trudeau’s version of federalism that promoted the equality of provinces, the
distinct-society clause went too far by creating a special legislative status for one
province)02 This opposition also included those who championed the benefits of
multiculturalism and those who thought the distinct society clause threatened the integrity
ofthe equality provisions ofthe Charter. This helped to make clear that the acceptance of
distinct society by constituencies outside of Quebec in the future would have to be
balanced against the support the symbolic affirmations and legal protections the Charter
had created. But the greatest hostility to special status for Quebec emerged from the
principle of equality as the comerstone of Canadian federalism — a position in the 1 990s
increasingly articulated by Canada’s premiers who would be involved in future
constitutional negotiations. It would take another t-wo years before the Progressive
Conservative govemment would be prepared to formally test the depths of this resistance.
101 Pierre Foumier makes the case that the Accord failed, in part, due to certain attitudes in English Canada
that directly chaiienged distinct society. Among these attitudes he singles-out multiculturalism, along with
American influence and the free trade deal with the United States. As suggested above, aithough the vision
of Canada that most Canadians subscribed to inciuded muiticulturalism, it is difficuit to accept as the
primaly impetus behind the refusai to accept speciai status for Quebec. Pierre Foumier, Autopsie du Lac
Meech: la souveraineté est-elle inévitable? (Monfréal, VLB, 1990).
102 Clearly many ofthe opponents ftamed their opposition to the Meech Lake Accord in terms ofthe
Trudeau vision, notably Clyde Wells. Then premier ofNewfoundland, Wells became the most articulate and
vocal supporter of the Trudeau vision and opponent of the accord. His cross-country tour in the months
before the deadline to approve the accord was designed officiaily to explain Newfoundiand and Labradors
opposition, but it functioned as a demonstration of the degree to which the Trudeau vision had taken root in
Engiish Canada and would be defended by the political elite.
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Conclusion
Our effort in this chapter was primarily directed at understanding the pattern of
policy making under the Liberal and Progressive Conservative govemments. We maintain
that the course ofmulticulturalism policy in the 1980s followed a fairly routine practice
where any innovation followed existing policy processes. There is a high degree of
continuity in most public policies and multiculturalism is illustrative of this point.
Adjustments to various aspects ofthe policy took place without radically altering the
overali configuration of the policy regime. Thïs is vastly different from the type ofpolicy
change characterised by an abrupt departure in how a policy is conceived or
implemented. This does flot imply that ideological considerations were absent from
policy calculations about what action, if any, should be taken on multiculturalism. We are
mindful the mid- 1 980s were a transition period for Canadian politics and in particular for
multiculturalism. New ideas and agendas were introduced into the policy milieu that set
out to challenge established principles. It took time for these ideas and arguments to work
against the status quo, and to sufficiently influence the institutional and behavioural
legacies ofthe past. Therefore, while at the policy level multiculturalism experienced
incremental change, a sustained critique was being developed that would only later
influence policy-making more profoundly and reshape the govemment’s orientation
towards ethuocultural diversity.
Nonetheless, in the second half of the chapter we documented instances that have
the affect of prompting a qualification to the conventional view of multiculturalism as a
policy on the rise. More directly, we demonstrated that the Mulroney govemment chose
consciously to limit its freedom of action in several policy endeavours. An examination
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ofthe debate surrounding the Employment Equity Act exposed the degree to which the
government was prepared to wilfully contain the role of the federal state in dealings with
the private sector. As for the Meech Lake Accord, the constitutional bargain undertaken
with Quebec was seen by ethnocultural groups as challenging the multicultural legacy
enshrined by the Charter ofRights and extended through the Multiculturalism Act. Even
the limited (i.e. largely symbolic) success ofthe Multiculturalism Act is brought into
question when held up against a standard that seeks to measure the Progressive
Conservative government’s overail commitment to equality. When viewed in this way the
accomplishments of multiculturalism in the latter part of the 1 980s diminish in value.
The linkage between multiculturalism and citizenship included other policies and
initiatives such as immigration, human rights and social justice. Yet it was
multiculturalism more than any other which focused on advancing respect for cultural
diversity that came to lie identified as one ofthe central pillars ofCanadian citizenship.
But by weakening the basis of social assistance through a mixture of social policy
“clawbacks” and the abandonment of universality, the interface between multiculturalism
and citizenship was compromised. If multiculturalism is about equality, as successive
Canadian governments have claimed, then attempts to alter the basis of membership in
related policy areas detracts from the overall condition of equality in society. There is, in
other words, no separating multiculturalism from other pillars of Canadian citizenship
similarly committed to fostering a sense of solidarity and belonging between citizens.
And even though the market-driven agenda ofthe Progressive Conservatives in the 1980s
did flot especially impact multiculturalism, any diminution in the force of social, political
and economic equality rights has the affect of compromising the intent and force of
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multicultural accomplishinents. For instance, proclaiming that visible minorities should
be treated equally whiie at the same time undermining social programs does flot render
the work on eliminating racism useless, but it compromises the full impact of social
justice.
What is undeniable about the Progressive Conservative agenda is that its
retrenchment efforts to dismantie social citizenship rights were inspired by the presumed
faults of the alternative paradigm. The Keynesian notion of government regulation and
intervention ied the new government to blame the country’s poor economic performance
on an ideology they believed to be outdated, and overly sceptical of the value of the
market and the power of pnvate industry. The full weight of these ideas had yet to
significantly alter the course ofmultïculturalism and the ail party consensus that existed
on the value ofethnoculturai pluralism. By the end ofthe 1980s, the governing
Progressive Conservative Party was stiil publicly defending multiculturaiism as poiicy
that contributed rather than detracted from national unity. Their actions, like those of the
Liberals before them, demonstrated that the management of ethnocuitural diversity was
appropriately viewed as an arena in which the state shouid be involved.
As the next chapter details, by the early 1 990s the Conservative neo-liberal
agenda camed many more implications for multiculturalism as new political parties and
influential players joined the debate over the course of the policy. Paramount among
these was the pressure from the Reform Party to end state support for multiculturalism.
Reform had staked its daim in federal politics, in part, out of its critique of Canada’s
pursuit of social justice which they feit undermined individual freedom. This argument
was added to the powerftil and ongoing discourse about the deficit that would come to
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form an important tool to blunt Canad&s social programs. for multiculturalism, this
meant flot only would the cost ofthe policy become the subject of scrutiny, but it
engendered a more fundamental debate on the very rationale for ethnocultural support.
The door being opened, the long-standing all-party commitment to multiculturalism was
broken, with the policy increasingly cast in some quarters as a threat to social cohesion
and national unity. What follows is the account ofhow a public philosophy and
programmatic ideas came to redefine the officiai multiculturalism agenda towards a new
path that ultimately served to contest its legitimacy.
CHAPTER 5
Redefining the Multicultural Agenda: The 1990s
Introductioit
By the early 1 990s, the political consensus in Canada underpinning support for
multiculturalism showed signs of coming apart. The market-driven agenda that sought to
contain the role of the state provided the Progressive Conservative govemment with a
coherent ideological frame by which it could recast social policy.’ The govemment’s view
of state-society relations was no longer group-based; it had become individual and
therefore “diversity” would also be de-collectivised and made more individual. But
beyond that, and supporting an attack on multiculturalism, there was the question of
national unity. Debate ensued within the agenda-sefting network on the proper scope and
nature of state activity in the reaim of ethnocultural management. Was the govemment
justified in encouraging the pursuit of multicultural identities through the state in an era
when multiculturalism was increasingly viewed as a threat to national unity? At the same
time, given its pre-existing commitment to foster and promote multiculturalism, how best
for the govemment to organize policy instruments to avoid eliminating multiculturalism
altogether? The next decade was devoted to working out these questions and by fixing on
a policy adjustment discourse that provided a rationale for multiculturalism reform and in
tum contributed to the alteration ofthe post-war commitment to social citizenship.
As noted in Chapter 4 the blueprint for this public philosophy was articulated by the Macdonald
Commission. On the influence ofthe Commission see Jonathan R. Kesselman, ‘Labour and Social Policy
Impacts ofthe Macdonald Commission Report,” Prepared for the conference on The Macdonald
Commission Report 20 Years On: Its Recommendations, Subsequent Experience, and Lessons for the Next
20 Years, Toronto, C.D. Howe Institute. December 9, 2004.
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The purpose of this une of inquiiy is to establish a measure of logical congruence.
Congruence refers to the connection between focusing events and ideological paradigms
that lead to institutional reform.2 Our objective in this chapter is therefore to locate a
degree ofinferential correlation that allows us to understand alterations in
multiculturalism policy. In sum, this analysis is directed at understanding how policies
like multiculturalism are variable in their content and subject to reformulation when new
ideas and circumstances reopen debate among individuals and groups within the agenda
setting network.
Afier 1990, three sources of ideas would emerge to dispute the entrenched policy
rationale for multiculturalism: political parties, government commissions, and
intellectuals. In the first instance, responding to a changing national unity environment
and a perceived failure ofthe policy, the Bloc Québécois added its voice to the
longstanding debate on the merits of multiculturalism. Also entering the fray was the
Reform Party which argued against the management of ethnocultural diversity based on
its critique ofthe liberal pursuit of social justice, and for scaling down the role ofthe
state. Within the institutions of the federal govemment, the search for answers in the
wake ofthe failure Meech Lake Accord that led to the Citizen’s Forum on Canada’s
Future, and ultimately the Charlottetown Accord, provided a wealth of ideas that helped
crystallize the concems ofvarious social forces into coherent poÏicy directions. Public
dissenters also weighed-in by contesting the design and implications of multicultural
2 The logic ofsuch a connection, according to Kenneth Hoover, “resides in the pattem ofthe congruence,
and the fact that the fit is flot contradicted by significant evidence.” What Hoover introduces as
“developmental tuming points,” we have substituted our use ofthe concept “focusing events”. See
“Ideologizing Institutions: Laski, Hayek, Keynes and the Creation of Contemporary Politics,” Journal of
Politicalideologies, february, 1999, 4 (1), 87-115.
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legislation. By the mid- 1 990s, these mobilizations and the ideas that flowed from them
began to acquire a certain resonance with the federal party system that came to challenge
the orthodoxy ofmulticulturalism policy. The evolution ofthese ideas and the policy
consequences they provoked are the main subjects ofthis chapter.
Also central to the course of policy in these years was the arrivai in power of a
new Liberal government in 1993. Committed to a political agenda remarkably similar to
that oftheir Progressive Conservative predecessors, the Liberals restructured the delivery
of social programs in a wide range ofareas. The rhetoric behind this effort vaned little
from one policy field to the next. Reductions in spending or the elimination ofprograms,
the Department of finance under the Liberals argued, reflected the public’s desire for
better management of limited financial resources.3 Multiculturalism policy thereafter was
shaped by the sensitivity of the govemment to the political atmosphere conditioned by
the most recent national unity crisis, and the attention to deficit and debt reduction that
became the primary focus ofthe new govemment’s programme. As a consequence, in the
spring of 1995 the new federal ministry responsible for multiculturalism, the Department
of Canadian Heritage, launched a comprehensive examination of multicultural activities,
the first of its kind since the policy was introduced in 1971. Although there have been
periodic evaluations of specific programming activities, the latest review was a major
development.4 The main thrust of this process was carried out through an extemal review
in Mardi of 1996 that called for significant changes in the way the federal government
Such was the tone and justification for “structural change” within the federal budget. Canada, Budget
speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, February 27, 1995.
The release ofthe Brighton Report (so named because it was conducted by Brighton Research, Ottawa)
coincided with the 2S anniversary ofmulticulturatism as officiai state policy in Canada.
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both promoted and administered multiculturalism.5 The redesigned multiculturalism
program that emerged in April of 1997 incorporated several ofthe proposed changes and
drew inspiration from the report’s theme of renewal.
Tracing the ideas which guided the adoption of a new direction in
multiculturalism policy is the focus of this chapter. The first section identifies the
introduction of ideas, with attention to the way various actors ftamed multicuhural issues
and advanced policy arguments that were linked to a set of beliefs associated with
political and economic models of development. These policy paradigms or interpretative
frames gave direction and purpose for those advocating a new policy course. The second
section considers the adoption of ideas at the federal level, analyzing the strategic choices
made in linking ideas to politics. Here we track the process ofrecasting multicuhuralism
policy as a reply to political mobilization and a discourse highlighting the viability of
ideas in the Canadian political system.
5.1 Introducing Ideas: Mutticutturatism and the National Mood
The 1 990s were a period of significant adjustment for the Canadian economy and
society. The inflation ofthe 1970s and 1980s, and the failure ofthe attendant fiscal
instruments designed to fight it, further weakened the grip ofthe Keynesian economic
mode! within the Canadian state. By the recession of 1990-1991, the leading narrative on
the subject ofmacroeconomic policy in Canada was the need to reduce public spending.6
Canada, Department ofCanadian Heritage, Strategic Evaluation ofliulticulturalism Programs, Final
Report (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996).
6 Even before the Macdonald Commission had engaged the Mulroney govemment on the need for
retrenchment efforts, the Liberal govemment identified public spending in 197$ as a leading cause of
i go
Emphasizing the limits of Keynesianism, the new national economic policy dïscourse
identified excessive government spending as a significant drag on the economy and
responsible for an unsustainable level of public debt.7 At the root of the crisis, it was
argued, were welfare state policies that strained the public purse and contributed to a
culture ofdependency. Canadians, as Lois Harder reveals, had therefore to be convinced
that “their personal well-being was a matter of individual responsibility [and] the best
thing that govemments could do to protect the interests of citizens was to safeguard the
market”.8 In political terms, deficit reduction was therefore cast as a painfiul though
necessary redemptive exercise the country needed to follow.9 Facilitating this course of
action in Canada was a shifi in the “national mood” towards an understanding that fiscal
prudence played a key role in the retum to economic prosperity and future stability.1°
economic under-performance. For an examination of the impact of this discourse on Canadian income
security policy sec, Stephen Harold Philips, “The Demise ofUniversality: The Politics ofFederal Income
Security in Canada, 1978-1993,” (PhD diss., University ofBritish Columbia, 1999).
For a discussion ofthe challenges posed to Keynes’ model and the wetfare state in general sec, Michael K.
Brown, “Remaking the Welfare State: A Comparative Perspective,” in Michael K. Brown, cd., Remaking
the Wefare State (Philadeiphia: Temple University Press, 1988).
8 Lois Harder, “Whither the Social Citizen,” in Reinventing Canada. Politics in the 21sf Century, eds.
Janine Brodie and Linda Trimble (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2003), 181.
The Liberal govemment defended its budget-cutting programme in the mid-1990s as a response to a
serious financial crisis with only one responsible course of action. Sec Canada, House ofCommons, Budget
2000: New Era. . .New Plan, Report ofthe Standing Committee on Finance (December 10, 1999) 36th
Parliament, 2nid Session (Ottawa: Public Works and Govemment Services, 1999). For a critical assessment
ofthese policy choices sec G. Swimmer, “Seeing Red -- A Liberai Report Card,” in How Ottawa Spends
1997-98: Seeing Red
- A Liberal Report Card, cd. G. Swimmer (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997),
1-22; and M. J. Prince, “from Health and Welfare to Stealth and Fareweli: Federal Social Policy, 1980 to
2000,” in Leslie A. Pal (cd.) How Ottawa Spends 1999-2000, Shape Shfling: Canadian Governance
Toward the 21st Centuty (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999), 151-196.
Unlike the influence of causal ideas and beliefs, or what we introduced as ideas in good currency in
Chapter 2, the national mood reflects a sense of change in a set of ideas among the public registcred
through public opinion that become accepted as the prevailing standard. As Leslie A. Pal notes, ideas in
good currency may flot necessarily (at lcast initialiy) reflect widcspread consensus among thc public;
whereas the national mood refers to ideas that have successfully captured the attention ofthe public and are
viewed as plausible. Sec, Beyond Poticy Anatysis, 21.
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The impact of this consensus has been significant for policy discussions at the national
level. As Leslie A. Pal explains:
If the deficit is the problem, then it impiies that govemment itself is the problem,
since the deficit is a reflection of govemment activity and management. No
ministerial musings on the deficit, from Canada to the United Kingdom to New
Zealand, have been complete without an explicit attack on the style of govemment
that produced it. The ferocity with which government itseif is attacked as a source of
problems varies from conservatives to liberals, but the general view is that a
minimum, govemment should “get itseifright,” and in doing so will provide the best
“solution” to its negative impact on the economy and society.”
Adding to this narrative in the 1 990s was the supporting dialogue about
giobalization. The power of giobalization as an adjunct to the discourse on deficit
reduction resided, in part, in its emotive force. While debate continues on the merits and
the inevitability of globalization, by the Ï 990s few Canadians were unaware of the foie it
played, particularly as an economic force, in reshaping the iives of citizens throughout
the world.’2 For policy makers, the power ofthe conventional story une associated with
globalization and its focus on the emergence of a single transnational liberalized
economy served to reinforce free market ideas at play in domestic budget-reduction
measures. Emphasis on the global “competitiveness” ofthe Canadian economy, in short,
became an attractive backdrop from which govemments could pursue market liberal
principles ofgovemance. Although an agenda that chose deficit reduction stiil required
that policy ideas be framed and defended, the rhetorical narrative ofglobalization gave
the policy daims ofthe federal govemment further corroboration.
Pal, Beyond Policy AnaÏysis, 122-123.
12 This is one ofthe conclusions reached by Anthony Giddens in his briefbook on globalization, Runaway
World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our L ives, 2”’ ed. (London: Routledge, 2003).
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Against this backdrop the Progressive Conservative govemments of the late 1 980s
and early 1 990s moved decisively to entrench market liberalism by negotiating a
comprehensive free Trade Agreement first with the United States and later with Mexico,
and by opting for a comprehensive reformulating of social policy.’3 The Progressive
Conservatives did more than set their sights on restraining and reducing expenditures in
the name of economic renewal, they sought to free the state imprisoned by its activism by
limiting its intervention in areas of social policy. What was far-reaching about the
Progressive Conservative agenda, therefore, were flot the “quantitative” cutbacks of
social services but rather the “qualitative” attack on them.’4
By the end of their first term, the Progressive Conservative govemment had opted
for a comprehensive reformulating of social policy as part of its new fiscal agenda. The
principles guiding this program were consistent with the neo-liberal disposition of the
govemment. They included removing work disincentives from social programs and
targeting the truly needy; and reducing overali public expenditures.15 By the time the
Progressive Conservatives lefi office the cumulative result ofthese initiatives was a
significant reduction in federal social programs. Rather than presenting a departure from
this practice the new Liberal govemment accelerated the pace of change by making
13 As Steve Patten notes, in the areas of social policy the Conservatives moved with greater purpose in their
second term. “By terminating Family Allowances, abolishing the universality ofûld Age Security, placing
a ceiling on funds transferred to selected provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan, and ending federal
contributions to Unemployment Insurance, the Mulroney Conservatives set in motion in a series of
fundamenta] changes to Canada’s social welfare policy regime”. “Toryism and the Conservative Party in a
Neo-liberal Era,” in Parly Politics in Canada, ed. eds., Hugh Thorbum and Alan Whitehom (Toronto:
Prentice Hall, 1991), 139.
14 Stephen McBride and John Shields, Dismantiing a Nation: The Transition to Corporate Rule in Canada,
2nd ed. (Halifax: Femwood Publishing, 1997), 23.
15 Neil Bradford, Commissioning Ideas: Canadian National Policy in Coniparative Perspective (Toronto:
OUP, 1998), 121.
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deficit reduction a priority over the maintenance ofthe social safety net. Determination to
reduce the deficit through spending reductions in the social policy area resulted in
declining federal transfers to the provinces, thereby dissolving much of the glue that
bound citizens together. Although claiming to revitalise social programs, the Liberals’
objective was the same as that oftheir predecessors: to replace what were seen as overly
generous programs and remove govemment ftom areas best left to the private sector. It
became clear the govemment’s argument that cost savings would only be a consequence
ofprogram reform, flot its cause, couid flot be credibly sustained.’6
The Party System
The assumptions and prescriptions of the neo-liberal agenda provided fertile
ground for policy debates in Canada throughout the 1 990s. A variety of channels
ultimately opened to facilitate the growth ofthese ideas, including the expansion ofthe
national party system. By the 1993 general election, Canada’s long standing two-and-a
half-party system had shified toward a multi-party system with the emergence of two
regionally based parties.17 The success ofthe Bloc Québécois, which became the Officiai
Opposition in 1993, and the Reform Party, which won the third highest number ofseats,
epitomized the increasingly fractured nature of the Canadian party system. Both parties
flourished at the poiis in the 1990s by providing a definition ofpolitics that challenged
‘6lbid., 125.
17 The two-and-a-half-party system referred to above explains the appearance of minor parties alongside the
Progressive Conservatives and Liberals in 1921. Throughout much of the 1 990s the multi-party system can
best be described as a one-party dominant system, wherein one party routinely received at least 40 percent
ofthe national vote. For an account of the party system in the 1990s see R. Kenneth Carty, William Cross
and Lisa Young, Rebuilding Canadian Party Potitics (Vancouver, U3C Press, 2000).
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the established political order. The Bloc Québécois presented, on the surface, the most
perceptible challenge with its support of Quebec sovereignty.’8
Although the nationalisrn espoused by the Bloc Québécois superseded the lefi
right ideological appeal of the party, the antipathy demonstrated by Quebec nationalists
towards multiculturalism meant that the partisan consensus on the merits of ethnocultural
pluralism would at the very least corne to an end. The party was vocal in its opposition to
the state-funded policy, arguing that multiculturalisrn was designed by the federal
govemment to negate Quebec’s distinctiveness.’9 Moreover, the Bloc rejected cultural
pluralisrn as a model for successfully managing inter-group differences in Quebec
society. In its place the party advocated integration of cultural communities built around
the knowledge and use ofthe French language. Cultural differences among citizens, they
rnaintained, should be recognized as long as a process of adapting to the social and
political life ofa francophone society was flot impeded.2° The similarity with the
18 The party’s basic motivation for ninning candidates federally was to defend Quebec’s interests at the seat
of national power. The long-standing mission ofthe party reflects this sentiment; «La présence du Bloc
Québécois rétablit la concordance et la légitimité entre la vision d’un peuple et celle de ses représentantes et
représentants élus sur la scène fédérale. Le Bloc Québécois affirme l’existence de la nation québécoise,
exige sa reconnaissance et défend les intérêts de ses citoyens et citoyennes ainsi que leur droit de choisir
librement leur avenir. » http://www.blocquebecois.org/fr/historique.asp (6juin 2005).
19 As Bloc Québécois MP Christiane Gagnon bas noted, “the whole diaÏectic oftwo founding peoples with
their own language and culture was submerged and diluted in this ocean ofother languages and cultures”
See “Bloc Québécois: Integration Rather Than Multiculturalism”, in The Battie Over Multiculturalism
Does it HeIp or Hinder Canadian Unity?, Volume 1, eds. Andrew Cardozo and Louis Musto (Pearson
Shoyama Institute, 1997), 43. Also, refer to section A of Bloc Québécois, La déclaration deprinc4e et les
orientations adoptées au Congrès de 2000, adoptés au congrès du 28 au 30 janvier, Montréal.
20 Christiane Gagnon, House ofCommons, Hansard, April 5, 1995. Canada, Parliament, House of
Commons, Debates, 35e’ Parliament, lst Session, 1994-1996, vol. 133, No.184, April 5, 1995 (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1995). This was the Bloc’s official position as recent as the 2004
election where the party noted their intent, «à continuer de promouvoir et défendre une citoyenneté
québécoise ouverte, fondée sur la langue française, la culture, un héritage culturel en constante évolution et
la participation des citoyens aux institutions publiques du Québec. » Bloc Québécois, Une société inclusive
à notre image, Plate-forme à l’intention des groupes ethnoculturels, préparée par la Commission de la
citoyenneté du Bloc Québécois, 2004. http://www.bloc.org/archivage/pIateformeethnoculturel.pdf
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govemment of Quebec’s officiai poiicy of integration described as “interculturaiism” is
flot coincidental. The objective ofthis provincial policy, expressed by way ofa written
“moral contract”, was designed to communicate to newly arrived immigrants that Quebec
society accepted and fostered diversity yet expected that its citizens wouid participate in a
common civic culture that is French-speaking.2’ For the govemment ofQuebec, as with
the Bloc Québécois, language became the central policy instrument aimed at socializing
Quebecers irrespective of their origins and promoting culturai exchange between them. In
this respect the Bioc’s position on multiculturalism spoke directly to the imperative of
securing the existence of the french language and culture in Quebec, thereby extending
beyond the critique of the federai poiicy as a ploy to undermine Quebec nationalism by
eroding support for the two founding nation’s thesis.
Histoncaliy, the prospect of cultural assimilation has provided successive Quebec
govemments with the justification to undertake legislative measures designed to actively
intervene in the process ofintegrating new immigrants.22 In this vein the Bloc’s hostiiity
to multiculturalism, like that ofmany Quebec francophones, did flot result from a
principled opposition to state intervention in areas of cultural management.23 Rather it
stemmed from a profound disagreement over the terms of multicultural integration that
appeared to frustrate rather than facilitate the survival of the “French fact” in North
21 The understanding is clearly outlined by the Quebec govemment. See http://www.immigration
quebec.gouv.qc.calfrancais/avantages-quebec/societe.html
22 BilI 22 (Loi sur la langue officielle) and later Bili lOl(Charte de la languefrançaise) were conscious
aftempts to manage the integration ofnon-french speakers through the passage of language legislation.
23 Insight into attempts by the Quebec govemment to tackie issues of diversity in the post-referendum era
can be found in Micheline Labelle, “The Politics of Managing Diversity: What is at Stake in Quebec?”
Paper presented at the Conference Quebec and Canada in the New Centuiy: New Dynamics, New
Opportunities (Institute of Intergovemmental Relations, Queen’s University, Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 2003).
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America. Consistent with this view, the idea of state intervention designed to accomplish
collective goals was flot attacked or undermined. What remained was a critique of
muhiculturalism policy that was based on a nationalist discourse structured around the
use ofthe state to promote an autonomous Quebec identity.
While the Bloc’s policy stance represented the necessary conditions for launching
further debate on the merits ofmulticulturalism, the ideas upon which the objections were
based were not sufficiently influential to consolidate institutional change. The policy
influence ofthese ideas has yet to sufficiently convince other interests in terms of
c1arifïing goals and motivating their actions. Moreover, despite the Bloc Québécois’
opposition to multiculturalism, the policy would neyer become a direct focus of concern.
The party’s most significant contribution to the debate over multiculturalism would be
measured indirectly, contesting the design and implications of the federally conceived
national unity projects of the 1 990s. In this sphere the Bloc Québécois argued that the
federal govemment promoted a form of centralized federalism that repudiated the distinct
nature of Quebec. The net effect of this posture was to discredit the notion of a pan
Canadian identity structured, in part, around multicultural principles.
Before the constitutional batties of the decade provided an opening from which
multiculturalism reform would be launched, other parties sparked by the unity issue and
opposition to an interventionist-activist state were determined to have their voices heard.
By the mid- 1 990s, the clearest expression of this discontent came from a second new
player on the federal scene, the Reform Party.
Created in 1987, the Reform Party represented a direct challenge to
multiculturalism through its platform of fiscal restraint and social conservatism. for
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Reform, state management of diversity was problematic because it ran counter to the neo
liberal ideological variant of economic freedom that professed fiscal conservatism. This
involved a preference for reductions in the level of state intervention in the area of social
policy, but it stemmed from two aspects of Reform’s perspective on political and social
life. One was based on their critique of the liberal pursuit of social justice; the other was
the party’s attempt to scale-down the role of the state. As far as the party was concemed,
state involvement in these naturally private activities infringed upon individual freedom.
As David Laycock notes, for Reform this meant that “the market-countervailing practices
ofthe modem welfare state were at odds with “proper” limits on public determinations of
social behaviour and welfare distribution”.24
At its core this thinldng represented flot simply an admonishment of extravagant
federal spending on social policy. It signalled a more principled objection. Tme, the
Reform Party would make the elimination of federal programs a comerstone ofits
populist platform; by arguing that govemment had to establish a clear set of spending
proprieties and live within its means.25 But support for downsizing the federal state
reflected a desire to rethink the very basis of social spending. Spending restraint
underlined Reform’s faith in the free market as the primary and most appropriate
organising principle in society. While there was recognition of the need for govemment
intervention in areas such as income support, it would be chiefly designed to provide a
minimum standard of living. In other words, if there is to be a modem welfare state it
24 David Laycock, The New Right and Dernocracy in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 47.
25 Reform’s view of govemment as a reslrained and conscientious manager of public finances was echoed
by the C.D. Howe Institute. See Irene K. Ip, “Strong medicine: Budgeting for Recession and Recovery,”
Cornmentaiy, C.D. Howe Institute, (January 1991, no. 27).
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should be a residual one in which social spending becomes the public expenditure of iast
resort.26
This thinking carried over to multiculturalism and led Reform initiaily to view the
policy as superfluous both as a poor use oftaxpayers’ money and as counter to the view
that the state was free to impose mies of behaviour that recognised or sponsored the
preservation of culture. The first critique, which is essentially about fiscal management,
appeared to be less ofa substantive appraisal ofthe policy than a rebuke of public
spending. In this sense there was nothing novel about Reform’s objection to
muiticulturaiism. The policy had long been the subject of controversy with the federal
govemment having to justify on more than one occasion public expenditures in support
of its approach to cuiturai diversity. What was new at the federal party level, however,
was the coupling of the fiscal critique with the argument that the state should be neutral
in matters of cuitural retention.27
The intellectual foundation for this principled attack on multicuituralism rested on
classicai liberal thought which emphasized individual freedom of action and condemned
excessive bureaucratic involvement by govemment in the lives of citizens. The party, and
its first leader Preston Manning, would emphasize that their opposition to official
muiticulturaiism did flot mean that Reform was opposed to multiculturalism practiced by
individuais. On the contrary, they agreed that Canadian society gained strength and
insight from the diversity of its citizenry. What they decried was state management of
26 On this subject see Steve Patten, “Citizenship, the New Right and Social Justice: Examining the Reform
Party’s Discourse on Citizenship,” Sociatist Studies Bulletin, Nos. 57-58 (July-December, 1999).
27 Discussion ofthe party’s opposition to multiculturalism can be found in several documents including,
Reform Party of Canada, Principles and Poticies: The Blue Book (1991).
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ethnocultural relations. Personal choice and the state’s neutrality became the operative
words. As Manning notes in the aptly titled The New Canada:
The reform Party believes that cultural development and preservation ought to be the
responsibility of individuals, groups, and, if necessary in certain cases (for example,
in the case of Quebec and Canadian Aboriginals), of provincial governments and
local governments. The role of the federal government should 5e neutral towards
culture just as it is towards religion. This does flot mean necessarily an abandonment
of the mosaic model of Canada, but a different division of labour in order to develop
that mosaic. Let individuals, groups, lower levels ofgovemments if necessary, be
responsible for cutting and polishing the individual pieces. But let the govemment of
Canada be responsible for the common background on which those pieces are to be
stuck, and the glue that holds them together.28
For Manning and Reform activists, Canada had become a country flot of
individuals, but of nations and groups where ethnicity was reinforced by the state as the
definïng experience. This made their objection to multiculturalism clear, not as a policy
that frustrated FrenchlEnglish relations in Canada, but one that hurt Canadian unity more
generally by the recognition ofcultural diversity at a political level. This became
Reform’s main attack against multiculturalism
— Canada had become an ethnically
divided country lacking a unified national identity. It followed from this argument that
multiculturalism as a solution to the challenges of an ethnoculturally diverse society had
failed.29 It failed because Reform argued that multiculturalism promoted the
“Baikanization” ofCanadian society. In other words, the party emphasized the threat to
social cohesion delivered through a divisive policy promoting group identity over
28 Preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1992), 317.
29 The grassroots enthusiasm wiffiin the Reform Party required the leadership to accept policy proposais of
which they were occasionaliy sceptical (recail and proportionai representation). Such was not the case with
multiculturalism. Preston Manning was firmly in une with the party view that muhiculturalism eroded
support for Canadian unity and should cease to exist as officiai state policy. On the subject ofpopuiism and
its influence on the Reform Party’s platform see, Tom Flanagan, from Riel to Reforrn: Understanding
Western Canada, Working paper ofthe fourth Annual Seagram Lecture, McGili Institute for the Study of
Canada, presented on October 26, 1999, 4.
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individual or societal welfare.3° This view ofthe policy was flot necessarily new, but it
found fertile ground in the Reform Party which sought to openly engage Canadians in a
debate about national identity.
Reform’s focus on national identity was designed to appeal to the Western
Canadian experience which had long been centred on protest and repeated indications
that the federal system ofgovernment was biased in favour ofthe two central provinces.3’
But Reform was calling for more than an end to the perceived federal bargain that had
produced the compact theory and daims of special status for Quebec. They were flot, to
be clear, adding their voice to the view increasingly present in English Canada which
argued that a pan-Canadian identity could flot rest on the idea oftwo distinct nations. For
this view had often stressed multiculturalism as a reaction to biculturalism by Canadians
who were of neither British nor French ongin. Reform’s position, on the other hand, was
pnmarily concerned with advancing the proposition that diversity does not necessarily
lead to unity, and may in fact endanger it.32 The rejection of any type of special status for
Quebec, but most importantly for ethnocultural groups, stemmed from this analysis.
Deep, broad ranging diversity may 5e a demographic reality and an unavoidable fact in
Canada, but without promoting societal homogeneity the party argued that political
30 This happens to be the view expounded by one ofthe most recognized opponents ofmulticulturalism
Arthur Schiesinger, Jr. The American author and academic does conceded that there are some Iimited
benefits in the trend toward ethnic awareness; however, “pressed too far, the cut of ethnicity lias bad
consequences too”. The Disuniting ofAmerica: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, revised edition (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1998), 20.
31 A good account ofthe intersections ofidentity, regionalism, and western alienation can be found in
Roger Gibbins and Sonia Arrison, Western Visions: Perspectives on the West in Canada (Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 1995).
32 Moreover, the effort to deflect accusations that the party’s opposition to multiculturalism was bom out of
intolerance ultimately became part ofthe expression ofresentment some within the party feit about the
prominence ethnic groups were receiving.
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unanimity on central issues that bind the country together could flot be achieved.33 In this
respect Reform’s position on culture was far from neutral. By denying the public
significance of divers ity, and in its place arguing for a govemment that is responsible for
providing the “common background” and “glue” that binds Canadians together, Reform’s
position appeared to confuse purposefiil integration with neutrality.34 In truth, the party’s
opposition to multiculturalism was ofien followed by an articulation of the view that the
full assimilation of immigrants into the English-Canadian mainstream was the preferred
policy course to adopt.35
In short, the Reform Party’s position on multiculturalism represented a significant
challenge to the elite consensus on the merits ofpluralism. Apart from any electoral
benefit the party hoped to gain with its stance, the enduring impact on the party system
would be the legitimization of a political discourse that rejected pluralism.36 As a
consequence, and far from an outpouring of support in defence of multiculturalism, other
federal parties began to rethink their owu aftachment to the policy. For one, the
Progressive Conservatives introduced several resolutions dealing with multiculturalism at
See, flaform & $tatement ofFrinctles (Edmonton: Reform Party of Canada, 1989); A fresh Startfor
Canadians: Blue Book: 1996-199 7 Principles & Policies of The Reform Party ofCanada (Calgary: Reform
Party of Canada, 1996).
Reform’s message that it valued ethnic diversity was complicated by occasional intolerant comments
made by party members towards visible minorities. This led Preston Manning to promise in the run-up to
the 1997 election to root out racists and extremists from the party. Edmonton Journal, Apr 27, 1997, A.1O.
At the same time the leader railed against the media accusing it of engaging in ‘a witch hunt against
Reform candidates to find evidence ofracism or intolerance”. The Ottawa Citizen, Apr 26, 1997, A.3
See Section IV, Charter ofRights and freedoms Task force Report (Calgary: Reform Party of Canada,
April 1996). This perspective on Reform’s position is corroborated by Steve Patten, “The Reform Party’s
Re-imagining ofthe Canadian Nation,” Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1999); and
Tom flanagan, Waitingfor the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995).
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their party policy convention in 1991. Among the measures adopted included an end to
the policy ofmulticulturalïsm in response to the alleged need to foster a common national
identity, and the abolition ofthe Department ofMulticulturalism.37 Three years removed
from the passage ofthe Multiculturalism Act the Progressive Conservatives now accepted
the notion that the encouragement by the federal govemment of an ethnïcally diverse
citizenship would breed politically dangerous resentments and undermine Canadian unity.
This is consistent with the PC position outlined in their 2000 electoral platform:
“Canadians broadly support and celebrate the richness of a society where people of
different ethnic and cultural backgrounds live and work together... Nevertheless, many
people feel that personal culture and ethnicity are best nurtured in the hands of
individuals and families... This diversity can best 5e promoted and supported by dynamic
community organizations as an expression of active Canadian citizenship.”38
While the other major federal party had flot necessarily adopted the view that
multiculturalism was a disintegrative force in Canadian society, by the mid-1990s the
Liberal govemment of Jean Chrétien would become increasingly sensitive to the public
perception that multiculturalism fwstrated attempts at greater inter-ethnic toleration.
Moreover, the relatively stable acceptance and defence of multiculturalism by the
Liberals gave way to an increasing reluctance to defend the policy from its critics,
36 DelIa Kirkham, “The Reform Party of Canada: A Discourse on Race, Ethnicity and Equality,” in Vic
Satzewich, ed., Racisrn and Social Inequality in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of
Resistance (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 199$).
Progressive Conservative Party, Resolution Guide from the 1991 General Meeting and National Policy
Conference (Ottawa: August 6-10, 1991).
38 Progressive Conservative Party, The Progressive Conservative Plan for Canada future (Progressive
Conseiwative ?arty of Canada, 2000), 21.
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inciuding those from within the party. John Nunziata, a Toronto-area MP and one time
contender for the Liberal leadership, spoke out on several occasions about his
dissatisfaction with the policy. Although a rninority position with the Liberal party,
Nunziata’s view was that the poiicy had served its purpose for a limited period of tirne,
but “instead ofundercutting the concept ofsecond-class citizenship, rnulticulturalism
[had] encouraged it by preventing the full integration of ail ethnic groups into mainstream
Canadian society”.39
While the growing opposition to multiculturaiism among Liberals and Progressive
Conservatives reflected judgements of the policy effectiveness, it aiso confirrned the
response to gains in popular support by the Reform Party. For the Progressive
Conservatives, whose traditional constituent base was a target for Reform, this was
especially true. The threat posed by a new Western-based, centre-nght party meant the
Progressive Conservatives wouid increasingly be subject to criticism over the party’s
perceived central Canadian bias, its defence ofmulticulturalism and officiai bilingualisrn,
and a host of social policies Reform considered objectionable. The speculation over
inroads made by Reform in Western Canada in the mid- Ï 990s was confirmed by polis
showing that the surge in support had corne iargely at the expense of disgruntled
Progressive Conservatives.4° As a resuit, Progressive Conservative Party organisers were
likely to have assessed the Reform Party as a bigger threat to their chances of forming a
govemment than the fledgiing Bloc Québécois.
Andrij Wynnyckyj, “Scholar and politician square off in multiculturalism prizefight,” The Ukrainian
Weekly (June 30, 1996) No. 26, Vol. LXIV.
° Neil Nevitte, A. Biais, E. Gidengil and R. Nadeau, Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election
(Toronto: OU?, 2000), 90.
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It followed then that when opponents of multiculturalism weighed into the debate
the federal govemment was reluctant to offer a strong vindication of the policy. Tied up
in the budget reduction exercises and national unity projects ofthe decade, the
Progressive Consewatives and Liberals were generally unwilling to rally behind the
policy. With this passivity it became obvious that the activism of the 1 980s responsible
for creating a Multïculturalism Act and a separate department would flot be matched.
Into the first years ofthe decade ofthe 1990s, both the market-liberal philosophy
of the govemment and the end of the all-party commitment demonstrated that the policy
was under sufficient pressure to require that its premises be re-examined. The federal
govemment which had previously committed itselfto defend multiculturalism as an
inclusionary political discourse than strengthened rather than undermined Canadian
citizenship, appeared ill-prepared to defend the policy from its cntics. Once the
govemment began to show signs of doubt and signalled its flagging public commitment
the floodgates were open to let others within the agenda-setting network question the
utility of state supported diversity. In fact, as the decision to abolish the Department of
Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1993 made clear, the federal govemment not only
confirmed an unwillingness to defend the policy, it became actively concemed with ways
of mitigating the source of the criticism.
Commissions and Constitutional Accords
In the spring of 1991, the federal govemment responded to the failure ofthe
Meech Lake Accord by setting up a consultative mechanism by engaging Canadians
directly on the subject of national unity. The Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s future was
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designed to “get Canadians taiking among themselves about vital issues that faced a
perpÏexed nation: Quebec’s quest for a new relationship with the rest of Canada;
Aboriginal grievances and aspirations; officiai languages; ethnic and cultural diversity;
fundamental Canadian values; the economy; and Canada’s place in the world”.4’ The
ambitious focus ofthe Commission, however, did flot act as a medium for activating and
mediating citizen input into policy development. Nor was it especially designed to focus
on the main issues designed to revitalize Canada’s constitution. Rather, under the
leadership ofKeïth Spïcer it sought to provide Canadians with a “sense of engagement”
as weli as presenting a vehicle to vent their frustrations on a range oftopics.42
Notwithstanding this impression that the Commission was an exercise in public
relations, the almost boundiess mandate of the Commission was virtually unprecedented.
Also unparaileied were the public consultations, flot simply for the number ofCanadians
consulted, but for the divergent opinions about the sources and stresses on Canadian
unity. The Commission would uitimately hear forceful representations of Canadians’
dissatisfaction with their political processes and institutions. It is on the subject of
muiticuituraiism, however, that it is otherwise well remembered. In particular, it is
recognized for its somber portrayal of public reactions to multiculturalism policy, its own
policy recommendations in this regard, and the personal comments of its chairperson.
41 Govemment of Canada, Citizens ‘forum on Canada Future: Report to the People and Government of
Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 1
42 Such is the conclusion of Laurier Lapierre who served as the untitled “Director of Facilitation” for the
Citizen’s Forum. See, Institute on Governance, “The Citizen Engagement Round Table: Royal
Commissions and Task forces” (Ottawa: May 15, 1996), 3. Also, consult Leslie A. Pal and Leslie Seidle,
“Constitutional Politics 1990-92: The Paradox of Participation,” in How Ottawa Spends: 1993-94: A More
Democratic Canada?, ed. Susan Philips (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 143-202.
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In June of 1991, in the face of considerabie divergence on the range of issues
facing the country, and an accepted iack ofknowiedge among Canadians ofthe “basic
realities ofthis country”, the Commission delivered a remarkably coherent poiicy
proposai in the area of cultural diversity that elaborated both a new philosophy and a set
ofprogrammatic ideas for multicuituraiism. Individual cultural maintenance, integration
into the mainstream, and iimited govemment intervention were the comerstones of the
Commission’s articulation of public reaction to cultural diversity. In an informative
section on the subject of citizenship and identity, the Commissioners related their
perception that Canadians “overwhelmingiy” felt that being reminded of our “different
origins was iess useful in building a united country than emphasizing the things we have
in common”.43 The Commission noted, “Participants queried the focus on citizens’
ongins and celebrating hentage cultures, rather than embracing a uniquely Canadian
national character and celebrating our Canadian heritage”. At the same time, however,
the Commission argued that Canadians were generally disposed to view the country’s
ethnically and culturally diverse population as one of its most positive national
characteristics. for the Commission this last statement did flot appear to be at odds with
the view that a focus on differences was less useful in building unity. Conversely, when
the Commission was met with comments that suggested support for the notion that all
provinces were equai, an unequivocaily different approach was adopted. In Part III ofthe
Final Report the Commission noted the, “contradictions and puzzles we have found in
‘ Citizens ‘ forum on Canada future, 85.
Ibid., 86.
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some of the things participants said they value”.45 It then continues by offering a brief
history lesson and corrective of the “conventional understanding” of equality as applied
to Quebec’s place in the federation. The report notes:
Equality is a case in point. But what do they [participants] mean by equality? They
stressed equality among provinces - including Quebec - apparently without knowing
or recognizing that provinces are not perfectly equal, and neyer have been. Our
provinces joined confederation at different times on different terms. Bilingualism
was established by our constitution in parliament and the legislatures ofManitoba
and Quebec, but flot others; denominational school rights were established in
Ontano, Quebec, and Newfoundland, but flot in other provinces; there was a
provision for a special property and civil rights regime for Quebec, different from the
requirement in other provinces. There are special provisions in the Canadian Charter
ofRights and Freedoms that apply only to Quebec - and others that apply only to
Newfoundland to suit particular-circumstances and needs. Bntish Columbiajoined
Canada with the promise of a transcontinental railway. Thus, the notion of equality
of the provinces is neither as absolute nor as unbending as some of the participants
seem to believe.46
Although the Commission heard of the value attached by Canadians to cultural
diversity, it saw fit to recommend that federal govemment funding for multiculturalism
activities be eliminated. It also argued for a re-focusing of officiaI policy with a central
goal the welcoming of alI Canadians to an “evolving mainstream and thus encourage real
respect for diversity”.47 It remains uncertain what or who constituted this “mainstream”,
but the Spicer Commission appeared to demonstrate its inspiration by recommending that
national symbols of historical value be strengthened in order to dispel the perception,
especially among English-speaking Canadians, that unity was being ftagmented. As
Wsevolod W. Isajiw has argued, “The unequivocal implication was that the Canadian
Ibid., 117.
46 Ibid.
‘ Ibid., 129.
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national symbols are the traditïonai Anglo symbols taken from the British colonial history
and they include no room for any other ethnic symbols, save at best, for a few French
The other ethnic symbols threaten the stabiiity and unity ofthe country”.48
No such ambiguity couid be found in the personal comments of the
Commission’s chairperson. In an article in the Montreal Gazette a year before the
Commission was formed, Spicer equates state-funded multiculturalism with a
“muiticultural zoo”, in which there is “an anthology ofterrors: Baikanization, ethnic
politicians siphoning off political protection money, ghetto mentalities, destabilization of
Quebec leading to secession, reverse intolerance by immigrants for Canadian culture and
institutions, [and] devaluation of the very idea of a common nationality”.49 The most
cunous feature ofthese revelations, however, is not that Spicer made his own prejudices
towards multicuituraiism known; it is the possible motivations of a govemment that
appointed as chairperson an individual 50 openiy hostile to the very idea of
muiticulturalism.
for ail its reassurance that it remained committed to the policy, the Spicer
Commission ended up articulating ideas that broke with long established policy thought
and practice. Muiticulturalism was deemed worthy, but only as “personal and individuai
goals”. On this basis, arguments made by organizations such as the Canadian
Ethnocultural Council in support of multiculturaiism were to have little tangible impact.
The CEC’s comments, as reflected in the Commission’s report, were limited and iinked
Wsevolod W. Isajiw, “Minority Challenge to Majority Identity: Toward a Theory,” Paper Presented at
the XIVth World Congress of Sociology, Social Knowledge: Heritage, Challenges, Perspectives (Montreal,
Canada, July 28, 1998), 7.
‘ Keith Spicer, “Ottawa Should Stop Money for Multiculturalism,” Montreal Gazette, March 9, 1989, B3.
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with efforts to fight racism and discrimination. Whenever a positive case was to be made
for multiculturalism, the Commission was intent on focusing on the federal govemment’s
capacity to help minority comrnunities play an active role in Canadian society by
promoting race relations and cross-cultural understanding. Representations by groups like
the CEC were also limited in their influence by the nature ofthe consultative process.
This was flot an inquiry expressly designed to solicit advice from stakehoïder
organizations. In fact, their voices were displaced by the approximately 400,000
Canadians who took part in discussions, and more decisively, the willingness of the
Commission in matters such as multiculturalism to readily interpret their concerns.
Thus, the Commission’s public phulosophy was grounded in a belief in the
superiority ofthe private maintenance ofcultural diversity over public means, and a clear
judgment about the flawed legacy of multiculturalism policy. framed by this critique of
the policy the Commission presented its programmatic ideas. Canadian unity, public
debts and deficits, and the failure to explain the “real” requirements of ethnocultural
policy, ail became pretexts for an argument that there remained only one policy future for
multiculturalism. This was perhaps the central lesson drawn by the Spicer Commission in
its search for an accepted relationship between state and citizen, and it soon joined other
voices to inform policy-makers about the course of multiculmralism in Canada.
In sum, the Commission was valuable for the govemment because it legitimised
the view of multiculturalism as a policy that functioned primarily to battle racism and
discrimination rather than cultural retention. It did this openly by making the case for
private support for the presewation ofethnic heritage, but it also pointed to something
equally important for a government about to engage itself in another round of
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constitutional negotiations. It revealed that a ‘watering down” of multiculturalism could
serve the cause of Canadian unity by allaying fears that govemment policy weakened the
idea of a common nationality. Additionally, for a federal govemment that wanted to
demonstrate that federalism was capable of reforming itself in directions that would bring
about a measure of constitutional peace, innovative ideas about multiculturalism would
be welcome.
Before the ink had dried on the Spicer Commission’s report, the federal
govemment hurriedly resurrected the issue of constitutional reform. In the fali of 1991, it
was agreed that the federal govemment along with premiers of the provinces would enter
into negotiations on a new constitutional package. Quebec, for its part, although invited
to take part in these negotiations refused, citing the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord.5°
Although the original purpose of the Meech Lake Accord had been to bnng Quebec back
into the constitution, the ensuing public debate and opposition to distinct society
exacerbated feelings ofrejection and isolation in the province. The collapse ofthe accord
in the summer of 1990 triggered a surge of nationalist sentiment in Quebec and was
thereafier captured in the legislative position adopted by the provincial govemment.5’
Vowing to sit out the next round of constitutional negotiations, the Quebec govemment
50 Many in Quebec considered Charlottetown to be a step back flot a move forward compared to Meech
Lake. Sensing this, Premier Bourassa of Quebec would eventuallyjoin the negotiations. Afier ail, Bourassa
had committed his govemment to hoid a referendum in October of 1992, and he ciearly preferred to hold it
on a new constitutionai package rather than on sovereignty.
Two reports were commissioned in Quebec as a resuit ofthe Meech Lake Accord’s demise. The Aliaire
Report, a product of the constitutionai commiffee struck by the Quebec Liberai Party, prepared proposais
for the reform ofthe Canadian Constitution which were presented to the party’s convention in 1991. The
second report established by the Quebec National Assembly emerged from the work ofthe Béianger
Campeau Commission, which proposed a radical reduction in federal powers and responsibilities as weil as
calling for a referendum on Quebec sovereignty in 1992.
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passed a biil in the National Assembly requiring the govemment to hold a referendum on
sovereignty, or altematively a deal that was considered to meet Quebec’s demands for
renewing the constitution by the fali of 1992. Not only did the continuing resentment at
the rejection ofthe Meech Lake Accord fuel a sense of opinion in Quebec that any new
constitutional deal would have to go beyond the substance of Meech Lake, it had
significant repercussions in English Canada.
The crux of the problem for many outside of Quebec was that distinct society and
the Meech Lake Accord more generally had attempted to tip the scales toward the
creation flot just oftwo nations, but two nation-states with potentially different powers of
govemment and rights ofcitizenship. For those, in particular, who championed the
equality provisions ofthe Charter ofRights the distinct society clause was especially
problematic by endangenng the idea of a truly national citizenship.52 Ultimately, it was
argued, recognition of Quebec’s daim for special status would inevitably break down any
sense of common feeling between the two communities with the result that political
independence would then seem flot only logicat, but inevitable.53
For supporters of renewed federalism outside Quebec, institutional changes in the
Canadian polity in any new constitutional amendment would require a balancing act
52 According to Christopher Manfredi this belief stems from a general confusion in Canada between the
concepts ofequal citizenship and national citizenship. “The Charter undoubtedly promotes an ideal ofequal
citizenship, whose doctrine ofthe equal right to self-government leads to an argument for provincial
equality. However, contrary to what many critics assume, equality does not require sameness; indeed, it is
perfectly consistent with policy asymmetry.” In “The Charter and Federalism: A Response to Professor
Balthazar,’ McGitl Institutefor the Study of Canada, An occasional paper based on a seminar (September
25, 1997), 13.
This is modified interpretation of the familiar position against asymmetry articulated by Trudeau. The
former prime minister’s opposition to distinct society and the Meech Lake Accord in particular is detailed
in “Say good-bye to the dream ofone Canada,” Toronto Star, Wednesday, May 27, 1987; and in “A
Conversation with Pierre Elliott Trudeau,” Cita libre, Volume XXVI, No.1, febmary-March 1998.
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between support for the concept of provincial equality in English Canada and the
recognition of Quebec’s distinctiveness. In order to be faithful to the prevailing public
mood in Canada while stiil arriving at an agreeable political settiement meant that
concessions were likely in order. In part, these concessions were understandable as an
increasingly unpopular and embattled federal govemment scrambled to maintain
credibility and sustain its key constitutional priorities. Moreover, such concessions
underscored that the unity file was integral to federal objectives and took precedence on
the goveming agenda.
Joining the politicians this time around in the discussions over the Charlottetown
Accord were with the leaders ofthe main Aboriginal groups. Their inclusion in the
process demonstrated that the latest round of constitutional discussion was indeed going
to be sensitive to the idea of Canada prevailing outside Quebec. This included a
heightened awareness of the demands ofAboriginal peoples, especially in light of the
armed standoffbetween members ofthe Mohawk nation and the Canadian military over a
land daims issue near Montreal dunng the summer of 199O. It also indicated the
readiness of Canada’s political leaders to ensure that Aboriginal issues would be
accommodated alongside those of Quebec and English-speaking Canada.55
If attitudes regarding the constitutional question were shaped by the status of
Aboriginal people, the public commitment to ethnocultural diversity hardly registered.
The Oka crisis, as it became known, helped to increase the awareness ofthe concems ofAboriginal
peoples and led to the establishment ofthe Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
The depth ofthis assurance resulted in the inclusion ofseveral feamres, including: The inherent right to
self-government; the recognition ofAboriginal govemments as a third order ofgovernment; a definition of
self-government that was related to Aboriginal land, environment, language, and culture; and representation
in the Canadian Senate. See Canada, Consensus Report on the Constitution, Charlottetown, August 28,
Final Text (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1992).
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On the subject ofethnocultural diversity the federal govemment was only prepared to
make a statement of fact about the existence of Canadian diversity, and avoid the more
problematic term multiculturalism. In the Canada clause, a short section to be included as
part of the revised Constitution that became a central feature ofthe Charlottetown
Accord, the commitment of Canadians to ethnic and racial diversity would simply be
acknowledged.56 Absent in this preamble that acted to codify the definitive values ofthe
Canadian character was any mention of govemment response to ethnocultural diversity
through public poiicy. The complete section read, “Canadians are committed to racial and
ethnic equality in a society that includes citizens from many lands who have contributed,
continue to contribute, to the building of a strong Canada that reflects ils cultural and
racial diversity”.57 Comparing the treatment ofbilingualism to ethnocultural diversity in
the Canada clause, former chancellor ofthe University ofAlberta Peter Savaiyn observes
that, “Clause (d) says that “Canadians and their govemments are committed to the vitality
and development of officiai language minority communities throughout Canada.” But
clauses (e), (O, (g) and (h), which deal respectively with our commitment to racial and
ethnic equaiity, to human rights, to gender equality, and to the equality ofthe provinces,
say only that “Canadians are committed”, not “Canadians and their govemments.”58
There were two other noteworthy aspects ofthe federal govemment’s position on
ethnocultural diversity reflected in the discussions leading to the Charlottetown Accord.
The first was the govemment’s desire to illustrate the inequity of Canada’s existing
The Canada clause was designed to express ftindamental Canadian values and guide the courts in their
interpretations ofthe Constitution, especially the Charter ofRights.
Canada, Consensus Report on the Constitution, Section 2 (e).
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constitutional protection of group rights. While multiculturalism was entrenched in The
Charter in 1982, no similar recognition existed for Quebec’s distinct society. As a
consequence, in the federal govemment’s initial bargaining position entitled Shaping
Canada Future Together there would be no new commitment to muhiculturalism.59
Rather it spoke of multiculturalism’s inclusion in the 1982 constitution ostensibly as a
means ofhighlighting the “anomalous” omission ofa similar clause for Quebec. The
suggestion was that if multiculturalism (and Abonginal rights) deserved inclusion in The
Charter, Canada’s fundamental pledge on the rights of citizenship, then surely admission
and recognition of Quebec’s distinct society was as least as deserving.
The other issue which drew attention was the federal govemment’s decision to
reject the more generous recognition of ethnoculturaÏ diversity endorsed by the Special
Joint Commiftee on a Renewed Canada. Established by parliament to solicit input and
make recommendations on the federal proposais, the final text of the committee report
proposed a Canada clause which included “recognition ofthe irreplaceable value ofour
multicultural heritage.”6° Instead, the federal govemment and its partners omifted any
reference to multiculturalism and in its place restated the ethnic and racial equality rights
already guaranteed in Section 15 of The Charter.
In its presentation to the Speciat Joint Cornmittee on a Renewed Canada the
Canadian EthnocuÏtural Council noted its frustration over multiculturaÏism’s exclusion. It
58 Fil fraser, “Why multicultural groups say Yes to accord,” Toronto Star (Oct 8, 1992), A25.
Canada, Shaping Canada ‘s future Together: Proposais (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1991).
60 Canada, Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, Report ofthe Special Joint Committee on a
Renewed Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1992), 24.
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appeaied to the federal govemment to make sure that in the present constimtional round,
unlike the last, no “substantial group [was] lefi out this time”.61 It was flot simply
speaking about the absence of any govemment commitment to multiculturalism in the
text ofthe federai proposais; it bemoaned their absence from the negotiating table.
Dmytro Cipywnyk, president of the CEC pressed for representation in the constitutional
process in three ways: through officiai observer status at the multilateral meeting of
officiais and at the subsequent first ministers conference; at a constitutional conference
that should be heid with input from ordinary Canadians including representation of ethnic
and visible minorities; and through open sessions ofthe multilateral conference to discuss
the Canada clause.62 The request was rejected and in the negotiations that produced the
Charlottetown Accord the CEC would 5e granted observer status only as part of the
Native Council of Canada delegation.
The CEC’s main lobbying effort, however, was directed at modifying the Canada
clause in order that the piuraiistic and multicultural reality of Canada be recognized
rather than simply the country’s commitment to racial and ethnic equaÏity. What mattered,
therefore, was not simply the recognition of Canada’s commitment to racial diversity, but
that the accord was prepared to mention multiculturalism explicitiy. In the context of
Canada’s compiicated political reality this was not merely a question of semantics.
Constitutional recognition of multicuituralism would stand as a symbol of the national
government’s commitment to the policy and the legacy it invoked.
61 Canadian Ethnocultural Council, Canadafor ail Canadians: Building a Strong Canada through Respect
for Diversity, Submission to the House of Commons and Senate Special Joint Comniittee on a Renewed
Canada (Febniary 1992), 1.
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Ultimately, and notwithstanding their iimited involvement, the Canadian
Ethnoculturai Council, the Black Coalition ofQuebec, the Canadian Jewish Congress, the
German Canadian Congress, the Heilenic Canadian Congress of Canada, the National
Congress of Italian Canadians, ail supported the accord. Although they would have
preferred stronger wording on culturai diversity their overriding concem, as Dmytro
Cipywnyk explained to his own membership, was to keep Canada united.63 Despite the
endorsement, as well as the backing of the federai and provincial govemments, the
national referendum to approve the Charlottetown Accord went down to defeat on
October 24, 1992. Among the many obstacles the accord failed to overcome was the
perception that it conferred too much power on Quebec.64
In hindsight, even though Quebec’s demands were controversial they were
destined to be a central focus of the negotiations aimed at repainng national unity. Not
surprisingly, considerable attention during the negotiations was directed at working out a
compromise position on distinct society that was amenable to ail sides, but in due course
Quebec’s insistence that it be recognized constitutionaliy couid flot be circumvented. For
the same reasons, but with clearly different resuits, muiticulturalism was flot going to be
part ofthese negotiations. Not only was it deemed inconsequential to the larger purpose,
but it potentialiy compiicated the venture by broadening the contentious nature of the
accord. Reflecting a similar point of view, Peter Russell alieges that multiculturalism’s
62
“Minority groups demand status at unity talks,” Toronto Star, June 9, 1992, A7. The CEC also wanted
the notwithstanding clause to be repealed, but this demand was unlikely to have been taken seriously.
63 Canadian Ethnocultural Council, Ethno Canada, 14 (Ottawa, 1992), 1.
M There are, of course, many other interpretations for the accord’s failure. One can be found in Main No1,
“Deliberating a Constitution: The Meaning of the Canadian Referendum of 1992,” in Curtis Cook, eU.,
Constitutionat Predicament: Canada after the Referendum of]992 (Montreal: MQUP, 1994), 64-81.
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inclusion would have had a domino effect on like-minded constituencies. On the subject
of the Canada clause he notes,
This exercise in defining the essence ofa deeply diverse society was rapidly proving
to be a “mug’s game”. [If multiculturalism was incorporated] then people with
disabilities would protest exclusion of their right to equality. If the disabled had been
included, homosexuals, seniors, juniors, and Lord knows who else would complain
about their exclusion. Could there be any better way of stirring up suspicion and
resentment than handiing out doÏlops of ill-defined constitutional status to certain
segments of the population at the beginning of a revised constitution?65
In the end, while the process that produced the Charloftetown Accord could not
avoid the language and meaning of distinct society, and would even add the concept of
Aboriginal self-government, it could easily make due without multiculturalism. Not even
The Charters’ recognition ofmulticuÏturaÏism through Section 27 was sufficient to
guarantee its reappearance in the most recent constitutional round.66 Moreover, while
distinct society from this point forward would generate a symbolic meaning beyond ils
institutional content, it was clear that multiculturalism by 1992 had already achieved its
own notoriety. Thereafier, both were viewed as contributing to the constitutional impasse
that made unattainable efforts to reconcile the apparently divergent interests of Canada’s
political community.
Public Dissenters
What made the diminishing support for multiculturalism defensible at a political
level was that it was mirrored by wider reservations about the policy. As the Progressive
Peter H Russeli, Constitutional Odyssey: C’an C’anadians Become a Sovereign Peopte?, 2d ed.
(Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1993), 203-204.
On this issue see, Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Tim Nieguth, “Reconsidering the Constitution, Minorities
and Politics in Canada,” The Canadian Journal ofPoliticalScience, 33: 3 (2000): 486-49 1.
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Conservatives and Liberals were to discover in the Ï 990s, there was a growing critique of
multiculturalism in the media that was shared by academic observers and often reflected
in public discussions ofthe policy. This opposition to multiculturalism often paralleled
criticism at the party level, but indicated a newly focused and determined criticism in the
social sciences and popular press. In part, this reflected the development ofa more
resotute attack on the entire “equity agenda” in the 1 990s. But it would be mistaken to
characterize the trend as simply a “backlash” levelled at the changing nature ofjustice or
resentment conceming how ethnocultural causes were seen as being privileged by the
state. Intellectuals in Canada were, for the most part, engaged in a dialogue centred on the
rights and obligations individuals and communities enjoy or owe.67 In effect, the realïty
of ethnocultural diversity led to discussions about the ground rules goveming
membership and inclusion, but also of what kinds of matters were of legitimate public
concem. While thïs feil short ofproducing a consensus on the merits ofmulticultural
policy, consensus nonetheless existed over the need to make Canada’s multicultural
society work.
What made the mobilization of intellectuals in the debate over multiculturalism
possible in the 1 990s was the fractious debate over national unity. Constitutional failures
called into question, even discredited, the notion that existing political institutions could
hold the country together. Political and social commentators, mostly ftom English
They were less concemed, but keen observers, ofthe debate in the United States over muÏticutturatism’s
relationship to the legacy of slavery and institutional racism, or even the debate on political correctness. As
Roger Hewitt notes, there were disparate but related issues in various national contexts on the question of
multiculturalism, “that included responses within specific local communities to policies regarding
migration, community relations and racism, as well as the competition between political groups seeking to
appeal to such constituencies of interest”. White Backlash and the Politics ofMutticulturalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.
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Canada, took it upon themselves to offer new ideas as a way of breaching the impasse
and influencing public policy. Integral to this pattem of advice was the belief that Canada
stood at a crossroads; outdated images ofCanadian society and associated policies stood
as obstacles to needed reform. A number of themes were drawn together but rested
ultimately on the assumption that multiculturalism was unsuccessful as an exercise in
state sponsored social engineering.
These views were elaborated by a number of influential writers and academics
through a variety ofchannels, including popular non-fictions writings and more directed
academic investigations. Public dissenters may flot have outnumbered supporters ofthe
policy, but greater attention was focused on the critics because they were high profile
members ofthe literary and academic community, and because their objections
highlighted that the consensus on multiculturalism had clearly been fractured.
Among those voicing opposition to multiculturalism, one of the better known is
the writer Neil Bissoondath. In his book Selling Illusions: The Cuit ofliuÏticulturalism in
Canada (1994), the author equated state-flinded multiculturalism with the promotion of
ghetto mentalities, the destabilisation of Quebec in the federation, and reverse
intolerance. In short, Bissoondath brought together many ofthe familiar accusations
against multiculturalism in one highly publicized work.68 The author’s message received
considerable attention when it surfaced because of its insistence that the policy was based
on false pretences. It made two central daims. first, it assumed that those who
voluntarily sought a new life in Canada wouïd want to retain cultural aspects from their
68 In 1995 the Canadian Iiterary establishment awarded the Gordon Montador Prize to Selling Illusions for
the best Canadian book on contemporary social issues.
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country of origin. And more importantly, assuming that culture could be transplanted, that
it would not have the effect or blumng Canadian identity in the process.
Instead of facilitating integration necessary in even the most liberal societies,
Bissoondath suggested that multiculturalism had revitalized ethnic subcommunities with
their language usage and cultural pattems. The fear represented here is that Canadian
culture and society was in danger of fragmenting under the weight of a multitude of
distinctive cultural practices. This view was echoed by Richard Gwyn in Nationalism
Wïthout Walls. The Unbearable Lightness ofBeing Canadian (1995). In much the same
language as Bissoondath, Gwyn argued that multiculturalism fostered a form ofethnic
separatism amongst immigrants.69 Both books were best sellers in Canada and received
ample coverage in the popular media. Largely overlooked by the mainstream press,
however, was a deeper discussion by academics about the limits ofmulticulturalism.7°
Two works by prominent Canadian academics added to this debate. Focusing on
problems of long-term political disequilibrium, Kenneth McRoberts in Misconceiving
Canada. The Struggiefor National Unity (1997), highlighted the state’s role in
influencing national unity. As for multiculturalism, state intervention in the field of
cultural diversity was viewed as destabilizing an already delicate balancing act within the
Gwyn in fact goes much further and suggests that “Our state encourages [ethnic leaders] to maintain
what amounts, at worst, to an apartheid form ofcitizenship”. Nationalism Without Watts: The Unbearabte
Lightness of3eing Canadian (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), 234.
° In his analysis ofthe newspaper coverage ofmulticulturalism in the latter part ofthe 1980s, K.H. Karim
has noted that the policy was often portrayed as an obstacle to nation-building or supporting an inverse
racism. The author notes that newspaper columnists often focused on the power of ethnocultural
organisations and the perceived inability ofindividual members ofminority cultural groups to advance in
Canadian society without govemment funding. The more serious charge that multiculturalism unwittingly
contributed to racism in Canada, while less exhibited, was stiil recognised by Karim as a discemible trend.
Karim H. Karim, Perceptions about MuÏticutturalisrn: A Content Anatysis ofNewspapers, Acadernic Briefs,
Ethnoculturat Organisation Briefs, Attitude Surveys, and Ministeriat Correspondence. January, 1989
(Policy and Research, Multiculturalism Sector, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada).
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federation. At the intergovemmental level, constitutional deliberations were the focus of
much concerted effort by Canada’s politicians to balance the demands coming from
Quebec with those emerging from English Canada. Complicating these negotiations,
according to Ken McRoberts, was the legacy ofTrudeau’s national unity strategy, of
which muiticulturalism piayed a pivotai part. It weakened the cause of national unity, he
argued, by simuitaneousiy committing Canadians to the belief that to no culture was
distinct, while confirming for Quebec francophones the intransigence of the federal
system to respond to their distinctiveness.71 Here the specific charge levelied against
multiculturalism was that it undermined Quebec’s sense of aftachment to Canada. At a
time when Canadians were coming to terms with Quebec’s demands for recognition as a
distinct society in the constitution, the message ofmuiticuituraiism — that there are no
officiai cultures — undermined the credibility of Quebec’s demands in the eyes of English
Canada. In other words, the balancing act that a policy ofmulticulturaiism within a
bilingual framework was supposed to achieve had failed.
The probiem then for those scepticai about the achievements and costs of
multiculturalism is that they emphasize a definition of muÏticulturalism that they view as
incompatible with minority nationaiism. This perspective considers multicuituralism to
be a politicai conception based iargely on inherited characteristics that identifies
individuals with one or more ethnicaliy based groups seeking preservation or protection
oftheir differences.72 In short, it does not treat ethnoculturai affiliation as voluntary.
71 Misconceiving Canada: The Struggiefor National Unity (Toronto: OUP 1997), 135.
72 This is the characterization of “pluralist’ multiculturalism by the American author David Hollinger. See,
Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995).
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Reginald Bibby in the book Mosaic Madness: The Poverty and Potentiat ofLfe
in Canada (1990), makes a much more broad charge against multiculturalism. He
laments how multiculturalism is driven by the contemporary view that ail cultures are of
equal value. Moreover, he suggests that the “goal of a just society, [hasJ succeeded in
providing individuals, groups and institutions with unprecedented freedom”.73 This
excessive individualism, he explained, coupled with subjective preferences undercut the
bonds ofunity and posed a serious threat to social life in Canada. This view of
multiculturalism as a form ofrelativism is thought to relegate nation-building to a
secondary, if not elusive, goal.74 Like Bissoondath and Gwyn, this argument sought to
cast doubt on the daim that unity could be fashioned out of diversity, and in its place
maintained that if all we have in common is our diversity, do we really have anything in
common at ail?
In the afiermath oftwo unsuccessful constitutional accords, and a siim victory for
federalism in the 1995 Quebec referendum, it was flot uncommon for Canadian
intellectuals to weigh into the debate on Canadian unity. Beyond the broad consensus on
the need for new ideas and their desire to supply them, by the mid- 1 990s there was a
general appeal by a group of dissenters to see a retooled or abandoned multicultural
policy as a preferred vehicle for change. 0f course these ideas were themselves
Reginald Bibby, Mosaic Madness: The foverty and Potential ofLfe in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart,
1990), 27.
Me suggests that in the service ofpluralism we are not very loyal to anything except to a “tenuous
willingness to coexist.” Ibid, 95. This kind of thinking has led some commentators to hold Bibby up as a
luminary with urgent advice in many areas. For example, Carol Goar, Toronto Star syndicated columnist
submits; “Bibby. . .forces us to rethink our image as a nation.. .He helps us to understand why federalism is
breaking down, relationships are disintegrating and single-interest groups are proliferating. He looks
beyond our symptoms — and points to the causes ofour distress.” Toronto Star (Oct 20, 1990), D4.
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contested. Several eminent Canadian thinkers, among them Wiil Kymiicka and Charles
Taylor, were prepared to make an argument that state policy could simultaneously
recognise ethnocultural diversity and Canada’s muiti-nationai character. In effect, they
separated the two things which the Reform Party, Bibby and other public dissenters had
lumped together.
For Kymiicka, what hoids multinational and multicultural nations together in the
absence of any common or shared history? Their great variance in historical, cultural, and
political situations suggests that no one solution is likely to apply in ail cases. However,
he notes: “What is clear, I think, is that if there is a viable way to promote a sense of
solidarity and common purpose in a multinational state, it will involve accommodating,
rather than subordinating, national identities. People from different national groups will
only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within which their
national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated”.75 This situation is complicated
when one introduces to multinationaiity a plurality of ethnie groups. In such a situation,
Kymlicka admits, we need a theory ofwhat Charles Tayior lias called “deep diversity” —
which revolves around the idea of accommodating flot only a diversity of ethnocultural
groups, but also a diversity ofways in which the members ofthese groups belong to the
larger polity.76
These ideas, and the debates they have engendered, would become important
counterweights to the perception that multiculturalism necessarily weakened national
1 Wi1J Kymiicka, Multicultural Citizenshtp: A Liberal Theoy ofMinority Rights (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 189.
76 Charles Taylor, “Shared and Divergent Values,” in Optionsfor a New Canada, eds. R. Watts and D.
Brown (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1991), 75.
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unity. Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s the assumptions and prescriptions ofthe public
dissenters alongside govemment inquiries and constitutional failures served only to
reinforce the perception that a policy review, at the very least, was inevitable.
5.2 Embracing Ideas: Mutticutturatism and the New Poticy Consensus
By the end of their second term in office it became apparent that the Progressive
Conservative govemment had abandoned its commitment to a reinvigorated multicultural
agenda. Alongside the interest in safeguarding their political terrain from the Reform
Party, the Progressive Conservatives increasingly focused on expenditure control and
reducing the role ofthe federal state in both the social and economic spheres. For
multiculturalism, this meant a wholesale change in its profile within the federal cabinet in
addition to deep cuts in program spending.77 These changes were a far cry from the “real
progressa in the area of equality that ffie Progressive Conservative Party had promised in
its 1984 policy on multiculturalism, and the recommendations made by the 1984 Special
Parliamentary Committee Report on Visible Minorities.78 But these changes were
squarely in une with the judgement within the government that multiculturalism had
become problematic. A key indicator of multiculturalism’s performance during this period
was the 1991 national survey commissioned by the Department ofMulticulturalism and
The reduction in spending on multiculturalism grants from 1990-91 to 1993-94 was approximately $30
million, which represented a decline of 42%. (Canada, Spendiiig Estimates, years 1990-1991 and 1993-94).
Lamenting the fali ofthe Conservative’s multicultural agenda, Andrew Cardozo head ofthe Canadian
Ethnocultural Council argued that the party and the govemment eventually went “soft” on the policy that
had proved politically expedient in the 198$ federal election. See, ‘On Guard for Multiculturatism”.
Canadian forum (April 1994), 16.
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Citizenship.79 While the notion that multiculturaÏism hinders national unity was flot
supported in the survey, the more common critique in the media and among academics
that the policy suffered from ambiguity was inferred from its findings.8° In explonng the
dimensions of multiculturalism in the survey there was undoubtedly a certain amount of
confusion as to who the policy was designed to serve. Respondents offered differing
interpretations, rangïng from “Canadïans ofevery ancestry” to “aboriginal peoples”.8’ A
somewhat more disconcerting finding for the govemment was that fiuly 25% of
respondents to the suiwey indicated no awareness of the federal multiculturalism policy
whatsoever.
While the findings of the 1991 survey provided a focus for the further
development and refinement of multicultural policy, the action taken by the federal
government in subsequent policy decisions seemed to run counter to their meaning.
Clearly the existing support for multiculturalism among respondents should have eased
suspicion that the policy lacked public endorsement. $imilarly, the positive view of the
impact of multiculturalism on Canadian life suggested support for the notion that the
policy was contributing to a sense ofbelonging rather than detracting from it. Moreover,
it remained clear form the level of awareness and understanding of multiculturalism that
still more had to be done by the federal govemment in the way of public education and
Angus Reid Group, Canadiens and Mutticulturalisrn: National Survey ofthe Attitude of Canadiens,
Report presented to Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, August 1991.
80 Supported by a subsequent study, the evidence from the 1991 national survey suggests that attitudes
towards multiculturalism were positive, and that tolerance as a whole was moderately high among
Canadians. See, J.W. Berry and R. Kalin, “Multicultural and ethnie attitudes in Canada: An Oveiwiew of
the 1991 National Survey,” Canadian Journal ofBehavioural Science, 27, 1995, 301-320.
SI Canadians and MutticuÏturaÏisrn: National Survey ofthe Attitude ofCanadians, 5.
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communication ofmuiticultural objectives. In this context, the elimination in 1993 ofthe
Department ofMulticulturalism and Citizenship, a visible expression ofthe govemment’s
commitment to supporting its multicuituralism policy, was unexpected.82
In contrast, the election ofa new government in 1993 and the promise of an
innovative agenda for goveming suggested a retum to an activist federal state and
perhaps even a renewed multicultural policy focus. Relying on a policy manifesto dubbed
the “Red Book”, the Liberals proclaimed support for multiculturalism and vowed to take
measures to combat hate propaganda and promote toierance and mutual understanding.83
While far from a making multicuituralism a pnority of govemment, the expectation of
change in a number ofpolicy fields leU observers to believe that the Liberal’s agenda
would represent a departure from the Progressive Conservative record of deficit reduction
and public sector downsizing. However, for ail the talk of charting a new course the
Liberals govemed with a fiscal agenda remarkably similar to the one followed by their
Progressive Conservative predecessors. In fact, as McBnde and Shields have argued, the
Liberals moved to implement a neo-Iiberal agenda with greater vigour than the
Progressive Conservatives.84
The vehicle for this public management, the program review, heralded a major
structural change in govemment activities. The true impact ofthe changes would be felt
82 The department was folded into the new super-ministry Canadian Heritage as part ofthe pre-election
cabinet ofKim Campbell. As Abu-Laban points out, Gerry Weiner’s former titie “Minister of
Mutticulturalism and Citizenship” was downgraded to ‘Minister for Citizenship”. See, “The Politics of
Race, Ethnicity and Immigration: The Contested Arena ofMulticulturalism,” in James Bickerton and
Main-G. Gagnon, eUs., Canadian Politics (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999), 251.
83 Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada (Ottawa: 1993), 86.
84 Stephen McBride and John Shields, Dismantiing a Nation: The Transition to Corporate Rule in Canada.
2” ed. (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997), 11.
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in 1995 with the release ofthe federal budget. In the document the federal govemment
announced its decision to reduce the federal deficit by $13.6-billion over the next two
years through major cuts in spending.85 In general these cuts were fiscally driven and tied
to public sector reforms designed to reign in the national debt. It soon became clear that
govemment departments in their drive to achieve more effective and efficient govemance
would target policy fields that were considered weak performers.86
In matters ofmulticulturalism, therefore, the Liberal govemment picked-up where
the Progressive Conservatives lefi off. Not only did they concur with their predecessors
about the need to downsize and amalgamate govemment departments, but they
determined that there was justification for further spending cuts. Rather than restore
multiculturalism to full departmental level, the Liberal govemment under Jean Chrétien
assigned the policy area to a junior ministry known as the Secretary of State,
Multiculturalism and the Status of Women.87 Still within the super-ministry of Canadian
Heritage, multiculturalism would now be grouped alongside a host of other policy areas
relating to Canadian identity, cultural development, gender equality, heritage, national
parks, amateur sport, and the arts. One ofthe other areas to be targeted was the funding of
85 Almost $7 in expenditure reductions for every Si in new tax revenues was proposed. See, Canada,
Budget speech by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, Feb. 1995.
86 As Leslie Pal notes, the Department of Finance provided six test questions to guide the policy review
process: serving the public interest; necessity ofgovernment involvement; appropriate federal role; scope
for public sector/private sector partnerships; scope for increased efficiency; and affordability. Canada,
Budget 1995 fact Sheets — 6, cited in Leslie A. Pal, Beyond Folicy Analysis: Public Issue Management in
Turbulent Times, Second Edition (Scarborough: Nelson, 2001), 79.
g While part ofthe Canadian Ministry, the nine secretaries ofstate created in the first Chrétien govemment
were not invited to Cabinet.
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ethnocultural organisations through multiculturalism’s program assistance.88 As the
Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Canadian Heritage Roger Collet was to
make clear, the drop in funding reflected the downsizing pressures placed upon the
department, but was also in une with efforts to gradually decrease core funding to
individual groups.89 Furthermore, as Mr. Collet pointed out, funding was progressively
directed towards race relations’ initiatives, whether through projects specifically set up
and recognised to that end or through anti-racism campaigns.
The diminishing level of support for individual ethnocultural organisations was
indicative ofthe govemment’s aftempt to bring program spending in une with criticism of
the multicultural sector of the Department of Canadian Heritage. In fact, on several
occasions members ofthe department acknowledged that their efforts to redefine the
multiculturalism program stemmed from a heightened sensitivity of the perceived
divisiveness of the policy.9° In the context of heightened criticism and mounting fiscal
restraint exercised by the Department of Finance it was flot surprising that the entire
multiculturalism program would eventually be put to review.
88 In this respect the Liberals clearly continued the work undertaken by the Conservatives. In 1993-94,
program spending accounted for $25 million of the Canadian Heritage budget, by 1998-99 the forecast was
approximately $17 million (Canada, Spending Estimates, years 1993-1994 and 1998-99).
89 Canada, Flouse ofCommons, Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, Evidence, 35th Parliament,
Second Session (March 26, 1996), 12. The drop in funding to interest and advocacy groups across federal
departments is explored in detail by Andrew Cardozo, ‘Lion Taming: Downsizing the Opponents of
Downsizing,” in How Ottawa $pends, 1996-1997: L/è Under the Knfe, ed. Gene Swimmer (Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1996).
° Both the Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister ofthe Citizenship and Canadian ldentity branch
ofCanadian Heritage have emphasised before the House ofCommons Committee on Canadian Heritage,
that the multiculturalism program is concemed with ways of building a cohesive society in une with the
comments (which included the reservations about the policy) from committee members and the public. See,
for instance, Canada, Flouse of Commons, Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, Evidence, 35th
Parliament, Second Session (March 31, 1996), and Canada, Flouse ofCommons, Standing Committee on
Canadian Heritage, Evidence, 35th Parliament, Second Session (March 26, 1996).
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The New Program Takes Shape
In the spring of 1995, an examination ofmulticulturalism programming activities
was undertaken and included: an analysis of funding and program delivery; demographic
projections; an assessment of activities across the federai govemment in support of
multiculturalism; a review of multiculturalism policies across Canada and intemationally;
surveys on public attitudes; and an in-depth examination of relevant research on
muiticuituralism and diversity.9’ While the scope ofthis investigation was wide, it was
apparent that the comerstone ofthis process was the strategic review performed by the
private firm Brighton Research.92 A small controversy was created when a drafi copy of
the report was obtained by the media in October of 1996, which precipitated the public
release of the final report by the govemment. In a news release announcing the disclosure
ofthe document Hedy fry, Secretary of State (Multiculturalism & Status of Women),
supported the objectives ofthe Strategic Evaluation while distancing the govemment
from some of its recommendations. She submitted:
This report is only one small part of a larger review of ail multiculturalism programs.
Program review is part of a govemment-wide effort of ail federal departments to
ensure that programs are effective, efficient and resuits onented. This government is
commitment to multiculturalism policy as a core component ofCanadian identity.
However, we need to ensure that programs keep pace with change and meet the
needs of a diverse society... While I do flot agree with ail of the recommendations of
the Bnghton Report, it clearly supports the mandate of multiculturalism programs,
and points out that flinding should be based on ability to meet program objectives.
This kind ofaccountability makes common sense and does flot preclude
ethnocultural organisations from receiving funding.93
91 Canada, Department ofCanadian Heritage, The ContextforRenewal(April 17, 1997), 1.
92 The release ofthe Brighton Report coincided with the 25” anniversary ofmulticuÏturalism as official
state policy.
Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage, Report on Multiculturatisrn Reteased - News Release
(October 17, 1996), 1.
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Although supportive ofmultïculturaïism, the Brighton Report was critical ofa
number offactors deemed to have impeded Canada’s pursuit ofa socially cohesive,
polyethnic society. Included in this iïst was the suggestion that the federal government
had contributed to the uncertainty and ambiguousness ofthe policy. Citing a iack of
clarity in communicating its promises and accompiishments, the report called on the
govemment to ciearly articulate the goals of a redesigned program with particular
emphasis on promoting multiculturalism as a poiicy that contributes to cohesion rather
than separateness.94 To such an end, a recommendation was made to refrain from
initiatives unreiated to identity, participation and justice “because such initiatives appear
to many Canadians to weaken the Canadian fabric”.95 The authors ofthe report go on to
press for a refocusing ofprogram objectives by advocating an end to direct funding for
ethnocultural organisations. Quoted here at length they maintain:
Notwithstanding the desires ofsome community members, the funding ofethno
specific organizations should not continue in its present form. Past funding practices
have reinforced the impression that multiculturalism is a “program for special
interests”, rather than a program for ail Canadians. In distinction to what in the past
lias appeared to some people to be “programming for special interests”, the Minister
shouid make clear that ail Canadians — rather than sub-groupings of Canadians —
are the recipients ofthe benefits ofmulticuituralism. A focus on Canadians,
generally, is in keeping with the value of universality which Canadians share with
regard to important social programs. An important implication ofthe focus on ail
Canadians is that activities carried out under the banner of muiticuituraiism should
be conducted by the public agencies and organizations that shape the public life of
Canadians — rather than through institutions or agencies representing sub-groups
within the Canadian population.96
Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage, Strategic Evaluation ofliutticuÏturalism Programs, final
Report, Corporate Review Brandi (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996). 72. Known as
the Brighton Report.
Ibid., 75.
96 Ibid., 76.
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Whlle the familiar Iitany of charges against multiculturaiism are evaluated
(contributes to divisiveness, ghettoises ethnic communities, lacks focus, etc.), it is
interesting that the authors of the report do flot regard the declining level of overail
funding for multicultural activities to be a serious issue — nor do they appear concemed
with the reasons behind it.97 Not only does the report steer clear of the fundamental issue
ofmulticulturalism’s decline, it subscribes to the view that less is more. In other words,
through the elimination of direct funding to ethnocuitural communities and narrowing of
guiding principles, the govemment will be in a better position to argue that
multiculturalism serves ail Canadians, rather than “sub-groups” within the Canadian
population.
Alarmed by the content ofthe Brighton Report, and concemed that its voice was
being marginalized, the Canadïan EthnocuÏtural CounciÏ sought to influence the review
process. In March of 1997, the organization presented a critique ofthe Strategic
Evaluation in which it registered a range of concems.98 One of the many problems cited
was the discussion ofcitizenship — particularly the inability ofthe report to envision a
model of cïtizenship linked with ethnocultural identity. The CEC noted:
Citizenship, according to the {Brighton] model, occurs as a resuit of participation,
but there is no substantive indication ofwhat this means. Presumably, the poiicy goal
is to engage ethnocultural communities so that they may strengthen their civic
identity, but this can only be achieved by acknowledging and supporting the value of
culture which defines the social role of ethnocultural comrnunities. Without this, the
notion of participation in this particular case is meaningless. Additionally, given that
the cultural identities of ethnie communities constitute the shared identity of ail
It is somewhat ironic that this should be the case considering their professed aversion to the “new
conservatism” which they view as another obstacle to the achievement ofa multicultural society.
98 Canadian Ethnocultural Council, ‘Multiculturalism, Citizenship and the Canadian Nation: A Critique of
die Proposed Design for Program Renewal, Paper submitted to Mukiculturalism Program, Department of
Canadian Heritage, March 1997.
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Canadians, there is a political and moral imperative to channelling the idea of civic
participation through the filter of multiculturalism. The heritage and identity of the
nation is reinforced and enhanced in this way; to ignore it, however, is to deny flot
only its validity but its potential as well.99
Moreover, the generally positive reception by the federal govemment that met with
the release of the Brighton Report led the CEC to draw a broad conclusion about the
ongoing commitment to the policy. Again, on the theme of citizenship it suggested:
Citizenship, to be meaningful, must emphasize the opportunities for participation,
including the opportunity of cultural expression. The [Multiculturalism] Act
recognizes the importance of this when it directs the Govemment of Canada to
preserve, promote, and enhance Canadian multiculturalism. By contrast, the model
for program renewal adopts a reserved, if flot laissez faire, approach to civic
participation. This is unfortunate but also telling. That the Government of Canada
chooses to ignore the pro-active elements of the policy highlights a certain level of
non-commitment. The CEC can only conclude from this shift in emphasis that there
is movement away from the original policy.’°°
In Apnl of 1997, with seemingly littie influence from stakeholders and with the
findings and observations of the Bnghton Report in hand, the Department of Canadian
Heritage announced its redesigned multiculturalism program. Not surprisingly the
redesigned program responded directly to the key recommendations ofthe Bnghton
Report. Among the issues reflected in the new multiculturalism program is the carefully
worded attempt to avoid initiatives that appear to reinforce the perception that
multiculturalism weakens the Canadian fabric. This has been done primarily, but flot
soÏely, by adding to the goals ofcultural retention and respect for diversity the notion of
active civic participation. The Department of Canadian Heritage argued that by
encouraging active civic participation multiculturalism will help foster an inclusive
Ibid., 4.
‘°°Ibid.
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society, yet the tone and the text of the Bnghton Report is more telling in this regard and
suggests another motive. By balancing its support for cuitural diversity against its
insistence that ail citizens should participate in shaping the future oftheir communities
and their country, the multiculturalism program can avoid criticism that it caters
exclusively to ethnocuiturai groups or works against national unity.
A second volley ofreforms was directed towards the funding ofmulticultural
programs. Again, concemed that past initiatives have been “ghettoising” for ethnocultural
minorities and have reinforced the suggestion that there are two culturai policies (one
mainstream and one for ethnic minorities); the redesigned multiculturalism program
would consider funding proposais based on objectives outlined by Canadian Hentage.
for ethnocultural organisations who were in the past the beneficiaries ofcore fiinding,
those wanting to secure funding from this point forward were iikely to have to do so on a
project-by-project basis.
The changes to the funding structure reveal, as suggested above, a dual strategy.
Rather than being merely concemed with reducing budgets and meeting deficit reduction
targets, the federal govemment has followed the recommendation of the Brighton Report
and has changed its fiinding assistance in order to ensure that it is not seen as catering to
speciai interests. furthermore, by adhering to a practice of funding “cost-effective
programs that show results”, the government is able to deflect criticism from opponents
ofthe reforms by suggesting that it is merely responding to the public’s desire for better
management of public finances and heightened reservations about the poiicy.’°’
There are at least two points to consider based on this sfrategy. First, notwithstanding the public’s
interest in controlling the federal deficit, it is difficuit to argue that Canadians were in favour ofthe level
and pace ofcuts to social spending in the mid-1990s. The second and more important point is whether the
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An interesting element of the redesigned multiculturalism program from a policy
perspective is how the stated goals of the redesigned program and the language used in
support of it reaffirmed the impression that multiculturalism was in a period of decline. In
her own assessment, prior to the 1995 review, Abu-Laban pointed to the changing
discourse surrounding multiculturalism at the federal level as one ofthe clear signs that
the policy had undergone a transformation. In her estimation, this transformation was
primarily evident in the underscoring ofthe “equity” as opposed to the “identity” aspect
ofmulticulturalism.’°2 The author suggests that this change reflects opposition to the idea
of funding or maintaining the cultural identity of minority ethnic groups, as well as
“opposition to the notion that a collective Canadian identity should be based on
multiculturalism”.’°3 What is being abandoned in this formulation, she concludes, “is the
potential to also emphasise that whatever the differences that may exist between
individuals, as based on group membership, these differences should be treated with
equal respect and value”.104
The reluctance to emphasise the identity dimension of multiculturalism
demonstrated that the promotion of diversity was viewed by the Liberal govemment as
coming at the expense or complicating the cause of unity. In keeping with this position,
the redesigned multiculturalism program went to great lengths to stress the requirement
substance ofthe changes to multiculturalism, how the program was redesigned, reflected the views of
Canadians. If the 1991 national survey is any basis from which tojudge, it is a multiculturalism program
that actively supports and promotes equality within diversity that Canadians sought.
102 Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “The Politics of Race and Ethnicity,” 251.
103 Poid 254.
104 Ibid., 257.
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of an “active citizenship” on the part of ail Canadians.’°5 While vague on the details,
presumably this was designed to encourage members of ethnocultural communities to
adopt a sense of attachment and belonging to the larger (read majority) community, rather
than accentuating the differences that exist between Canadians. The contrast between the
redesigned program and the Multiculturalism Act is significant in this respect. Wbiie the
redesigned multiculturalism program spoke of active participation on the part of
Canadians, the Multiculturalism Act makes no mention of it, instead it holds that it is the
policy of the Government of Canada to “promote the full and equitable participation of
individuals and communities of ail origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of ail
aspects ofCanadian society” [my emphasis].’°6 Moreover, in accentuating the need for
multicultural programs to perform an integrative fiinction, the redesigned
multiculturalism program made little mention of the value attached to diversity for
Canadian society. Conversely, the Multiculturalism Act underlines the commitment of
govemment to “promote the understanding and creativity that arise(s) from the
interaction between individuals and communities ofdifferent origins”.107
By promoting integration and social cohesion as guiding principles ofthe
redesigned muiticulturalism program, the federal govemment reflected the collective
anxiety ofthe policy’s opponents. Yet, no one who supports the principle ofcultural
diversity believes that the government should arrange its muiticulturalism policy to suit
105 Developing “active citizens’ under the banner of civic participation was consideted one ofthe
fundamental goals ofmulticulturalism (the other goals are related to identity and social justice).
106 Canada, House ofCommons, But C-93 An Actfor the Preservation andEnhancement of
Multiculturalism in Canada. Passed July 12, 1988, 3(c).
107 p0jj 3(g).
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ail the differences that exist within cultures. As Anne Phillips has argued; “No society
could organise its political affairs, or sustain any semblance of national unity, if it
fragmented the citizens into a thousand sub-groups, each with its own daims to
representation. But we do flot have to choose between an unstoppable logic of further
fragmentation and naïve assertions of indivisible unity”.’°8
But in its search for the middle ground the Liberal govemment threatened to
erode the symbolic character of multiculturaÏism. Multiculturalism, like other institutions
designed to manage diversity, has a strong symbolic component that provides members of
ethnocultural communities with a context for understanding our society’s views on
tolerance, justice, and identity. It is an also environment within which individuals and
groups seek recognition oftheir identities. By impiying that the recognition ofdifferent
identitïes is frauglit with danger, or that it is flot the role of govemment to affect the
distribution ofresources among individuals, a clear message was sent to those seeking
inclusion about the terms oftheir acceptance.
Conclusion
This chapter analysed the institutional-political dynamics of multiculturalism
reform in the criticai decade ofthe 1990s. Afier more than twenty years of debate and
adjustment, a new policy model was embedded that overtook pre-existing views about
the responsibility ofa government to recognise and actively support Canada’s diversity.
We argued that the stage for this shifi was conditioned by a govemment predisposed to
arguments about the iogic of market-countervailing practices of the modem welfare state.
108 Anne Phillips, “Why Worry About Multiculturalism.” Dissent. Winter: 1997, 61.
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At the same time we demonstrated that policy outcomes are the product of a more
complex logic than the automatic dispiacement of one paradigm by another. In the case
of multiculturalism, neo-liberal ideas interacted with the growing fear about the
potentially destabilising effects ofmulticultural recognition to produce policy change. A
range of causal factors ultimately interacted with ideas to make this possible. 0f
particular significance was the organisation of political interests, intellectual opposition,
and the constitutional batties waged on the national unity front in the early 1990s.
While the focus of state activity in the 1 990s had shified from the use of
govemment for broad social improvement to the focus of public attention to deficit and
debt reduction, the consequences for multiculturalism were flot predetermined. By the
mid- 1 990s a stream of analysis and criticism of federal multicultural policy helped to
solidify the concems ofvarious social interests into coherent policy discourses. The
coalescing of ideas within the agenda setting network acquired a certain resonance within
the federal party system, allowing for a convergence of opinion among the Liberals and
the Progressive Conservatives on the future direction of multiculturalism.
In the years between 1991 and 1996, an appreciable decline in support for
muhiculturalism was the result. Despite the fanfare surrounding the establishment of the
Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, its tenure was brief. Within two years of
its creation by the Progressive Conservative government, the department was abandoned
and for the first time in twenty-one years the multiculturalism portfolio was dropped from
the federal cabinet. As part of a major reorganisation of govemment departments that
ensued, the portfolios of Multiculturalism and the Status of Women were combined in
1993 and transferred to a new “super-ministiy” the Department of Canadian Heritage.
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Both portfolios were represented within the DCH by the newly established “secretary of
state”, ajunior ministerial level that was flot directly represented in cabinet.
Multiculturalism’s move to the Department ofCanadian Heritage was SOOfi followed by
the election of the Liberal govemment of Jean Chrétien in 1993. The retum ofthe
Liberals to power following a nine-year absence stirred debate about multiculturalism,
notably about future prospects for the policy that had been subjected to budgetary
pressures under the previous govemment. Providing additional impetus for the discussion
over multiculturalism’s future was the Reform Party, whose unequivocal opposition to
multiculturalism would become a prominent feature ofthe party’s platform. Reform’s
objection to multiculturalism combined with the spectre offurther reductions to
departmental and program spending by the Liberals, provided a backdrop from which to
reassess the merits ofthe policy.
With respect to national unity, in the first haif of the decade the federal
govemment wanted to demonstrate that federalism was capable ofreforming itself in
directions that would appeal to Quebec francophones and restore national unity. This
could only be done by challenging the perception that “status quo” federalism, or the
absence of any evolution in federal-provincial relations towards meeting calis for change,
was the prevailing wisdom within the central govemment. After the failure of the Meech
Lake Accord this meant devising a balancing act between support for the concept of
provincial equality in English Canada and the recognition ofQuebec’s distinctiveness.
This agenda had no interest in promoting multiculturalism, nor the sources of
ethnocultural unity which affirmed a public commitment to diversity and Canadian
citizenship. Not only was the policy trivialised by the federal govemment in the process
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that produced the Charlottetown Accord, but the Spicer Commission openly legitimised
the view that multiculturalism was worthy only as a personal pursuit. And while the
arguments put forward by “world class philosophers” such as Kymlicka and Taylor may
have served as counterweights to the negative assessments of multiculturalism, and
provided the Liberal govemment with an opportunity to see continued value in the policy,
the perception remained that reform was needed.
Viewed from this perspective, the federal govemment consciously chose to
reconsider the terms of ethnocultural integration by questioning whether multicultural
demands posed a threat to Canadian unity. Confronted with mounting criticism and its
own reservations about the policy, the federal govemment looked to policy review as a
means by which its fiscal priorities could be achieved and its concerns about
multiculturalism addressed. For multiculturalism this came to mean budget cuts — but
more importantly it led to a wholesale change in its profile within the federal
govemment. Dunng the review of multiculturalism programs in 1996-1997, the federal
government remarked that while spending was being curbed, their commitment to
multicultural principles remained intact. In essence, they argued that program spending
could be separated from the purely symbolic tenets upon which the policy rested. The
reform measures, however, indicated a tendency to consider the symbolic/cultural
dimensions of institutions and policies as secondary, as something to consider when the
“real” problems and issues have been deait with. During the 1990s, the debate over public
policies in Canada, as with multiculturalism, increasingly concentrated on economic and
material aspects.
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Yet multicuÏturalism policy was altered flot simply as a resuit ofthis rational
analysis ofeconomic costs and benefits. The perception that multiculturalism undermined
national unity was very much part of the govemment’s calculations, and as a
consequence, the very definition of what it means to be Canadian was being rethought.
Here the differences between the policy paradigms ofthe 1960s and 1990s are quite
striking. In the 1 960s, multiculturalism was bom out of a desire to promote cultural
differences as a public good, but also as a potential fou to Quebec nationalism. In this
sense mukiculturalism policy was created out of the ideas, attitudes, and beliefs
encapsulated in the prevailing national unity discourse of the period. In contrast, by the
late I 990s instead of recommitting itself to an inclusionary model of integration, the
federal government sought to cast doubt on the idea that citizenship in Canada could be
finnly rooted in the recognition ofcitizens with diverse origins. In its place, the new
vision of a multicultural society reflected the idea that the preservation of ethnocultural
identity was above ah a private pursuit, and Canadians shouhd not expect uniformity
between their private identities and the content of state policy. In effect, the activist era of
multiculturalism was over and with it the public commitment to reflect and respond to
Canada’s ethnocultural diversity.
CONCLUSION
Ethnocultural Diversity and Policy Reform
in the Canadian Political System
This thesis began by indicating the disagreement over the sources of unity in an
ethnoculturally diverse society. We maintained that finding morally defensible and
politically viable answers to the issues (or) concerns to which diversity gave rise went
beyond a philosophical task; it also required serious analytic attention to the role of
public institutions. To support this position we tracked the evolution ofmulticulturalism
policy in Canada — from generation and implementation to reformulation
— across four
decades. We proposed that multiculturalism has served as a vehicle for adjusting the
terms of integration as well as contributing to our understanding of citizenship. This
perspective was consistent with an understanding of citizenship as a system of inclusion
and exclusion in which state institutions recognise different categories of citizens with
particular rights and daims. We argued that changes in multiculturalism policy would
therefore affect the rights exercised by a range of Canadian citizens and for their
recognition as citizens by the state more generally.
To carry out the historical-institutional analysis required by this case study the
policy paradigm and the agenda-setting network concepts were used to develop and
understanding ofpolicy choice and historical change.’ Here the proposition was advanced
that during periods of contestation policy disputes are often marked by conflicting ideas
about change derived from fundamental beliefs about politics and economics. Yet we
claimed that policy outcomes are also explained by a range of causal factors that interact
‘As noted in chapter 1, this studyts interest in the interaction between ideas and interests in institutional
settings might also be understood to follow an institutional-interpretative approach.
231
232
with ideas, including the organisation ofpolitical interests within the agenda-setting
network. As such our research supported the position that ideas interact within specific
institutional contexts to produce policy change.
from the standpoint of trying to explain the emergence of multiculturalism policy
in the 1970s and 1980s, we focused on the role ofpolicy-making as an exercise in
political thinking. Political ideas were highlighted as an important determinant ofthe
policy process because they influenced the conceptualisation ofthe problem, and
underscored potential courses of action. We began by focusing on the emergence of
multiculturalism as part of a larger rights framework that has evolved over time.
Multiculturalism may have had its origins in the 1 960s, but developments ofthe late
1940s and 1950s laid the basis for several important changes that have shaped the
Canadian political landscape. These included; the growth ofthe postwar citizenship
regime based on the welfare state, the risc ofnew forms ofidentity politics, and the
liberalisation of Canadian society following an international trend towards individual
rights. Foremost among these transformations was the debate over identity concems and
the connection to membership in the Canadian political community. As we noted,
changes to citizensbip and immigration policy in the 1 960s were to provide a context
within which citizens of an increasingly diverse society could recognise themselves.
Recognising themselves in the values and meanings of these evolving institutions
provided reassurance that there was a growing congruence between their own identities
and public life. In short, the period demonstrated that public policy was capable of
assuring those whose values it reflected that Canada was a society capable of meaningfiil
recognition.
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Our focus on the interplay between ideas and institutions also led us to direct
attention to the first federal govemment of Pierre Elliofi Trudeau. Describing and
analysing Trudeau’s views on Quebec nationalism allowed us to understand the ideational
framework through which a national unity strategy was constructed. Even though the
national unity problem played a central role in the policy process from which
multiculturalism emerged, the story of the policy’s origin is flot limited to a single
explanation. Multicultural ideas gathered momentum and once engaged with the ideas of
a Just Society fuelled an affempt to deal with matters of cultural policy by
accommodating interests and filtering politics. The mobilisation of ethnocuhural groups
in response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism also figured as
an important causal factor. Although the presence of ethnocultural groups before the
Commission may flot have been sufficiently broad-based to independently move the
govemment to action, the capacity ofthe groups to make their identity daims known and
resonate with the Canadian state outweighed the significance oftheir numbers.
As introduced in the fail of 1971, the policy of multiculturalism was suggestive of
an environment shaped by the postwar citizenship regime where govemment intervention
was evident in several areas of social policy. And by the end of the 1 970s, an agreement
existed on the appropriateness of state support for ethnocultural groups with
multiculturaÏism as a key element in the symbolic expressions of Canadian citizenship.
This symbolic recognition, backed-up by institutional support, was significant in its own
right but must be understood as part of a larger rights ftamework that included more than
multiculturalism policy. The federal government’s commitment to diversity and the idea
of citizenship it supported were based on policies and initiatives such as immigration,
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human rights and social justice. In essence, the ideas and agendas associated within this
era did more than advance political interests, they revealed an attempt by state and
societal interests to fashion a consensus on how the boundaries of membership within a
polity should be defined; how the benefits and responsibilities of membership should be
allocated; and how the boundaries ofmembership should be understood and legitimised.
In the I 980s, the course of multiculturalism policy followed a fairly routine
practice where adjustments to various aspects of the policy took place without radically
altering the overali configuration of the policy regime. In effect this meant that on the
surface adjustments to the federal policy were ofien compatible with the existing policy
paradigm. for the long-term stability ofmulticulturalism, however, we argued that the
changing circumstances and ideas that were characteristic of this policymaking era would
ultimately serve to inspire efforts towards more fundamental change. In this regard we
saw the 1980s as a pivotai decade, one that proved not to be an era oftrue policy
innovation, but one that triggered intellectual and bureaucratic debate around new policy
goals and practices. Ideological considerations, in particular, were seldom absent from
policy calculations. Quite the opposite was true. The mid-1980s were a transition period
for Canadian politics and in particular for multiculturalism. We considered how new
ideas and agendas were introduced into the policy milieu that set out to challenge
established principles. Here the neo-Iiberal agenda ofthe Progressive Conservatives
figured prominently in our analysis. What was undeniable about the government’s agenda
was that its retrenchment efforts to dismantle social citizenship rights were inspired by
the presumed faults of the alternative paradigm. The Keynesian notion of govemment
regulation and intervention Ied the new govemment to blame the country’s poor
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economic performance on an ideology they believed to be outdated, and overly sceptical
ofthe value ofthe market and the power ofprivate industry. It took time for the ideas and
arguments associated with this paradigm to work against the status quo, or more
appropriately, to sufficiently influence the institutional and behavioural legacies of the
past. This une of argument spoke directly to the change or variability in multiculturalism
brought on by its interaction within the political environment. It is at this point that we
believe our study revealed the strengths of the historical-institutionalist approach. While
at the policy level multiculturalism in the early 1 980s experienced only incremental
change, a sustained critique was being developed that would only later influence policy
making more profoundly and reshape the govemment’s orientation towards ethnocultural
diversity.
By the late 1 980s, and in spite of the federal government public commitment to
multiculturalism, we documented instances that had the effect of prompting a
qualification to the conventional view ofmulticulturalism as a policy on the rise. far
from a period of policy innovation, the stmggles within the Canadian political system
demonstrated how the choices of state actors were bound by institutional arrangements
that actively shaped their view of ethnocultural policy. More directly, we demonstrated
that the Mulroney government chose consciously to limit its freedom of action in several
policy endeavours. An examination ofthe debate surrounding the Employment Equity
Act exposed the degree to which the govemment was prepared to wilfiuly contain the
role of the federal state in dealings with the private sector. Although the legislation
demonstrated that the national government did have a role to play in promoting equity, it
was understood that the public interest would flot be accorded more weight in policy
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calculations than private interests. In effect it demonstrated that under Mulroney, the
Progressive Conservatives were prepared in certain policy reaims to transfer autonomy to
the market and thereby support the logic of a limited interventionist state. As for the
Meech Lake Accord, the constitutional bargain undertaken with Quebec challenged the
multicultural legacy enshrined by the Charter ofRights and Freedoms. This evidence
contributed to our view that the Canadian state was evidentiy willing to compromise its
commitment to ethnocultural diversity. On the one hand, the federal government was
prepared to recognise ethnocultural identities through new legislation in the
Multiculturalism Act that was designed to boister support for the policy. On the other
hand, we exposed how multiculturalism could only exist in a policy environment in
which the traditional two-nations concept was not sacrificed. This meant that initiatives
designed to recognise etbnocultural identities would neyer be accorded more weight in
federal policy calculations than initiatives designed to manage the ongoing, and by the
late 19$Os growing, constitutional crisis involving Quebec. It equally implied that when
multicultural rights were extended, such as in the new MuhiculturaÏism Act, they would
ofien be limited to symbolic recognition; for fear that they would be perceived as
working against the cause ofCanadian unity by inflaming other group interests. for that
reason, the message from Ottawa was that the cause of Canadian unity and the
requirement to reconcile national or linguistic cleavages would trump multicultural
recognition. Multiculturalism during this period was flot seen as undermining social
cohesion and a sense of cominunity; rather it was viewed as peripheral to federal efforts
to deal with amendments necessary to enable the govemment of Quebec to give its
willing assent to the Constitution. The story of the Meech Lake Accord from the
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perspective of multiculturalism is consequently about the degree to which the policy was
relegated to the background in debates about the redesign of the constitutional order.
In the early 1 990s, rnulticulturalism continued to be mediated by the broader
political context as new political parties and influential players joined the debate over the
course ofthe policy. Paramount among these was the pressure from the Reform Party to
end state support for rnulticulturalism. This argument was added to the powerful and
ongoing discourse about the fiscal deficit that would corne to form an important tool to
blunt Canadian social policy. for multiculturalism, this meant flot only would the cost of
the policy become the subject of scrutiny, but it engendered a more fundamental debate
on the very rationale for ethnocultural support. The door being opened, the long-standing
all-party commitment to multiculturalism was broken, with the policy increasingly cast in
some quarters as a threat to social cohesion and national unity.
The final historical juncture in our study demonstrated the utility of Peter Hall’s
approach to explaining the diffusion of ideas within the political system. As we
documented, three sources of ideas would ultirnately emerge to dispute the entrenched
policy rationale for multiculturalism: political parties, govemment commissions, and
intellectuals. Our study identified the introduction of ideas, with attention to the way
various actors ftamed multicultural issues and advanced policy arguments that were
linked to a set of beliefs associated with political and econornic models of developrnent.
At the party level, the Bloc Québécois added its voice to the longstanding debate on the
merits of multiculturalism by responding to a changing national unity environment and a
perceived failure ofthe policy. The party’s most significant contribution to the debate
over rnulticulturalisrn would be measured indirectly, contesting the design and
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implications ofthe federally conceived national unity projects ofthe 1990s. In this way
the Bloc Québécois argued that the federal govemment promoted a form of centralized
federalism that repudiated the distinct nature of Quebec. The net effect of this posture
was to discredït the notion of a pan-Canadian identity structured, in part, around
multicultural principles.
Also entering the debate over multiculturalism was the Reform Party who argued
against the management of ethnocultural diversity based on its critique of the liberal
pursuit of social justice and because it ran counter to the neo-liberal ideological variant of
economic freedom that professed fiscal conservatism. What was new about this
opposition to multiculturalism was the coupling of the fiscal critique with the argument
that the state should be neutral in maffers of cultural retention. As noted, the resuit was a
principled attack on the state management of ethnocultural relations that represented a
significant challenge to the elite consensus on the merits ofpluralism. Apart from any
electoral benefit the party hoped to gain with its stance, the enduring impact on the party
system would be the legitimization of a political discourse that downplayed pluralism. As
a consequence, and far from an outpouring of support in defence of multiculturalism,
other federal parties began to rethink their own attachment to the policy. Both the
Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals became increasingly sensitive to the public
perception that multiculturalism frustrated attempts at greater inter-ethnie toleration. In
particular, when opponents of multiculturalism weighed into the debate the federal
govemment was reluctant to offer a strong vindication of the policy. Tied up in the budget
reduction exercises and national unity projects ofthe decade, the Progressive
Conservatives and Liberals were generally unwilling to rally behind multiculturalism.
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With this passivity it became obvious that the activism ofthe 19$Os responsible for
creating a Multiculturalism Act and a separate department would flot be matched.
Towards the end of our final chapter we considered the adoption of ideas at the
level of the federal bureaucracy, analyzing the strategic choices made in linking ideas to
politics. Here we tracked the process ofrecasting multiculturalism policy as a reply to
political mobilization and a discourse highlighting ffie viability of ideas in the Canadian
political system. Within the institutions of the federal govemment, the search for answers
in the wake ofthe failure Meech Lake Accord that led to the Citizen’s forum on Canada’s
future, and ultimately the Charlottetown Accord, provided a wealth of ideas that helped
crystallize the concems of various social forces into coherent policy directions. As an
agent of change the Citizen’s forum fulfilled two important functions for state leaders:
legitimising a model of ethnocultural relations that lauded the private maintenance of
cultural diversity over public means, and by providing much anticipated strategic
direction, for a government about to ready itself for another round of constitutional
negotiations the Commission readïly provided a re-tooled version of multiculturalism that
could serve the cause of Canadian unity by dispelling fears that the policy weakened the
idea of a common nationality.
Public dissenters also weighed-in to the debate, and while challenged by
supporters ofthe policy, were able to contribute to the search by state officials for a new
policy direction to fend off charges that multiculturalism was divisive. Integral to this
pattem of advice was the beliefthat Canada stood at a crossroads; outdated images of
Canadian society and associated polices stood as obstacles to needed reform. A number of
themes were drawn together but rested ultimately on the assumption that multiculturalism
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was unsuccessful as an exercise in state sponsored social engineering. By the mid- 1 990s
the assumptions and prescriptions ofthe public dissenters alongside govemment inquiries
and constitutional failures served only to reinforce the perception that a policy review, at
the very least, was inevitable.
Also central to the course of policy in these years was the arrivai in power of a
new Liberal government in 1993. Committed to a politicai agenda similar to that of
Progressive Conservative, the Liberals restructured ffie delivery of social programs in a
wide range of areas. Multiculturalism policy during the Liberals first term was shaped by
the sensitivity of the govemment to the political atmosphere conditioned by the most
recent national unity crisis, and the attention to deficit and debt reduction that became the
primary focus of their new agenda. In the context of heightened criticism and mounting
fiscal restraint exercised by the Department of Finance it was not surprising that the
entire multiculturalism program would eventuaily be put to review. The resultant
Brighton Report fimctioned as an institutional mechanism for non-partisan experts to
reflect on the policy’s failures, and generate innovative ideas in support of change. With
an “authoritativ&’ response to the policy’s failings in hand the government in 1997
announced its redesigned multiculturalism program. Not unexpectedly the new poiicy
direction echoed the key recommendations of the Brighton Report. Among the issues
reflected in the new multiculturalism program was the careftuly worded attempt to avoid
initiatives that appeared to reinforce the perception that muiticulturalism weakened the
Canadian fabric. This was done primarily, but not solely, by adding to the goals of
cultural retention and respect for diversity the notion of active civic participation. In this
respect the contrast is sharp with the Multiculturalism Act. In accentuating the need for
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multicultural programs to perform an integrative fiinction, the redesigned
multiculturalism program made littie mention of the value attached to diversity for
Canadian society.
It remains to be seen whether the changes to multiculturalism will erode the
symbolic character of multiculturalism. Like other institutions designed to manage
diversity, this thesis began by focusing on the strong symbolic component of
multiculturalism that provides members of ethnocultural communities with a context for
understanding our society’s views on tolerance, justice, and identity. At the very least, by
implying that the recognition of different identities is fraught with danger, or that il is flot
the role ofgovemment to affect the distribution ofresources among individuals, a clear
message was sent to those seeking inclusion about the terms of their acceptance. The
message remains true today not simply because of the diffusion of neo-liberal ideas in the
Canadian political system. Beyond neo-liberalism, multiculturalism in Canada has been
shaped by the national unity debate wherein successive federal govemments have opted
to regard multiculturalism as a tbreat to national unity, rather than a way of shoring it up.
Shifts in the multicultural agenda were precipitated, in part, by a view ofproper state
society relations, but the perception of undermining national unity and the very definition
ofwhat it means to be Canadian remains foremost on the table. The election ofthe
Conservative govemment in January 2006 has so far suggested littie deviation from this
trend. With an enthusiasm for tax cuts and a focus on new policy prÏorities there appears
to be no interest in a reinvigorated multiculturalism policy.2 Indeed, neither the
2 Alongside the tax cuts announced early in the new govemments mandate was the decision in the fali of
2006 to reduce, or eliminate altogether, funding for policy branches within government or those outside
that received govemment money. The program cuts are detailed in Backgrounder — Effective Spending,
Treasury Board Secretariat (Ottawa: September 25, 2006).
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Conservative Party’s 2006 election piatform nor ffie most recent Speech from the Throne
made any reference to multiculturalism.3
One cautionary note here is the experience with the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. Multiculturalism as a concept for
understanding and promoting Canadian diversity had aiways been controversial, but
being forced to navigate between a heightened concem about national security and a
longstanding commitment to civil liberties may change the dynamics of the multicultural
debate in important ways. It is possible that protest voices, the loudest of which is on the
conservative right, wiil succeed in bringing an end to officiai multiculturaiism policy out
of fear that it deepens the divide between cultures. The policy environment shaped by
concem over national security that led to the passage in December 2001 of Canada’s anti
terrorism legislation, and tested most recently in the arrest of suspected terrorists in
Toronto in June 2006, has iikely only deepened the view of multiculmralism by these
same voices as a dangerous experiment that promotes group differences and divisions.4
At the same time, however, the struggie to define Canada’s stance towards diversity
amidst the tbreat of fundamentaiist terrorism might succeed in inspiring poiicy makers to
a reassess their assumptions about cultural difference and recognition practices. The
content of muiticuiturai policy would then be debated and defined as a much more
constructive route to increased social cohesion than has been the case in the past.
Sce Conservative Party of Canada, Stand Upfor Canada. Conservative Farty ofCanada federat Etection
P1aform 2006 (13 Januaiy, 2006); and Canada, House of Commons. Canada ‘s New Government — Speech
from the Throne: Turning a New Leaf 1St Session, 39dm Parliament (Ottawa: Service Canada, 2006).
The short titie ofthe legislation is the Anti-terrorism Act, otherwise known as Bu! C-36. On June 2, 2006,
police arrested about a dozen men in the Toronto area on terrorism-related charges. Canadian intelligence
sources allege the men were part of a terrorist celi which was close to carrying out attacks on one or more
Canadian targets.
APPENDIX 1
Announcement of Implementation of Policy of Multiculturalism
Within a Bilingual Framework’
Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, I am happy this morning
to be abie to reveal to the House that the govemment has accepted ail those
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism
which are contained in Volume IV of its reports directed to federal departments and
agencies. Hon. Members will recail that the subject of thïs volume is “the
contribution by other ethnic groups to the cuitural enrichment of Canada and the
measures that shouid be taken to safeguard that contribution.”
Volume IV examined the whole question ofcultural and ethnic pluralism in this
country and the status of our various cultures and languages, an area of study given
ail too Iittle attention in the past by scholars.
It was the view ofthe royal commission, shared by the government and, I am sure,
by all Canadians, that there cannot be one cuitural policy for Canadians ofBritish
and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for ah others. for
although there are two official languages, there is no officiai culture, nor does any
ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other
than Canadian, and ail shouid be treated fairly.
The royal commission was guided by the beiief that adherence to one’s ethnic group
is influenced flot 80 much by one’s origin or mother tongue as by one’s sense of
belonging to the group, and by what the commission cails the group’s “collective
will to exist.” The govemment shares this belief.
The individual’s freedom would be hampered if lie were locked for life within a
particular cultural compartment by the accident ofbirth or language. It is vital,
therefore, that every Canadian, wliatever lis ethnic origin, be given a chance to
‘Debates, 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, October 8, 1971, 8545-8548.
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learn at least one of the two languages in which his country conducts its officiai
business and its poiitics.
A poiicy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itseif to the
government as the most suitabie means of assuring the cultural freedom of
Canadians. Such a policy shouid help break down discriminatory attitudes and
cultural jealousies. National unity if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal
sense must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity; out of this
can grow respect for that of others and a wiilingness to share ideas, attitudes and
assumptions. A vigorous policy of muÏticulturalism wiil help create this initial
confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for ail.
The government will support and encourage the varïous cultures and ethnic groups
that give structure and vitality to our society. They will be encouraged to share their
cultural expression and values with other Canadians and so contribute to a richer
life for us ail.
In the past, substantial public support has been given largely to the arts and cultural
institutions of English-speaking Canada. More recently and largely with the help of
the royal commission’s earlier recommendations in Volumes I to III, there has been
a conscious effort on the governments part to correct any bias against the French
language and culture. In the iast few months the govemment has taken steps to
provide funds to support cultural educational centres for native people. The policy I
am announcing today accepts the contention of the other cultural communities that
they, too, are essential elements in Canada and deserve govemment assistance in
order to contribute to regional and national lïfe in ways that derive from their
heritage yet are distinctiveiy Canadian.
In impiementing a policy of multicuituralism within a bilingual framework, the
govemment will provide support in four ways.
First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist ail Canadian cultural
groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity
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to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the smail and
weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.
Second, the government will assïst members of ail cultural groups to overcome
cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.
Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among ail
Canadian culturai groups in the interest of national unity.
Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of
Canad&s officiai languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society.
Mr. Speaker, I stated at the outset that the government has accepted in principle ail
recommendations addressed to federal departments and agencies. We are aiso ready
and willing to work cooperatively with the provincial governments towards
implementing those recommendations that concern matters under provincial or
shared responsibiiity.
Some of the programmes endorsed or recommended by the Commission have been
administered for some time by various federal agencies. I might mention the
Citizenship Branch, the CRTC and its predecessor the BBG, the National Film
Board and the National Museum of Man. These programmes will be revised,
broadened and reactivated and they will receive the additional funds that may be
required.
Some of the recommendations that concern matters under provincial jurisdiction cali
for coordinated federal and provincial action. As a first step, I have written to the
First Ministers of the provinces informing them of the response of the federal
government and seeking their cooperation. Officiais will be asked to carry this
consultation further.
I wish to table details ofthe governments response to each ofthe several
recommendations.
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It should be noted that some ofthe programmes require pilot projects or further
short-term research before more extensive action can be taken. As soon as these
preliminary studies are available, further programmes wiil be announced and
initiated. Additional financial and personnel resources will 5e provided.
Responsibility for implementing these recommendations has been assigned to the
Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of $tate, the agency now
responsible for matters affecting the social integration of immigrants and the
cultural activities of ail ethnic groups. An Inter-Agency Committee of ail those
agencies involved will be established to co-ordinate the federal effort.
In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the view of the government that a policy of
multiculturalism within a bilingual framework is basically the conscious support of
individual freedom of choice. We are free to be ourselves. But this cannot be Ieft to
chance. It must be fostered and pursued actïvely. If freedom of choice is in danger
for some ethnic groups, it is in danger for ail. It is the policy ofthis government to
eliminate any such danger and to “safeguard” this freedom.
I am tabiing this document, Mr. Speaker, but it might be the desire of the buse to
have it appended to Hansard in view of its importance and iong-lasting effect.
Mr. Speaker: Is that agreed?
Some hon. Members. Agreed.
*****
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Appendix to Hansard, October 8, 1971
(Federa Response to Book IV Recommendations, Part A & B)2
PART A
Federat Response in Generat
The government accepts and endorses the recommendations and spirit of Book IV of
the Royal Commission on Biiinguaiism and Biculturalism. It believes the time is
overdue for the people of Canada to become more aware of the rich tradition of the
many cultures we have in Canada. Canada’s citizens corne from aimost every
country in the world, and bring with them every major world religion and language.
This cuiturai diversity endows ail Canadians with a great variety of human
experience. The government regards this as a heritage to treasure and believes that
Canada would be the poorer if we adopted assimilation programs forcing our
citizens to forsake and forget the cultures they have brought to us.
The federal government hopes that the provinces will also respond positively to
those recommendations which the commissioners addressed to them. The Prime
Minister has written to each of the provincial premiers outiining the policies and
programs which the Federal Government is initiating and asking for their co
operation. Some provinces have aiready taken the initiative and are responding to
the recommendations directed to them.
The govemment while responding positively to the commission’s recommendations,
wishes to go beyond them to the spirit ofthe Book IV to ensure that Canada’s
cultural diversity continues.
Cultural diversity throughout the world is being eroded by the impact of industrial
technology’, mass communications and urbanization. Many writers have discussed
this as the creation of a mass society -- in which mass produced culture and
entertainment and large impersonal institutions threaten to denature and
2Debates 28th Parliament, 3rd Session, October 8, 1971, pp.$58O-8581.
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depersonalize man. One of man’s basic needs is a sense ofbeîonging, and a good
deal ofcontemporary social unrest - in ah age groups - exists because this need bas
flot been met. Ethnie groups are certainly not the only way in which this need for
belonging can be met, but they have been an important one in Canadian society.
Ethnie phuralism can help us overcome or prevent the homogenization and
depersonalization of mass society. Vibrant ethnie groups can give Canadians of the
second, third, and subsequent generations a feeling that they are connected with
tradition and with human experience in various parts of the world and different
periods of time.
Two misconceptions often arise when cultural diversity is discussed.
ta) Cultural Identity and National Allegianee.
The sense of identity developed by each citizen as a unique individual is distinct
from his national allegiance. There is no reason to suppose that a citizen who
identifies himself with pride as a Chinese-Canadian, who is deeply involved in the
cultural activities ofthe Chinese community in Canada, wihI be less loyal or
concemed with Canadian matters than a citizen of $cottish origin who takes part in
a bagpipe band or highland dancing group. Cultural identity is flot the same thing as
allegiance to a country. Each of us is boni into a particular family with a distinct
heritage: that is, everyone -- French, English, Itahian and Slav included -- lias an
“ethnic” background. The more secure we feel in one particular social context, the
more we are free to explore our identity beyond it. Ethnie groups ofien provide
people with a sense of belonging whieh can make them better able to cope with the
rest of society than they would as isolated individuals. Ethnie loyalties need flot, and
usually do not, detract from wider loyalties to community and country.
Canadian identity will not be undermined by multiculturahism. Indeed, we believe
that cultural pluralism is the very essence ofCanadian identity. Every ethnie group
has the right to preserve and develop its own culture and values within the Canadian
context. To say we have two officiaI languages is flot to say we have two official
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cultures, and no particular culture is more “official’ than another. A poiicy of
multiculturalism must be a policy for ail Canadians.
(b) Language and Culture.
The distinction between language and culture has neyer been ciearly defined. The
very name of the royal commission whose recommendations we now seek to
implement tends to indicate that bilingualism and bicuituralism are indivisible. But,
biculturalism does flot properly describe our society; multiculturalism is more
accurate. The Officiai Languages Act designated two languages, English and
french, as the officiai languages of Canada for the purposes of ail the institutions of
the Parliament and government of Canada; no reference was made to cultures, and
this act does not impinge urn the role of ail languages as instruments ofthe various
Canadian cultures. Nor, on the other hand, should the recognition of the cultural
value of many ianguages weaken the position of Canada’s two officiai languages.
Their use by ail ofthe citizens of Canada will continue to be promoted and
encouraged.
PART B
Poticy Objectives in the Federat Sphere
The govemment is concerned with preserving human rights, deveioping Canadian
identity, strengthening citizenship participation, reinforcing Canadian unity and
encouraging cuiturai diversification within a bilinguai framework. These objectives
can best be served through a policy of muiticulturalism composed of four main
elements.
1 .The govemment of Canada wiil support ail of Canada’s cultures and will seek to
assist, resources permitting, the development of those cultural groups which have
demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop, a capacity to grow and
contribute to Canada, as weli as a ciear need for assistance.
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The special role of the government will be to support and encourage those cultures
and cultural groups which Canadians wish to preserve.
The stronger and more populous cultural groups generally have the resources to be
seif-supporting and general cultural activities tend to be supportive of them. The
two largest cultures, in areas where they exist in a minority situation, are already
supported under the aegis of the government’s officiai languages programs. New
programs are proposed to give support to minorÏty cultural groups in keeping with
their needs and particular situations.
However, the govemment cannot and should not take upon itself the responsibility
for the continued viability of ail ethnic groups. The objective of our policy is the
cultural survival and development of ethnic groups to the degree that a given group
exhibits a desire for this. Government aid to cultural groups must proceed on the
basis of aid to self-effort. And in our concern for the preservation of ethnic group
identity, we should flot forget that individuals in a democracy may choose flot to be
concerned about maintaining a strong sense of their ethnic identity.
2. The Govemment will assist members of ail cultural groups to overcome cultural
barriers to full participation in Canadian society.
The law can and will protect individuals from overt discrimination but there are
more subtie barriers to entry into our society. A sense of flot belonging, or a feeling
of inferiority, whatever its cause, cannot be legislated out of existence. Programs
outlined in this document have been designed to foster confidence in one’s
individual cultural identity and in one’s rightful place in Canadian life. Histories,
films and museum exhibits showing the great contributions of Canad&s various
cultural groups wiil heip achieve this objective. But, we must emphasize that every
Canadian must help eliminate discrimination. Every Canadian must help contribute
to the sense of national acceptance and belonging.
3.The Government wili promote creative encounters and interchange among ail
Canadian cultural groups in the ïnterest of national unity. As Canadians become
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more sensitive to their own ethnic identity and to the richness of our country, we
will become more involved with one another and develop a greater acceptance of
differences and a greater pride in our heritage. Cuitural and inteliectual creativity in
almost ail societies has been fostered by the interaction and creative relationship of
different ethnic groups within that society. Government aid to multiculturai centres,
to specific projects of ethnie groups, and to displays ofthe performing and visuai
arts as well as the programs already mentioned, will promote cultural exchange. The
Government lias made it very clear that it does flot plan on aiding individual groups
to cut themselves off from the rest of society. The programs are designed to
encourage cultural groups to share their heritage with ail other Canadians and with
other countries, and to make us ail aware of our cultural diversity.
4.The Govemment will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of
Canada’s officiai languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society.
The federal government, through the Manpower and Immigration Department and
the Citizenship Brandi ofthe Department ofthe Secretary ofState, already assists
the provinces in language training for aduits, but new arrivais in Canada require
additional help to adjust to Canadian life, and to participate fully in the economic
and social life of Canada.
APPENDIX 2
Canadian Multiculturalism Act
1. This Act may be cited as the Canadian Multiculturalism Act.1
Interpretation
2. In this Act, “federal institution” means any ofthe following institutions ofthe
Govemment of Canada:
(a) a department, board, commission or council, or other body or office,
established to perform a governmental function by or pursuant to an Act of
Parliament or by or under the authority ofthe Govemor in Council, and
(b) a departmental corporation or Crown corporation as defined in section 2 of the
Fïnancial Administration Act, but does flot inciude
(c) any institution ofthe Council or govemment ofthe Northwest Territories or
the Yukon Territory, or
(d) any Indian band, band council or other body estabiished to perform a
govemmental function in relation to an Indian band or other group of aboriginal
people;
“Minister” means such member ofthe Queen’s Privy Council for Canada as is designated
by the Governor in Council as the Minister for the purposes ofthis Act.
MuÏticulturalism Policy ofCanada
3. (1) It is hereby deciared to be the policy ofthe Govemment of Canada to
(a) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the
cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of
ail members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their culturai
heritage;
R.S., 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.) An Act for the presewation and enhancement ofmulticulturalism in Canada
[1988, c. 31, assented to 2Ist Juty, 1988].
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(b) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism is a
fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it
provides an invaluabie resource in the shaping ofCanad&s future;
(c) promote the full and equitable participation of individuals and communities of
ail origins in the continuing evolution and shaping of ail aspects of Canadian
society and assist them in the elimination of any barrier to that participation;
(d) recognize the existence of communities whose members share a common
origin and their histonc contribution to Canadian society, and enhance their
development;
(e) ensure that ail individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under
the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity;
(J) encourage and assist the social, cuiturai, economic and political institutions of
Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada’s multiculturai character;
(g) promote the understanding and creativity that arise from the interaction
between individuals and communities ofdifferent origins;
(h) foster the recognition and appreciation of the diverse cultures of Canadian
society and promote the reflection and the evoiving expressions ofthose cultures;
(j) preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French,
whule strengthening the status and use of the officiai languages of Canada; and
(j) advance multiculturalism throughout Canada in hannony with the national
commitment to the officiai languages of Canada.
(2) It is further declared to be the policy of the Govemment of Canada that ail federai
institutions shah
ta) ensure that Canadians of ail origins have an equal opportunity to obtain
employment and advancement in those institutions;
(b) promote poiicies, programs and practices that enhance the ability of
individuals and communities of ail origins to contnbute to the continuing
evolution of Canada;
(e) promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the understanding of
and respect for the diversity of the members of Canadian society;
(d) cohlect statistical data in order to enabie the development ofpoiicies, programs
and practices that are sensitive and responsive to the multicuiturai reality of
Canada;
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(e) make use, as appropriate, of the language skiils and cuitural understanding of
individuals of ail origins; and
Q) generally, carry on their activities in a manner that is sensitive and responsive
to the multiculturai reality of Canada.
Implementation ofthe MulticuÏturalisrn Folicy ofCanada
4. The Minister, in consultation with other ministers ofthe Crown, shall encourage and
promote a coordinated approach to the implementation of the multiculturalism policy of
Canada and may provide advice and assistance in the development and implementation of
programs and practices in support of the policy.
5. (1) The Minister shail take such measures as the Minister considers appropriate to
implement the multicuituraiism policy of Canada and, without limiting the generaiity of
the foregoing, may
(a) encourage and assist individuals, organizations and institutions to project the
multicultural reality of Canada in their actïvities in Canada and abroad;
(b) undertake and assist research relating to Canadian muÏticulturalism and foster
scholarship in the field;
(c) encourage and promote exchanges and cooperation among the diverse
communities of Canada;
(d) encourage and assist the business community, labour organizations, voluntary
and other private organizations, as well as public institutions, in ensuring full
participation in Canadian society, including the social and economic aspects, of
individuals of ail ongins and their communities, and in promoting respect and
appreciation for the multicultural reality of Canada;
(e) encourage the preservation, enhancement, sharing and evolving expression of
the multicultural heritage of Canada;
Q) facilitate the acquisition, retention and use of ail languages that contribute to
the multicultural heritage of Canada;
(g) assist ethno-cultural minority communities to conduct activities with a view to
overcoming any discriminatoiy barrier and, in particular, discrimination based on
race or national or ethnic origin;
(h) provide support to individuals, groups or organizatïons for the purpose of
preserving, enhancing and promoting multiculmralism in Canada; and
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(I) undertake such other projects or programs in respect ofmulticulturalism, flot
by law assigned to any other federal institution, as are designed promote the
multiculturalism policy of Canada.
(2) The Minister may enter into an agreement or arrangement with any province
respecting the implementation of the multiculturalism policy of Canada.
(3) The Minister may, with the approval of the Govemor in Council, enter into an
agreement or arrangement with the govemment of any foreign state in order to foster the
multicultural character of Canada.
6. (1) The ministers ofthe Crown, other than the Minister, shah, in the execution oftheir
respective mandates, take such measures as they consider appropriate to implement the
multiculturalism policy of Canada.
(2) A minister of the Crown, other than the Minister, may enter into an agreement or
arrangement with any province respecting the implementation of the multiculturahism
policy of Canada.
7. (1) The Minister may estabhish an advisory committee to advise and assist the Minister
on the implementation ofthis Act and any other matter relating to multiculturalism and,
in consultation with such organizations representing multicultural interests as the
Minister deems appropriate, may appoint the members and designate the chairman and
other officers ofthe committee.
(2) Each member of the advisory committee shah be paid such remuneration for the
member’s services as may be fixed by the Minister and is entitled to be paid the
reasonable travel and living expenses incurred by the member whule absent from the
member’s ordinary place ofresidence in connection with the work ofthe committee.
(3) The chairman ofthe advisory committee shah, within four months afier the end of
each fiscal year, submit to the Minister a report on the activities of the committee for that
year and on any other matter relating to the implementation of the multiculturalism policy
of Canada that the chairman considers appropriate.
General
8. The Minister shah cause to be laid before each House of Parhiament, flot later than the
fiflh sitting day ofthat House afier January 31 next following the end ofeach fiscal year,
a report on the operation of this Act for that fiscal year.
9. The operation ofthis Act and any report made pursuant to section 8 shah be reviewed
on a permanent basïs by such committee ofthe House, ofthe Senate or ofboth Houses of
Parhiament as may be designated or established for the purpose.
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